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For Filipe and Kahlil, 
who, hopefully, will never want for a sense of belonging, but will 
learn that; as Kant put it in his Critique of Pure Reason, "The critical 





This thesis is a multi-disciplinary inquiry into 
the nature and functioning of national identity. By 
interpreting a single text, The Critique of Political 
Reason, by the French philosopher and activist 
Regis Debray, a range of new analytical concepts 
are located and some standard concepts are recast 
in new terms. The religious nature of social 
identities, that is, the role of the sacred in society, 
is identified and explained. Some mainstream 
theories of ideology, religion, and nationalism are 
explored in an attempt to determine whether these 
tools of analysis are practicable and how these 
theoretical resources might be reworked in the light 
of Debray's analysis. As Debray shows, the 
national question is not a problem to be solved but 
a persisting dilemma to be engaged at the levels of 
both theory and practice. 
Following an introduction in Chapter One, 
Chapter Two deals with Debray's critique of 
ideology. This chapter considers the Marxist 
origins of the prevailing notion of ideology and 
shows how this notion is essentially misleading in 
that it turns ideology into a fetish and leads to a 
confusion between ideology as ideological 
discourse and ideology as the science of ideas. 
Chapter Three considers Debray's theory of the 
religiopolitical unconscious, which redefines 
ideology as symbolic efficacy and suggests that 
myth,· religion, and ideology are all manifestations 
of the patterns and processes of the sacred that 
originate in the collective unconscious. Unlike 
idealist or rationalist accounts of the unconscious, 
however, Debray's religiopolitical unconscious is 
given a material explanation in terms of 
determining factors of biology, territory, and 
psychology, particularly as these factors are 
evident in the social production of sacred space 
and time. As Debray argues, this social physics, or 
"logic of the sacred," predisposes social 
organisation towards orthodoxy and thereby 
towards political conservatism. 
Chapter Four considers the predominant 
modern form of the sacred, nationalism. Reviewing 
alternative theories of nationalism, this chapter 
critiques both primordialist and modernist 
approaches. Arguing that Debray combines 
elements of both, the chapter considers Debray's 
work in building an distinctive primordialist theory 
that sees social organisation as elite-led if not 
elite-driven. Ultimately, however, Debray's theory 
points towards a modern political economy of the 
sacred. 
In concluding this study, 
considers the manner in which 
Chapter Five 
this modern 
religion, nationalism, has manifested in South 
Africa, particularly during the transition to 
democracy and in the new democratic 
dispensation. The discourse of nationalism reveals 
the sacred in the formation and founding of the 
new nation. Debray's warnings about the 
conservative nature of social organisation and the 
tendency for all social transformations to 
degenerate are considered seriously. As this thesis 
concludes, however, political conservatism, 
dogmatic orthodoxy, and social entropy can be 
avoided in the South African nation-building project 
if the symbolic resources of the nation are located 
in a vibrant_, progressive, and democratic 
movement that favours the poor and disadvantaged 
mass of people and is less concerned with the 
symbolic aspects of the political that reinforce 
dogmatic orthodoxy than with democratic 
organisation in its engagement with the political 
economy of the sacred in South Africa. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The 
presented 
phenomenon of nationalism has 
social a problem to political and 
theorists ever since it was recognised as being a 
distinct form of social identity. While posing a 
general problem for critical social theory, the 
national question has presented a particular 
problem for Marxist theory and practice. Marxists 
who have adopted a critical perspective have 
generally been unhappy with Marx's own 
treatment of· nationalism; some have been 
dissatisfied with Marx's theory of ideology that 
underlies his analysis. Intense debate has raged. 
In addition to the theoretical problems 
concerning the phenomenon, nationalism has, in 
practical ways, bedeviled every socialist program 
and revolution since the time of the First 
International. 
This problem of nationalism, along with the 
related problems of ethnic, racial, and other 
identities, has still not been entirely 
satisfactorily dealt with at the level of theory, 
either within or outside of the Marxist tradition. 
One of the results of this failure to deal 
adequately with the problem of nationalism has 
been that political practice has often been 
uninformed with regard to the phenomenon. 
Related is a general problem concerning identity 
that is recognised as such in social theory which 
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also affects the political in general. Religious, 
sexual, age-related, and other identities, 
together with national identities, confront us with 
the general problem of the subject that is at the 
centre of modern theoretical discourse and 
political practice. 
The question of the subject in society is 
inextricably bound up with a number of other 
theoretical problems. Most obvious amongst 
these is the problem of ideology. This problem of 
explaining how it is that ideas can have effects, 
or the question of symbolic efficacy, is central to 
the notion of subjectivity. Any theory that explain 
a collective identity, such as nationalism, must 
deal with the problem of symbolic efficacy. The 
fact that individuals see themselves in a 
particular way, identify with other individuals, 
adopt certain perspectives, values, beliefs, and 
practices, is not adequately explained by simply 
asserting that these aspects of the subject are 
defined by identities. In history, the notion of the 
subject, both in the form of the individual and 
the collective, 1s either seen as central to 
understanding relations and activities, or is 
regarded as irrelevant and even as fictitious. 
The question of national identity, together with 
religious identity, is the most powerful example 
of this social and theoretical debate in 
contemporary society. Whether one subscribes to 
the notion of agency in the form of the subject or 
not, the fact of the matter is that in contemporary 
discourse, political events and processes the 
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world over are more often described 1n national 
terms than in any other terms. Politics is 
therefore inextricably linked to the nation and 
nationalism in practice. 
The transition from an authoritarian, racist, 
and segregationist political dispensation to that 
of a non-racial, and non-sexist democracy 
currently underway in South Africa presents a 
unique set of problems and opportunities for 
engaging both the more general difficulties of 
social identity and the particular problem of 
nationalism. The effects of approximately 50 
years of apartheid and another 300 of 
colonialism have created a unique situation in 
South Africa in which social identities play a 
specific and significant role in relation to the 
ways in which people work, play, eat, reproduce, 
drink, sleep, and even die. The problem of 
nationalism lies at the heart of the social, 
political, and economic transition underway in 
South Africa and may determine the success or 
failure of that process. The issue of identity also 
places the objective of the transition in 
perspective, since the very goal of a united, non-
racial, non-sexist democracy makes certain 
assumptions about identity. 
The debate about national identity and 
nationalism in South Africa has taken place in 
the context of the struggle for national liberation 
of the descendants of the indigenous inhabitants 
of the region and those people generally 
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oppressed and discriminated against in the 
colonial and subsequent apartheid experience. 
This struggle has been led primarily by the 
African National Congress and it's allies, the 
South African Communist Party and the Congress 
of South African Trade Unions, and was fought 
against the National Party government in the first 
instance. The National Party was originally 
formed as the vanguard of a political movement 
that was to represent the narrow economic, 
social, and political interests and aspirations of 
those inhabitants of the territory now called 
South Africa who considered themselves to be 
White Afrikaners. The main protagonists in this 
struggle have conducted this struggle and 
articulated their positions with certain implicit 
and explicit assumptions about identity. Of 
particular relevance is the fact that, for 
approximately the last 30 years, the ANC in 
particular has been guided on the national. 
question mainly by ideas that have their origins 
in the Marxist paradigm. International 
experiences and debates about nationalism in 
the context of colonialism and the anti-colonial 
struggle have also had a profound impact on the 
politics of South Africa. 
Regis Debray's Critique of Political Reason 
offers a significant proposal for approaching the 
problem of social identity in general and 
nationalism in particular (1983). Debray's 
reflections on how identities are formed and 
function enable a theoretical approach which can 
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help us, if not solve, then at least better 
understand the problem. His reflections also 
suggest an approach to the practical issues 
which the problem of nationalism presents for 
political activists. Debray's explanation of how 
ideologies mobilise historical subjects provides a 
framework for dealing with the problem of 
national identities and nationalism through 
understanding the religious nature of these 
identities and thereby redefining the relationship 
between religion and ideology. 
Debray's thesis, simply put, is that ideology 
is the consequence of the organising of the 
social collective. This process of organising 
necessitates the enclosure of certain people in a 
group and the exclusion of others from it. 
Through this enclosure and exclusion an "other" 
to the individual social subject is created and 
the subject is constituted as a conscious, social, 
and cultural actor. The other of a social group is 
not merely defined by identifying outsiders. More 
significantly for Debray, the other of any social 
group is constituted as the group itself. In the 
process of producing itself as other, a social 
group generates terms of conditions by which it 
can be recognised and venerated as sacred. The 
sacred in society is prescribed by what Debray 
describes as an archaic political unconscious 
that arises from the biological, psychological, 
and territorial conjuncture that is the social. 
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The title of the original French text, 
Critique de Ia Raison de Politique: le lnconscient 
R e I i g i e o u x ,' r a i s e s t h e i s s u e a s t o w h e t h e r t h i s 
unconscious is better understood as political or 
religious (1981 ). This issue will be considered in 
more detail below, but the view taken is that 
religion and politics are only distinguishable by 
their form and not by their essential content. For 
this reason, this unconscious is best understood 
as being a religiopolitical unconscious. Religion 
and ideology are explained as being expressions 
of this religiopolitical unconscious and are the 
sacred aspect of our existence that is articulated 
in discourse and enacted in practice. 
Nationalism, for Debray, is the most efficacious 
form of the ideologico-religious in contemporary 
society. The obvious historical precursor to 
nationalism and other contemporary forms of the 
ideologico-religious is religion, and the 
relationship between these forms of social 
identity is explained by understanding them to be 
different expressions of the religiopolitical 
unconscious. The dynamic relationship between 
biology, territory, and psychology that determines 
the form and character of social existence is 
central to Debray's explanation of symbolic 
efficacy. He describes the strategic nature of 
collective identities and the negotiation and 
contestation of these identities. 
Redefining the problem of ideology, which is 
usually regarded as essentially secular political 
beliefs, as being the problem of symbolic 
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efficacy, that is, how the symbolic in all its 
manifestations is able to effectively motivate 
subjects, Debray relocates the subject within the 
collective. He thereby describes the subject as 
constituted out of the relationship among three 
forces: human biology, that is the fact of the 
constant threat to life posed by any number of 
variables; human , psychology, which is 
determined primarily by the inevitability of death 
and the fear of our biological frailty; and the 
territorial nature of our social existence, which 
is essentially produced within demarcated spaces 
that necessarily hold beyond them dangers and 
threats. In Debray's view, the subject is both 
given identity and works to determine identity 
through a preconscious schema that is defined 
by the operation of the symbolic. Located 
primarily in language, the preconscious schema 
is also evident in what are commonly regarded as 
cultural aspects of social existence, the manner 
in which we walk, talk, eat, and so on. According 
to Debray, the preconscious schema determines 
how human beings experience agency, that is, 
the ability to act in the world. Subjectivity, 
agency, and identity, therefore, are all reworked 
by Debray and explained as being productions of 
the largely unconscious power of symbolic 
efficacy. 
In developing a new "social physics", 
Debray finds that social identity IS always 
determined by oppositional relations. 
Accordingly, identity is always fashioned as a 
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polarity. The most fundamental polarity in 
Debray's social physics is the opposition 
between sacred and profane. Because the power 
of symbols is derived from ritual acts of setting 
apart the sacred from the profane, Debray argues 
that a "logic of the sacred" is a constant feature 
of social existence. That social logic of the 
sacred allows two broad principles to be 
identified. First, the "law of incompleteness" 
suggests that every collective is based on what 
Debray calls a "founding absence" around which 
myths, rituals, and social formations revolve. 
Since the sacred identity of the collective is 
defined by its exclusion of the profane, social 
identity is actually constituted in terms of that 
which lies outside of its demarcations. 
Therefore, any collective identity is inherently 
incomplete. Second, the "law of incompleteness" 
suggests that the void around which society is 
constructed-its "founding absence"-is filled by 
myths and rituals that constantly ensure a return 
to sacred origins, reinforce sacred space, and 
assert claims on the legitimate ownership of the 
sacred symbols of the collective. In this regard, 
Debray identifies the role of the leader as the 
primary substitution in the formation of a 
collective. By standing in for the "founding 
absence" of the collective, the leader performs 
this crucial act of substitution. In all these 
respects, therefore, Debray proposes an analysis 
of political reason that is grounded in the 
unconscious, collective, and ultimately material 
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logic of the sacred. His method, which he has 
characterised as "religious materialism", reveal 
"the whole stratum of religiosity which I ies 
dormant, preserved, packed away, and 
concentrated beneath all our games and 
fireworks, that underworld of sedimented 
affective responses and confused values wherein 
we can always read the struggle of the quick to 
ward off death, forestall emptiness, and hold 
back the fleeting of time" (1986:159). 
Debray draws on a broad range of 
disciplines, including history, sociology, and 
anthropology, as well as political, religious, and 
cultural studies, to 
framework for dealing 
provide a theoretical 
with the problems of 
political theory and practice. Primarily, however, 
he mobilises two sets of theoretical resources; 
Marxist and Durkheimian. Debray brings these 
two analytical traditions, which are usually 
understood to be in tension, into creative 
conversation. Critically analysing Marx's 
contribution to theory, and a product of that 
theory in the form of what was once regarded as 
"really existing socialism", the socialist world 
system that was in place prior to reforms 
initiated by the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union, led by Mikhail Gorbachev in the USSR, 
Debray offers an interpretation of Marx's theory 
that is intended to be more consistent and more 
materialist than classical Marxism. Drawing on 
the work of Emile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss, and 
others, Oebray brings to the fore our essentially 
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religious existence, the structural nature of 
social existence, and the affective aspect of our 
humanity. Human insecurity, fragility, and 
mortality are considered to be as responsible for 
the forms of social relationships and practices 
that prevail as are such factors as socio-
economic class. Debray constructs a theory of 
the subject which accounts for some of the 
failures and successes of various attempts at 
revolutionary and counter-revolutionary activity. 
The Critique of Political Reasun has to be 
considered within the context which it was 
conceived and written, Debray's political 
activities and subsequent imprisonment in South 
America, the political and philosophical debates 
of the post-1968 period, and more specifically 
those debates in France. Debray is only one of a 
number of French philosophers who have 
attempted to reinterpret Marxism in the context 
of these particular debates and to claim that 
politics is basically religion in another key, but 
the experiences and perspectives he brings to 
these critical issues ensure that his 
contributions are unique and significant. The 
analysis of the origins and nature of collective 
identities that Debray puts forward explains a 
dynamic that makes any simplistic notion of 
social progress, revolution, or evolution seem 
naive. It is arguable that the .Critique of Political 
Reason calls into question the very notion of 
revolution. At the very least it explains the real 
limitations the social collective places upon the 
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attempts that are made to radically improve that 
existence. The constant contestation and 
negotiation that follows from the perpetual "state 
of war" that is created and maintained by the 
territorial nature of human social existence, as 
well as the dynamic of the social collective 
created by the simultaneous biological and 
psychological factors which construct the 
subject, makes that existence one that is 
governed by an oppositional relationship 
between what Debray calls the "rational-
technological" and "irrational-political" sides of 
humanity. It is this unchanging feature of our 
social existence that ensures the transhistorical 
nature of collective identities and provides the 
impetus for the apparent political fragmentation 
of society even as it is being economically and 
technologically totalised. 
Debray describes the Critique of Political 
Reason as an attempt to deal with a number of 
political and philosophical problems 
simultaneously. In the first instance it is an 
attempt to deal with the obvious gap that exists 
between stated political objectives and actual 
political practice. The Critique of Political 
Reason attempts to explain what Debray believes 
are laws that regulate this failure of humanity to 
perform up to the standard of the theory that he 
and others have constructed. This gap between 
theory and practice is a particular problem in 
relation to Marxism. Most of the attempts at 
revolutionary transformation guided by Marxist 
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theory have been perceived to either have failed 
or fallen short of the mark. 
In considering this problem it became 
apparent to Debray that his own Marxist 
theoretical framework did not adequately explain 
the phenomenon of nationalism because it failed 
to recognise the religious nature of society. The 
Critique of Political Reason is also therefore a 
personal reckoning with Marx and Marxism. In 
this regard it is both an attempt to deal with the 
perceived shortcomings of Marxist theory and 
also to provide a manifesto for revolutionary 
practice. That Debray had previously made the 
observation that Marxists could be idealists is 
recorded. In reply to critics of his Revolution 1n 
the Revolution, Debray remarked that "all of us, 
Marxists included, are more or less Platonists 
and . . three thousand years of theological 
idealism cannot be eradicated overnight from the 
human brain" (1969: 141 ). The Critique of 
Political Reason can therefore be located in 
Debray's own work as an attempt to grapple with 
this archaic survival. 
In approaching Marxist theory critically 
Debray finds the enduring phenomenon of the 
nation to be a convenient starting point 
(1977b:25; 1994:5). Even modern variations of 
Marxism, Debray alleges, are unable to explain 
w h a t g i v e s r i s e t o t h e p h e n o m en o n of n a t i o n a I i s m 
(1977b:25-41; 1983:25). They are also unable to 
adequately provide theoretical rigour in building 
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socialism itself. Debray asserts that when reality 
has not accorded with the forecasts of Marxists 
they have tended, as do most political theorists, 
to regard the world as wrong for not conforming 
with their theory, rather than the other way 
around. 
In approaching the issue of organised 
societies, Debray has identified his larger field 
of study as being that of mediation or mediology 
(1983:34; 1995:529). This field deals with the 
phenomenon of power and authority in society 
and how these are facilitated through symbolic 
efficacy. Debray has described the Critique of 
Political Reason as a study in "mediation per se 
in its ageless logical necessity" (1986:3-4). What 
the nation expresses, which was expressed in 
pre-capitalist society almost exclusively by 
religion, is seen as an enduring feature of 
society and a manifestation of what Debray 
describes as the transhistorical nature of 
identities (1977b:26). The expression of the 
sacred in symbolic terms not only suggests the 
need for a political economy of the symbols 
involved in this phenomenon, but of the sacred 
itself. Debray's contribution enables the 
beginnings of a framework for such a political 
economy of the sacred. 
The specific issues that Debray raises for 
South Africans are indeed challenging, given the 
current political conjuncture. Amongst these are 
firstly, the very problem of nationalism or the 
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national question. The issue of whether this can 
be dealt with in such a manner that the interests 
of all South Africans are simultaneously 
advanced, and in particular those previously 
disadvantaged by colonialism and apartheid, is 
pertinent at this point in our history. Related to 
this is the issue of what the character of a South 
African nationalism could and should be and who 
or what organisation should be the guardian and 
manager of the symbolic resources that must be 
the manifestation of the national entity. 
In the context of the Post Cold-War, 
unipolar world, the very notion of revolutionary 
transformation, not to mention the idea of a 
socialist project, has been called into question. 
Debray raises the issue for consideration in a 
far-reaching but practical manner that even 
supersedes this analysi.s by asking not only the 
question, is revolution possible, but more 
profoundly, is revolution revolutionary ? Debray's 
conclusions, while sobering, are not as 
pessimistic as they might at first appear. Whilst 
they require revolutionaries to reconsider much 
of what has been standard theory for decades, 
Debray's ideas are useful resource for 
developing a radical programme for the 
transformation of society. If there were ever any 
doubt as to whether Debray believes revolution 
is possible or not, his observations on the 
Zapatista movement in Mexico answer the 
question in a daunting but honest manner. He 
observed that the 1994 Zapatista rebellion in 
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Mexico, which has dragged on with little won in 
real terms, "was not a surrender", but "a return 
to the essential: resistance" (1996:137). 
15 
Chapter 2: Ideology 
Debray begins the Critique of Political 
Reason by confronting a particular notion of 
ideology. While he describes the notion of 
ideology that defines it as a recent historical 
intellectual phenomenon and as an analytical tool 
for understanding how and why subjects act in the 
manner they do, Debray holds that ideology is, at 
the same time, an obstacle to better knowledge of 
the political (61 ). Debray uses this impediment, 
which he argues fails to provide a material 
explanation of human action, as a means to set 
up his own theory of symbolic efficacy. By 
reformulating the problem of ideology as the 
problem of symbolic efficacy Debray revitalises 
the question of how ideas can have effects and 
move historical subjects to act in a particular 
fashion. 
The prevailing notion of ideology that 
describes the phenomenon as mental and 
imagined, as in some manner reflective of the 
material world, and as able to direct the beliefs 
and activities of subjects, seems to provide a 
relatively simple and convenient way of 
explaining the obvious role that ideas play in 
society. As Debray argues, however, this notion 
of ideology is actually "a vague idea that passes 
for a clear idea, an animist entity for a scientific 
concept, a speculative ersatz for a datum of 
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observation". This notion of ideology has been 
responsible for obscuring the "self-evident 
reality" of the role of ideas. While this particular 
notion of ideology may convince us that political 
ideas can result in social action, it actually 
serves to render the problem of symbolic efficacy 
"inexplicable" for at least two reasons. This 
notion of ideology functions as a fetish where 
our theory fails us and as censor and exorcist in 
ideological discourse. 
Debray's argument is that this prevailing 
notion of ideology performs a particular function 
in theoretical discourse by filling in the space 
that exists as a result of our lack of knowledge 
or understanding of the problem of symbolic 
efficacy. Debray is obviously prepared to accept 
that the concept of ideology can be found in the 
discourse. But this does not mean that it is an 
actual thing in itself, or even an accurate or 
helpful characterisation of an actual 
phenomenon. Ideology is, he argues, a 
"speculative theme". In other words, there are 
"concepts, definitions and theories of ideology", 
but all of this theoretical discourse does not 
entail the actual existence of ideology (62). 
Debray characterises the science of ideology as 
analogous· to the science of astrology in this 
respect by suggesting that both are fictions. 
Debray proposes that there are, on the one hand, 
"observable phenomena like phlegmona, fires, 
attraction, constellations in the sky and systems 
that interpret the historico-political world." On 
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the other hand however, there are pseudo-
scientific engagements with these realities that 
form "a set of rational apparatuses such as 
organic incitability, phlogiston, ether, astrology 
and ideology" (62). It is worth noting at this 
point that Debray is not anti-science, since the 
exemplar against which he is measuring all rival 
theories is that of science. On scientific 
grounds, therefore, Debray identifies ideology as 
a fiction. Nevertheless, ideology has been a 
potent fiction. 
Because the notion of ideology has two 
uses-ethical and scientific-there is a perpetual 
ambiguity about its status within theoretical 
discourse. This ambiguity gives rise to an 
inevitable and constant equivocation. Debray 
therefore argues that the notion of ideology 
needs to be "stripped of it's semantic values" to 
enable us to understand the problem of symbolic 
efficacy and pose a solution to it (67). To deal 
with this problem of semantic values, Debray 
proposes the rather obvious distinction between 
ideological discourse and discourse about 
ideology. 
Theory about ideology, or the science of 
ideology, usually attempts to find explanations 
for humanity's social conditions and situations. 
But such theoretical discourse is also ideological 
in itself, since it seeks to put across a particular 
point of view, and often suggests a political 
program to actualise that vision. Like religious 
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and juridical discourse, ideological discourse is 
"sacred" and in this respect cannot be 
challenged within a rational framework. It is 
Oebray's contention that the purveyors of various 
political points of view seek to blame our social 
ills on something and find a convenient guilty 
party in the notion of ideology. Identifying the 
cause of humanity's generally miserable 
condition enables these masters of the discourse 
to suggest an immediate solution to the problem. 
They propose an end to ideology and usually an 
acceptance of their own putatively superior, 
scientific, and objective ideas. 
Debray attempts to separate the use of the 
word ideology to describe "a system of 
signification that accompanies a historically 
given set of social practices" from the manner in 
which it is utilised to imply superiority in one's 
own ideas and some deficiency in those of others 
(64). He does thereby reinstate the use of the 
term ideology, but he is only prepared to do so to 
use it as a short title for the phenomenon he 
claims to be addressing, the observable fact of 
symbolic efficacy. 
According to Oebray, the notion of ideology 
he describes as prevalent in society presents a 
problem because with it we cannot explain "the 
relationship between belief and action" or, "how 
saying becomes doing". Despite its scientific 
pretensions, the "science" of ideology actually 
explains nothing, the science of ideology thus 
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describes its subject as playing a role within 
discourse similar to the Melanesian religious 
concept of mana, which is "a transmissible, 
efficacious fluid that the sorcerer alone can 
manipulate" (72). In other words, the power that 
ideas appear to have to mobilise subjects is seen 
to be generated by and transmitted through the 
mysterious force of ideology. 
Debray also observes that within the 
scientific study of ideas the study of the 
collective is doubly problematic because it deals 
not only with infinite variables but also with that 
which is most emotive for us as human beings, 
our collective psychology. The powers that be 
within any collective, the elite, also try to see to 
it that the study of the collective is tightly 
controlled to ensure that what is perceived to be 
the mystical power that they wield is not 
undermined. Ideological discourse performs the 
function of political censor within this context. A 
theory about the collective can transform the 
very nature of the group, thus demonstrating the 
decisive nature of the ideas that are considered 
to be ideological. 
If we are to study these efficacious ideas 
free of the inherent bias of any worldview and 
without prejudging the issue of symbolic efficacy, 
we must accept that all ideas that have social 
consequences must be considered on an equal 
basis. To "respect the autonomy of ideological 
production", we must consider the object of 
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study, ideology, and remove the objectives of the 
discourse (79). This means accepting a version 
of the philosophical position of relativism in 
relation to these ideas. But the ideas themselves 
are not to be considered in the abstract. The key 
issue for Debray is still to consider what it is 
that enables ideas to have effects. It is therefore 
necessary to consider ideas that are "organised, 
programmatic forces". These arise within society, 
religion being one of the most obvious forms and 
nationalism another. 
Ideology, the Fetish, and False Consciousness 
Debray's critique of the prevailing notion of 
ideology points to two problems that any theory 
of symbolic efficacy must confront. Firstly, 
ideology, as it is most commonly understood, is a 
vague notion and actually obscures the real 
nature of the problem of symbolic efficacy by 
suggesting that the relationship between thought 
and action is governed through mystical or 
m a g i c a I m e a n s . T h e r e a I ch a II e n g e i s t o f i n d a 
materialist explanation of symbolic efficacy. 
Ideology, as it has been described by Debray, is 
a fetish. It is seen to have power and interests 
all of its own. This has created the impression 
that symbolic efficacy can be removed from the 
context within which it operates, that is, the 
human social collective, and be studied on its 
own. This reified conception of ideology creates 
b o t h e p i s t e m o I o g i c a I a n d o n t o I o g i c a I p r o bl e m s 
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function within theoretical discourse that cannot 
be ignored. It is both an attempt to explain 
symbolic efficacy and at the same time an 
attempt to monopolise the discourse for political 
objectives. Ideology does this by acting as 
censor and exorcist. As a theoretical concept, 
ideology is therefore part of the process of the 
manufacture and manipulation of symbolic 
resources. This has to be recognised if 
purveyors of theory are to be explicit about their 
own objectives and to recognise the political 
nature of their theoretical activity. Ideology 1s 
manipulated as part of the apparent contest of 
ideas that characterises any society. 
Debray's questioning of the very notion of 
ideology is an important initiative in the broader 
collective project that seeks to develop both an 
understanding and substantial critique of 
ideology. In his useful introduction, Ideology, 
David Mclellan describes his subject as "the 
most elusive concept of in the whole of social 
science" (Mclellan, 1986:1 ). This view is one 
that con f i r m s Debra y '.s suspicions abo u t the 
notion of ideology. Despite this, there is no end 
to the number of academic works that simply 
accept ideology as a given. Without even 
offering an account of the concept, or the need 
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for a theory of ideology, these contributions 
proceed to discuss anything from the historical 
period within which ideology has supposedly 
existed to how ideology allegedly functions in 
society. It is this self-justified and reified 
conception of symbolic efficacy that Debray 
opposes. 
This notion of ideology is also problematic 
because it assumes that there was a time before 
ideology, when ideas operated significantly 
differently, for example, when ideas were less 
rational or scientific. It is also a short step from 
such a view to the notion that developments in 
the production and communication of symbolic 
resources can fundamentally transform the 
essential relationships between human beings. 
This view is one that Debray challenges. Central 
to Debray's explanation of symbolic efficacy is 
the notion that there are essential features of 
the symbolic which ensure that society can and 
does change at a superficial level, but that 
certain recurring features in relationships of 
power and authority remain constant despite 
these changes. 
Debray attempts to explain the force of the 
idea that historical subjects are driven by 
ideology. For example, Frederick Watkins, writing 
in a series of books that attempts to serve as a 
foundation for understanding political science, 
asks the question: "Why has it been the case 
that political ideologies ... gain so strong a 
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hold over the minds of men" (Watkins,1964:2)? 
Debray's description of the scope of symbolic 
efficacy answers this question by covering what 
he describes as "variations on a theme". This 
theme is the "power of words" (73). Watkins 
describes ideology as essentially optimistic, 
utopian in its objectives, and prone to 
oversimplification. This description would not be 
such a problem if Watkins regarded all socially 
efficacious ideas in the same way. Watkins 
presumably sees his own "non-ideological" ideas 
as sober, rational, and realistic. Such a view is 
clearly a problem, because the manner in which 
this judgment of other worldviews is effected is 
not explained. 
By way of contrast, Marxist theoretician, 
Franz Jakubowski, describes ideology as that 
element of the superstructure which is 
distinguished methodologically from the political 
and legal relations which together make up the 
"totality, which is the intellectual structure of 
society, as opposed to the material structure" 
(Jakubowski, 1990: 40). This view is far closer to 
that of Debray's, although he does not 
necessarily agree on the separation of the realm 
of the ideological from the rest of the world, it's 
definition as non-material, or with the 
economistic perspective of such a view. That 
there can be such opposing views on the matter, 
yet an apparent agreement on the existence of 
this thing that is described as ideology, means 
that the concept requires further interrogation. 
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There is a clear set of ideas that can be 
detected in Debray's consideration of ideology 
as a "theme on the power of words" that revolves 
around.the notion of false consciousness as the 
history of fears. Fetishism, animism, totemism, 
and mana are all theories and concepts that 
attempt to explain the religious belief and 
practices of others. As theories, they are all 
premised on the similar notion that the subjects 
holding the beliefs and engaged in the practices 
that are alleged to go along with holding these 
beliefs do so out of ignorance and fear, or simply 
social and intellectual under-development. 
Accordingly, these theories postulate a wide 
range of belief systems in pejorative terms. 
Animism is described as the inability to 
distinguish betweeh reality and dreaming. Mana 
is the inability to distinguis~ between expressive 
and instrumental acts. Totemism is a feature of 
the inability to demystify the collective. 
Fetishism is the inability to evaluate material 
objects, relations, and exchanges. Debray's 
interrogation of ideology produces an 
understanding of the notion as an e xp Ian at ion for 
the actions of historical subjects in the same 
category as these theories. The notion of 
i d e o I o g y m i g h t b e ch a r a c t e r i s e d a s p o i n t i n g t o 
the inability to distinguish between ideas and 
their social origins. 
The notion of false consciousness is central 
to Marx's critique of capitalism. In The German 
Ideology, Marx and Engels explain how 
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consciousness develops, first as awareness of 
the subject's physical environment, then as 
awareness of the power of that environment. 
With the division of mental and material labour, 
consciousness is able to develop the false notion 
that "it really represents something without 
representing something real" (Marx and Engels, 
1970: 51-52). This false consciousness, which 
has the effect of masking the real social and 
property relations, and the concomitant 
extraction of surplus value from workers, is a 
conception of the world that is not simply an 
incidental feature of capitalist society. It is part 
of a philosophy propagated and perpetuated by 
the ruling class (Marx and Engels, 1970: 64). 
False consciousness therefore 
system of exploitation by 
explanation of the world that 
prevailing social relationships, 









The form of false consciousness that 
prevails in capitalist society has particular 
characteristics. The division of labour in the 
production of commodities and the nature of the 
exchange of commodities, is really the exchange 
of use values, according to Marx. Since the 
exchange of commodities is seen as a 
relationship between things and this relationship 
is one mediated by money, those involved in the 
processes of production and exchange do not 
consider the social relationships that exist 
between the producers of these various 
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commodities that are exchanged. Commodities 
are therefore perceived to have inherent value 
and even power over one another. Not least of 
all, labour is treated as a commodity within 
capitalist relations, giving rise to the alienation 
that is a feature of capitalism. It is no wonder 
then that as Marx puts it, "this fetishism of the 
world of commodities" is one which dominates 
social existence in capitalist society (Marx, 
1976: 165). 
In an important series of essays on the 
fetish, William Pietz identified four themes that 
give meaning to the idea of the fetish: 
materiality, historicality, social relations, and the 
relationship of the fetish to the individual subject 
(Pietz, 1985: 1 5). Although it could be argued 
that the notion of ideology satisfies all of these 
conditions, it is to this last aspect of the fetish, 
as an "external controlling organ ·directed by 
powers outside the affected persons will", that 
Debray seems to be alluding in particular (Pietz, 
1987: 23). Ideology is described by Debray as 
being a concept that 
of determining not 
is attributed all the power 
only the actions and 
behaviour of individual subjects, but of entire 
collections of people such as religions and 
nations. The reality, however, is that people are 
moved by each other. They are organised and 
mobilised through ideas, but these ideas can 
only have their origins in individual or collective 
subjects. 
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This fetishised notion of ideology 
erroneously ascribes to the notion itself the 
power to determine our actions, but it is also a 
self-undermining notion. The notion of the fetish 
has been historically deconstructed and its 
genealogy as a concept explained. Pietz 
effectively demonstrates the social and political 
origins of the notion of the fetish.· Any fetishised 
notion can be subjected to the same type of 
critique and Debray's critique of ideology does 
just that. Just as the very notion of the fetish 
has to be located within the context of 
intercultural conflict over the meaning and value 
of materiality, id~ology has to be located within 
the context of the relationship of certain theories 
about society, and thus within particular 
relations of culture and power. (Pietz, 1985: 5). 
According to the value system of the sixteenth-
century capitalist traders who coined the term, 
"fetishists" overvalued certain "sacred" objects 
and undervalued trade goods. Any theory of 
symbolic efficacy cannot be separated from the 
economy, politics, gender relations, or any other 
soc i a I situation or reI at ions and i g no r.e the 
aspects of power and authority in society. 
Ideologists place essential value on certain 
theories about society without being able to 
scientifically determine the real value, truth, or 
falsity of these ideas. 
Pietz demonstrates that the term fetish was 
appropriated by social theorists "as a theoretical 
term" from the mercantilists who coined it. 
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(1987:23). What is of prime importance in 
understanding the notion of the fetish, however, 
is to recognise the unsympathetic gaze of the 
European traders and later colonialists who 
coined the term and the political objectives of 
the social theorists who sought to explain away 
observed African beliefs and practices as being 
inferior to European, Christian beliefs 
(1988:105). European colonial expansion into the 
"New World" was facilitated by the trading 
relations that arose between the European 
countries and the inhabitants of that "New 
World". 
Not only was this "New World" seen as 
bountiful and ripe for exploitation, but the 
economic relations which arose in the context of 
these encounters were essentially of a super-
exploitative nature. The rationalisation of these 
terms of engagement sought to justify the fact 
that trade was on such lucrative terms by 
describing the inhabitants of the new world as 
being without religion and therefore as inferior 
(Chidester, 1996: 12-13). They also sought to 
characterise the "New World's" inhabitants as 
primitive, lacking intelligence, morals, and even 
acceptable standards of hygiene. This 
Eurocentric, prejudiced, mercenary, and patently 
opportunistic gaze facilitated social, 
and political relations which were 
profitable. The fetish theory played 
justifying this super-exploitation. 
economic, 
extremely 
a role in 
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What Pietz also reveals is that the notion of 
the fetish was itself a fetishised notion. It 
attributed power where there was none and 
explained away human actions in simplistic and 
even idealistic terms. Not only were the beliefs, 
rituals, and practices of the inhabitants of Africa 
part of a rich and developed culture, but they 
included notions of the supernatural and 
relations between the natural and supernatural. 
It is only with the unmasking of the ideological 
nature of the study of these beliefs, rituals, and 
practices that the project of the colonialists has 
been more reasonably understood (Chidester, 
1996). 
Debray sees the notion of ideology 
functioning in an analogous manner to that of the 
fetish. Like the fetish, the notion of ideology 
obscures the real relations of power and 
authority that actually exist in society. Debray's 
project is to expose these. He therefore attempts 
to deal with the pitfalls that accompany the 
notion of ideology by explaining symbolic 
efficacy in materialist terms. What is of real 
relevance for a post-colonial critical theory is to 
determine what enabled the relations which 
fetish theory sought to justify. No doubt the 
racist, elitist, self-righteous views that were a 
central feature of Christianity, feudalism, 
colonialism, and mercantile capitalism are of 
relevance, but fetish theory, in general, 
overlooked these. Theories of ideology suffer 
from the same problem. They either do not locate 
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the matter of symbolic efficacy in the context of 
society, or when they do, offer only an 
instrumentalist explanation of the relationship 
between ideas and action. A critical theory, post-
ideology, must explain the political, economic, 
and social relations in a society, and in 
particular the functioning of power and authority, 
which are defining features of symbolic efficacy. 
Given the problem of ideology, 
includes its vagueness as a concept, 
which 
the 
plethora of definitions of ideology, and the 
contested nature of its application, and in view 
of the fetishised notion of ideology which creates 
further problems by mystifying the 1ssue of 
causality in relation to ideas and action, 
Debray's attempt to redefine the terms· of the 
debate in seeking an explanation for symbolic 
efficacy is an effort to construct a path through 
these problems. In explaining his alternative 
approach, Debray tackles the origins of the 
particular notion of ideology he has described, 
which he identifies as being located in classical 
Marxism. The origins of the problematic features 
of the notion of ideology, it's fetishism and it's 
censorship function, are also to be found in the 
Marxist theory of ideology. 
Marx, Subjectivity, Agency, and Determinism: 
Base and Superstructure 
Debray suggests what at first seems to be a 
radical relativism or an anarchic "anything goes" 
position in relation to symbolic efficacy, such as 
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has been held in relation to scientific theory by 
Paul Feyerabend, to deal with the problem of 
ideology as censor and exorcist (Feyerabend, 
1975). This relativism allows for the possibility 
of . rising above the ideological nature of 
ideological discourse and enabling us to treat 
each socially efficacious set of ideas or theories 
on its merits. Mclellan recognises what he calls 
the "pejorative connotation" attached to the word 
ideology (Mclellan, 1986:1). He suggests 
however, that this kind of relativism that 
demands that the ideological nature of all ideas 
be recognised, is devoid of any real meaning. 
There is a general problem of relativism 
which Debray does not confront directly which is 
arguably a serious weakness in his thesis. 
Debray does place all discourse about ideology 
on an equal footing. In this respect his method of 
analysis recalls features of post-modernism that 
have been criticised by, amongst others, Earnest 
Gellner. As Gellner argues, post-modern methods 
actually essentialise meaning by finding it 
everywhere and thereby relativise the actual 
locations of meaning and power in reality. 
(Gellner, 1992: 2 3). 
By way of an alternative, view Alex 
Callinicos has identified two strands of 
"textual ism" in poststructural theory, one 
originating with Jaques Derrida and the other 
with Michel Foucault. The former argues that 
there is nothing beyond the text, while the latter 
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allows for both that which is articulated in 
language and that which is beyond language 
(Callinicos 1989:68). The type of relativism 
Gellner is describing would obviously be a 
.f e a t u r e of t h e D e r r i d e a n " t e x t u a I i s m " , b u t i t 
need not be of the latter Foucauldian "power-
knowledge" theory. If a theory allows for a world 
beyond the text, then it must allow for the 
possibility of knowledge of this objective reality, 
even if such knowledge is actually unattainable 
in practice. Foucault attempted to construct a 
critique of "domination and power" and in doing 
this he studies "genealogies of power" (Poster, 
1984:8-9). Debray certainly can be located in the 
"Foucauldian genealogy" that Callinitos 
describes, since by his own argument, 
understanding society is about finding a material 
explanation for the phenomenon of symbolic 
efficacy and the functioning of the social 
collective. 
There are other Marxist theoreticians who 
share a similar approach to the one Debray 
advocates. Rossi-Landi suggests that "there is 
no human activity, whether it deals directly with 
ideology as an object of study or not, which is 
not potentially ideological" (Rossi-Landi, 
1982:6). Rossi-Landi then goes on to suggest at 
least eleven identifiable headings for classifying 
ideology. These include everything from 
mythology, to li~s, to worldview (1982:18). While 
h e o r d e r s t h e s e j, n a h i e r a r c h i c a I m a n n e r , R o s s i -
Landi does acknowledge the reality of all of 
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these modalities of ideology. The issue that 
arises from this approach is that none of these 
modalities can be dismissed without a deeper 
analysis of what symbolic efficacy is and how it 
functions. 
The issue of relativism is obviously a 
central one to the development of all theory and 
to the problem of knowledge in general. What is 
relevant in this regard is to understand that 
Debray can be read as proposing a kind of 
"weak" relativism which seeks to open up a 
dialogue among discourses. The objective of this 
strategy is to ensure that no social, political, or 
economic discourse may present itself in such a 
manner as to close off the debate about social 
experience. 
Adopting this stance does not mean 
accepting that in the end relativism rules and 
therefore holding that claims to knowledge are 
only contextually valid. In the cultural sense, 
claims to knowledge can be sympathetically 
understood by adopting a limited position of 
relativism. This could mean for example, 
accepting that the truth claims made in the name 
of myth, religion, or ideology all have elements 
of validity, particularly for those who are located 
in the cultural ambit of any one of these systems 
of symbolic efficacy. But all of these claims 
could be subject to a meta-theory of a scientific 
nature, for example. Such a relativism could also 
exist within the context of a structuralist type of 
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system such as that proposed by Levi-Strauss, 
where the unconscious mind is said to force 
certain categories upon the way in which we as 
subjects experience the world. These 
experiences may be articulated in different ways, 
therefore requiring a relativist position as a 
strategy of inquiry but requiring that the 
underlying forms and processes be somehow 
uncovered (Dant, 1991:1 03). 
The notion of symbolic 
alternative characterisation of 
efficacy as an 
the observable 
phenomenon of socially efficacious ideas is one 
that can also be found in the work of other 
Marxists, even if it is not explained in quite the 
same terms that Debray uses. Indeed, the entire 
effort of attempting to understand ideology 
hinges on the belief that human subjects are 
driven to engage in certain behaviour by the 
force of the ideas that they hold. This takes 
various forms and may include both the notion of 
the subject as possessing free will or as being 
the subject of deterministic outcomes. In both 
these cases, the role of ideas is central, even if 
different. In determinist theories ideas are the 
cause of actions, though they are themselves 
caused by other stimuli. In indeterminist theories 
subjects have ideas which they essentially have 
chosen to motivate themselves in a course of 
action (Honderich, 1993:3). The interrelated 
issue of the subject and agency is also one that 
Debray attempts to address. 
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The history of the concept of ideology, 
approximately two centuries long, is a relatively 
short one. Definitions of ideology tend to want to 
distinguish it from religion, mythology, and all 
so-called non-rational belief or thought 
(Mclellan, 1986:3). In the Marxist tradition, prior 
to Gramsci's intervention, there is a similar 
tendency. The notion of ideology has to be 
located within the rationalist project from which 
it arises. Debray's notion of symbolic efficacy 
undermines this tendency by suggesting that all 
ideas that have observable effects in the realm 
of the social need to be considered when looking 
for an explanation of symbolic efficacy. 
Debray argues that the root of the problem 
of the fetishised notion of ideology can be traced 
back to Marxist discourse in which ideology is 
seen as "false or wrong ideas, illusion, a lack, 
privation, failure and insufficiency" (93). 
Although the actual term ideology has it's origins 
in the writings of the Comte Destutt de Tracy, 
Marx changed the meaning of ideology from "the 
science of ideas" to the "ideas of anti-science" 
(85). It has been widely acknowledged that the 
Marxist theory of ideology has dominated the 
social sciences. The errors that Marx committed 
i n co n s t ru c t i n g h i s t h e o r y h a v e s u b s e q u e n t I y 
been carried over into the disciplines which 
consider the problem of ideology. Debray argues 
that in addition to this, the errors of the 
rationalist project of the Enlightenment also 
pervade modern political theory. Since Marxism 
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is also a product of the Enlightenment, the same 
weaknesses are to be found in Marxist theory 
that are general within the rationalist paradigm. 
Not least amongst these are the attempt to 
create a total theory of society, the overriding 
scientism that is central to rationalism, and the 
inherent imperialist nature of the discourse of 
rationalism. 
Marxist theory was constructed in the 
context of a contests of ideas. Marx and Engel's 
critique of Hegel saw them attempting to set up 
their own theories as "scientific", that is, to 
claim a particular status for their ideas over and 
above others. All that had come before, or stood 
in opposition, was to be considered "unscientific" 
or "ideological". In other words, Marxist theory 
operates, in this instance, precisely as "censor 
and exorcist" by declaring all other theory to be 
"false" and the cause of society's ills to be "false 
consciousness". 
According to Debray, the dichotomy between 
mental and physical reality which is central to 
Hegel's philosophy is carried over into Marxist 
theory. Whereas for Hegel the idea creates the 
world, for Marx the world creates the idea. The 
effect of this "turning on it's head" of Hegel's 
philosophy is that Marx's epistemology does not 
allow for consciousness to produce anything. In 
fact, consciousness is regarded as simply a poor, 
mirror image of the real. By wrestling with Hegel, 
Marx's theory of ideology bears traces of an 
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idealism. Because this theory does not allow for 
consciousness itself to be active, it makes a 
fetish of ideology. All that we think and do as 
subjects is seen to come from outside of us. 
According to De bray's interpretation of Marx's 
theory, it is therefore only when we are finally 
able to "see the world the way it really is" that 
we will be able to understand how the world 
needs to be remade (95). How this is possible is 
not easily explained, unless one accepts an 
evolutionary development of humanity's ability to 
understand its situation or a Platonic view of the 
acquisition of knowledge. In that case, arguing 
for change and revolutionary activity is self-
contradictory, since all change will happen in 
good time as the veil of ignorance we blindly 
suffer under is lifted through the inevitable 
progress towards a better world or by revelation 
and recognition of the ideal forms that underlie 
reality. 
The problem that Debray identifies is that 
Marxism does not allow for subjectivity despite 
arguing for recognition of the subject. According 
to Debray, there is no room in Marxism for the 
psychological subject, the thinking, feeling, 
deciding, scheming, lying, joking person. There 
is consequently no theoretical location of the 
mental creativity of human beings. The 
determinism by which Marx's theory of ideology 
is straight-jacketed removes the power of thought 
from thought itself and thereby from the subject. 
Those who think they are the power themselves 
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may be conscious, but the form of this 
consciousness, seen from the classical Marxist 
point of view, is false. 
Debray argues that this error within Marx's 
thought arises from "a fatal preclassification" of 
"forms and forces". This flaw in Marxism is a 
consequence of the historical period within which 
Marx wrote. Marx's ideas about society were 
premised upon the outdated framework of 
classical mechanics. Science has developed from 
these earlier explanatory models of classical 
mechanics to those of quantum physics, which 
has revealed shortcomings in the classical 
model, not least of all in relation to the notion of 
determinism. There has not been a similar 
universally accepted development of social 
theory in general or of Marxism in particular. 
Consequently, the problem of ideology that 
Marxism poses simply does not exist for us in the 
same sense that it did for Marx. Like all social 
theory, Marxism only presents us with a 
particular segment of social reality that is 
determined by a number of factors. One of these, 
as already noted, is the conceptual separation of 
physical activity and consciousness, which 
results in ideology being conceptually separated 
from social existence in academic and polemical 
discourse. This critical point begs the question, 
can there be a science about society, or can 
there only be doctrines about society? 
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The base/superstructure division in Marx's 
theory that underlies this view of the world 
results in the perception that all that goes on in 
the world is "real" and all our representations of 
this activity are "unreal". The effect of this 
separation, which runs throughout Marxist theory, 
and indeed the entire rationalist project, carries 
with it a "schizophrenia" that causes Marxism to 
give only secondary consideration to what are 
"primary structures of social vitality, that is 
"ethnic groups, nations, languages, religions" 
(104). In classical Marxism, these are all 
considered to be mental or social constructions 
of varying degrees of falsity. They are 
superstructural phenomena with no actual basis 
in the "real" material world, other than in the 
economic relations which are essential to 
society. In classical rationa1ist theories, these 
are ideas that operate in a spiritual or 
intellectual realm separate from the world. 
According to Debray, Marx's error in relation 
to understanding and explaining symbolic 
efficacy was to "spontaneously link religions with 
ideologies as mental representations rather than 
as organisational processes". Debray argues that 
as an alternative we need to recognise that 
thought does not "take place" within peoples 
heads and it is not "subjective determination". 
Thought actually has "the objective materiality of 
an organisational process" (109). What this 
means is that religious or political doctrines do 
not "form" groups by creating a situation where 
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p eo pIe c I in g to the (wrong) ide a that they are, 
for example, Christians or South Africans. 
Doctrines are actually part of, and arise from, 
the process. of the formation of the religious o.r 
political group. There can be no effective 
doctrine without the community which sustains 
and perpetuates it. Just as he was mistaken 
about ideology, Marx was wrong about religion. 
A I t h o u g h M a r x i s t t h e o r y w a s o s t e n s i b I y f o u n d e'd 
on the critique of religion, Debray argues that 
Marx did not go far enough. Marx never 
considered the organisation of religious 
institutions and consequently could not see 
where the force of ideas was actually located. 
Marx studied the canons of religion but not the 
church. 
Debray's challenge to the classical Marxist 
view of ideology raises some important matters 
for consideration. The, interpretation he gives of 
Marx's theory aside, his points about the manner 
in which thought and action are conceptualised 
are important ones. The weakness of Marx's 
mode I I i e s .j n its attempt at appro p ria tin g 
rationalist discourse and then failing to follow 
t h i s th r o u g h by r e v i s i n g i t s a s s u m p t i o n s , m o d e I s , 
and experiments with the developments in the 
scientific project that is the standard bearer of 
ration a I ism. Not on I y this, s. inc e there is a Is o no 
theory of the subject and of the imaginary in 
Marxism. The notion of consciousness as 
essentially a reflective activity is simplistic. The 
challenge that Debray has to· confront is to 
41 
primarily through struggle. Later Marxist-Leninist 
theory saw the ne·ed to actively foster working-
class consciousness, but none of this rules out 
the existence of the subject (Lenin, 1947a:41 ). 
The knowledge of the world, that is of 
reality, held by such subjects would of course be 
inferior knowledge in Marx's view. Marxism posits 
an objective truth and a social teleology in which 
subjectivity is located. This rationalist aspect of 
Marxism, which seeks to stake its claim as the 
advanced theory of the social by ensuring an 
efficient "method of procuring truth", is a matter 
that cannot be dealt with fully here. However, 
theory will only be regarded as efficacious to the 
extent that it is successful both in terms of its 
descriptive, explanatory, and predictive features, 
as well as its ability to shape the course of 
history. What determines the latter is as much a 
strategic matter as it is an epistemological 
question. The subject may be a problem for 
Marxism, but more fundamental is the fact that 
Debray identifies Marxism as having to grapple 
with the notion of agency. 
Jakubowski points out that ideology in 
Marxism is described as a consequence of the 
essential features of capitalism as defined by 
Marx. These are the division of labour, 
commodity production and exchange, wage 
labour, and the social relations and institutions 
that accompany these, such as private property, 
and the state (Jakubowski, 1990:97). It is 
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because the false consciousness that fails to 
express :reality in its totality is a feature of 
capitalist society that ideology is a "conscious 
expression of the objective appearance assumed 
by capitalist reality" (Jakubowski, 1990:1 03). 
Jakubowski understands Marx to mean that "the 
whole superstructure of human ideas is 
ideological, as long as these ideas maintain an 
apparent autonomy of the political and legal 
superstructure and of the economic base" 
(Jakubowski, 1990:104). 
Despite the fact that there seems to be a 
failure to differentiate between concepts such as 
culture and hegemony in such a definition of 
ideology, what this definition does do is 
reinforce Debray's own suggestion that we 
should concentrate on the observable fact of 
symbolic efficacy. Jakubowski's interpretation of 
Marxist theory contradicts the somewhat 
simplistic argument that the Marxist conception 
of ideology is one that simply counters opposing 
views with the "discourse of imputation". In 
Jakubowski's interpretation of Marxist theory, as 
is in Lenin's, there is room for both bourgeois as 
well as proletarian ideology, even if one is 
regarded as a form of false consciousness and 
the other as scientific knowledge or the truth. 
This interpretation of Marx does not however 
grapple with the other criticisms that Debray 
makes of Marx's original theory. 
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It has to be recognised that Marxists have 
been confronted with a number of weaknesses in 
Marx's theory that Jakubowski's description does 
not take into account. Various ideas have been 
shown to maintain an apparent autonomy from 
the "base". For example, the fact that capitalism 
seems to be "manageable" to the extent that, 
despite the regular cyclical crises of the system, 
or even perhaps because of them, sections of the 
working class can be co-opted to the side of 
capital, still needs to be adequately explained. 
There is no automatic logic of the base that the 
superstructure follows. Revolutionary practice 
has also revealed the fact that the relationship 
between the revolutionary party, the state, and 
the revolutionary constituency is not always 
managed to the benefit of the subjects 
concerned, working class or otherwise, or to 
maximise the potential of the revolution. The 
Soviet Union during the reign of Stalin springs to 
mind as an obvious example. 
In a substantial critique of Marxist political 
economy, Jean Baudrillard pointed out that not 
only is the Marxist analysis of the productive 
cycle and the relations of production inadequate, 
it is also prone towards the same weakness of all 
totalising and structuralist theories; they end up 
as studies of order and thereby fail to Unearth 
the processes of power and authority that 
characterise social existence in all its subtlety 
(Levin, 1981:1 0). 
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Debray's argument that Marx is guilty of 
idealism is one that cannot be easily dismissed. 
As a consequence of this problem the history of 
Marxist theory is littered with attempts to 
redefine Marx on ideology. Debray's lecturer at 
university, Louis Althusser, asserted that Marx 
has no materialist theory of ideology (Aithusser, 
1984:32). Althusser offered a reformulation of 
Marxist theory that defined ideology as 
"representing the imaginary relationship of 
individuals to their real conditions of existence", 
and described ideology as having "a material 
existence" (Aithusser, 1984:36-39). In addition, 
Althusser questioned what he describes as the 
"edifice" theoretical analysis of Marxism. He 
argued that by representing the structure of 
society in purely "spatial" terms, this metaphor is 
one that can only be regarded as being 
descriptive (Aithusser, 1984:1 0). In other words, 
it is of little value, for example, in explaining 
how society actually functions or the dynamic 
relationships between thought and action. 
The mere fact that Althusser embarked on 
the project of reformulating Marx gives a clear 
indication of the fact that he, like many other 
intellectuals in France at the time, was 
attempting to rescue Marxism from its perceived 
impending collapse, an event that according to 
many commentators 
(Ferry and Renault, 
has now actually occurred 
1990:xiv). The tradition of 
critically reinterpreting Marx, which has been 
described as "Western Marxism", is widely 
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recognised as a project that seeks to deal with 
the perceived shortcomings of Leninism and 
Social Democracy by supplementing Marxism with 
existentialism, language theory, psychoanalysis, 
and subject theory (Poster, 1984:1, 20, 28, 32, 
37). It has also been read as an attempt at "out-
Marxing Marx", thereby attempting to rescue 
Marxism from the criticisms of the 
deconstructionists, structuralists, and post-
structuralists by creating a nee-Marxism (Ferry 
and. Renaut, 1990:20). Debray can safely be 
located within this tradition. 
Of course, the critique of the deterministic 
and economistic base/superstructure 
representation· of society goes back further than 
Althusser. Gramsci not only criticised the 
interpretation of Marx that reads a mechanical 
relationship between the base and superstructure 
(Gramsci, 1988: 190). He also argued that the 
complexity of social existence and the simplistic 
nature of Marx's theory disguises the fact that 
the whole set of economic and social relations, 
together with the ideological expression of these, 
forms a "historical bloc", which is a the complex 
but more effective way of describing society 
(Gramsci, 1988:191 ). This view does in effect 
collapse the base/superstructure edifice and 
attempts to regard all aspects of society as 
being material. Roger Simon asserts that 
Gramsci defines ideology as being that which 
"organises" humanity. He quotes Gramsci as 
identifying the ideological as that which 
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establishes "the terrain on which men move, 
acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, 
etc." (Simon, 1982:58). In this sense, ideology 
has "material existence". Significantly, ideology 
is equated with religion in this respect. 
Later critics of Marx are referred to as 
having been disenchanted by the perceived 
reductionism of Marxism, that sees humanity as 
simply history, and that history is divisible into 
clearly identifiable stages with a teleological 
motor anchored in the economic relations of 
society that will ensure a communist future. Even 
Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason, to which 
Debray's Critique of Political Reason owes more 
than just it's title, must be read in the context of 
what Sartre called 
(Sartre, 1976: 19). 
preoccupied with 
"a crisis in 
only 
Marxist culture" 
was Sartre also Not 
the problematic relationship 
between theory and history, which for Marxism is 
acute because it defines all history prior to 
Marxism as essentially pre-historical, but 
Sartre's entire critique can be read as an attempt 
to define a path around the impasse for theory 
that is created by the determinism of the 
base/superstructure dichotomy (Sartre, 1976:23). 
In its more recent form in the work of 
Baudrillard, for example, this critique not only 
rejects the superstructure but all that goes with 
it, including the notions of false consciousness, 
alienation, and even the historical subject. 
(Levin, 1991:12). 
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It is clear that Marx's base/superstructure 
dichotomy is problematic. Debray's critique of 
the "edifice" representation has a pedigree that 
cannot be easily ignored. The fact that so much 
of Marxist theory has been taken up with trying 
to understand, redefine, or interpret this 
"topographical metaphor", as Althusser 
characterised the base/superstructure dichotomy, 
is reason enough to regard this metaphor and the 
theory that goes with it with some degree of 
caution. Debray's critique also reveals problems 
that follow from the dichotomy created by the 
edifice metaphor. This view reduces 
consciousness to being a representation of the 
real. This has the effect of removing the subject 
from the social equation and it necessarily forces 
acceptance of a strong determinism. Since the 
classical Marxist view recognises the economic 
relations in society as being of primary 
determinance, the possibility of other social 
relations being of significance does not fit easily 
with this view. 
Marx's theory of ideology is responsible for 
the creation of the problem of ideology, a 
convenient shorthand for the essential failure of 
the social sciences in constructing a sustainable, 
critical theory of the social. It has resulted in a 
fetishised notion of ideology in which the power 
of ideology is seen to come from everywhere but 
society itself. Marx's theory, while having the 
merits of clarifying the nature of capitalist 
- relations and the class character of society has 
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the inherent tendency to reduce all social 
phenomenon to class, or economics, and to 
explain the continued rule of the bourgeoisie 
through the medium of a false consciousness. 
Even if that is ultimately how society functions, 
meaning that even if the base/superstructure 
theory is an inadequate description of the actual 
relations prevailing in society, but that class or 
economic factors are the real determinants of 
history, at the level of what people are aware of 
in their social existence, of what motivates them, 
such an explanation is not necessarily helpful, 
since it does not adequately explain the beliefs 
and actions of subjects. 
Similarly, if consciousness is reduced to 
being essentially a poor reflection of the 
material, then such a description is limited. 
Consciousness is certainly the ability to reflect 
at a personal and collective level on the spatia-
temporal and logical nature of our existence, on 
the social, political, and economic relations in 
which we are engaged. But consciousness is also 
the ability to devise amendments and 
adjustments to the material world in which we 
function as subjects. In other words, 
consciousness is an interactive medium between 
a subject and an environment. It is a channel for 
agency. Not only can we manipulate our own 
consciousness through the exercise of our 
imagination, but such imaginings can be 
projected beyond our private existence. It is this 
aspect of consciousness that Marxism must 
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grapple with and explain if it is to offer an 
adequate account of symbolic efficacy and 
ultimately of society. It is also possible that 
there may be room for error in all worldviews, so 
that "false ideas" are not the preserve of one 
perspective but a common feature of knowledge 
about the world. If this is the case we may be 
close to the truth but never quite get there. 
While Debray's critique of Marxism and its 
notion of ideology is useful there are 
weaknesses in it. For one thing his reading of 
Marx is an unsympathetic one because it does 
not allow for the fact that within such a vast body 
of work various aspects of earlier theory were 
superseded by later developments. A critic could 
therefore find a quote to justify almost any 
argument from within Marx's collected works. But 
the main criticisms Debray makes of Marx in 
relation to ideology have a substantial tradition 
behind them. In addition, these comments are not 
made to simply reject Marx's theory, but are an 
attempt to apply this theory in a more rigorous 
fashion in a world that has changed substantially 
since the theory was first developed. 
Relativism 
In the course of Oebray's critique of Marx's 
theory of ideology a number of related issues 
come to the fore. Among these is the issue of 
relativism in theory. Debray seems, at first sight, 
to be guilty of accepting the kind of absolute 
relativism that have been .identified as a feature 
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of postmodernism (Gellner, 1992a:23) and 
poststructuralism (Callinicos, 1989:6). But 
Debray's attempt to accord all symbolic systems 
or worldviews equal status in relation to each 
other for the purposes of developing a theory of 
symbolic efficacy does not mean that he does not 
accept the possibility of objective knowledge or 
of the ultimate superiority of one of these 
worldviews. In fact, Debray argues for the 
supremacy of the scientific method. But he also 
believes that what we have called political 
science is a pale imitation of this method in 
relation to understanding society. 
Since his main objective is to understand 
the phenomenon of symbolic efficacy, Oebray 
presumably accepts that this knowledge can be 
used to promote a particular worldview. Although 
he seeks to test his theory by claiming no 
special status for it in relation to all other 
worldviews, Debray hopes that this Cartesian 
rigour will allow for the development of a theory 
that is free of any normative assumptions, 
whether conscious or unconscious. This view 
also allows for the somewhat Machiavellian 
notion that the truth in politics is what people 
believe. But the essence of Oebray's theory is to 
provide an explanation for political practice. This 
could be done even if the application of such a 
theory is by someone holding strong views 
themselves, providing these views are not able 
to unduly influence the outcome of such a critical 
exercise. 
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Debray's alternative characterisation of the 
problem of ideology as that of symbolic efficacy 
raises the related issues of subject and agency. 
It is worth noting that this problem is one that 
runs through the work of a number of influential 
French philosophers and political theorists. Luc 
Ferry and Alain Renaut have characterised 
French theory of the post Second World War 
period as being essentially a debate between 
humanism and anti-humanism (Ferry and Renaut, 
1990). The crisis of French theory was that both 
of these views had been accused of having 
resulted in totalitarian political projects, in the 
forms of Fascism and Stalinism. The dominant 
project of French intellectuals was thus one of 
attempting to find ways out of this cui de sac, 
primarily by "carrying out a radical critique of 
subjectivity" (Ferry and Renaut, 1990: 15) Like 
Debray, Ferry and Renaut identify the tension 
between the subject and history within Marx and 
Marxism as a "process without a subject". 
While Debray has to be read in the context 
of this discourse, he does himself acknowledge 
the failings of Marxism. He sees the phenomenon 
of the nation as the means to reclaim subjectivity 
and to explain its functioning. It is in Debray's 
characterisation of the social collective and the 
functioning of the symbolic that the subject and 
agency are explained. The basis for this 
explanation is the argument that De bray puts 
forward for the religiopolitical unconscious. But 
Debray's explanation of the phenomenon of 
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symbolic efficacy blurs many concepts that have 
been traditionally defined in a number of ways. 
Not least of these are the notions of culture and 
hegemony. Anthropologists Jean and John 
Comaroff have offered a concise definition of 
these concepts and their relations that is not 
incompatible with Debray's notion of symbolic 
efficacy. Their proposals warrant some 
consideration as possible means for constructing 
a working model of the relationships between 
I a n g u a g e , co n s c i o u s n e s s , p owe r, a nd a u t h o r i t y. 
Ideology, Hegemony, and Culture 
Building on Gramsci's description of the 
concepts of hegemony, ideology, and culture, the 
Comaroffs define these terms in a way which they 
claim can assist in understanding symbolic 
efficacy. They see culture as the totality of "the5 
shared repertoire of practices, symbols, and 
meanings from which hegemonic forms are cast -
and by extension resisted" (Comaroff and 
Comaroff, 1991:21 ). Hegemony, the Comaroffs 
point out, has been defined by many of those 
that interpret Gramsci as being the voluntary 
agreement given by society to the leadership of a 
particular elite. It is "that order of signs and 
practices, relations and distinctions, images and 
epistemologies-drawn from a historically 
situated cultural field-that come to be taken for 
granted as the natural and received shape of the 
world and everything that inhabits it" (Comaroff 
and Comaroff, 1991 :23). Much of what is left 
56 
unsaid, because it is given, is what is hegemonic 
in society. As Debray puts it, it is the way in 
which the subject eats, sleeps, drinks, walks, 
and talks. 
The Comaroffs see hegemony and ideology 
as being the manner in which power is located 
within culture. Ideology is the "worldview" of a 
particular group "that provides an organising 
scheme for collective symbolic production" 
(Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991 :24). They also see 
ideology as necessarily being located in the 
collective. Unlike cultural forms that have 
already become hegemonic, ideology is part of a 
not yet successful attempt to get control of the 
cultural sphere and through this effort to 
legitimise power. 
This perspective on ideology does seem, at 
first sight, to support Debray's argument. While 
ideology organises, it reflects that which is not 
yet necessarily taken for granted. An ideology, 
represented in a particular symbolic form, which 
has been accepted by society, becomes 
hegemonic. All of this takes place within the 
realm of culture. Most important in this 
description of the relationship between ideology, 
hegemony, and culture is the understanding that 
they exist within a dynamic relationship that is 
constantly shifting and changing. Nothing is 
static and the terms of culture are being 
constantly renegotiated. That which is 
ideological today can be hegemonic tomorrow, 
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and vice versa (Comaroff 
1991 :25). 
Even if the notion of the 
being voluntarily accepted is 
and Com a roff, 
hegemonic as 
not entirely 
satisfactory, and the relationship between their 
concepts of ideology and culture seems fairly 
mechanical, the schema of the Comaroffs is 
h e I p f u I b e c a u s e i t d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t we e n th e 
various states or modalities of the socially 
efficacious idea. In this description of the 
relationship between ideology, hegemony, and 
culture, we can begin to get a sense of how 
hegemony is about established ritual, practice, 
ceremony, and observance. Ideology is both the 
organisational process by which this social 
aspect becomes hegemonic, or orthodox, and the 
contest over the symbolic representation of that 
organisational process, in Debray's terms. Since 
most of social practice is about the organisation 
of subjects and the maintenance of hegemony, 
large amounts of society's activity are spent in 
the production, reproduction, contestation, and 
negotiation of symbolic resources. Understanding 
ideology, hegemony, and culture in this way 
allows for the recognition that there is much 
which is common in the discourse of power. This 
would account for the "constancy" that Debray 
describes as being a common feature of political 
practice (324). 
The interpellation of the subject, which is 
the incorporation of individuals and their 
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location in society, also fits in comfortably with 
the Comaroffs approach. According to the 
Comaroffs, subjects are not passive observers or 
unconscious of their positions. Just as in 
Debray's view, the subject has to be located in 
the realm of the collective, that is, within 
culture. But as an agent, the subject can also 
influence culture, can use it as a resource, and 
can play an ideological role. Lastly, the 
Comaroffs provide a framework that describes in 
some detail what is effectively Debray's 
"collective preconscious schematism". Their 
description of the relationship between ideology, 
hegemony, and culture provides a means of 
understanding the relationship between "power, 
consciousness and representation" at the level of 
discourse at least (Comaroff and Comaroff, 
1991 :25). 
The relationship between these three 
aspects of social existence can explain how the 
ways in which subjects negotiate their own 
position in the world is determined by relations 
of power, that is, hegemonic and ideological 
cultural practice, as well as the forms of 
representation these relationships take on. It is 
noticeable that the Comaroffs terminology does 
not necessarily coincide with Debray's. What 
they describe as hegemony Debray calls 
ideology, for example. But the manner in which 
these concepts are explained seems to indicate 
much symmetry between the two sets of views. 
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Although not explicitly stated in the 
Comaroffs description of how ideology, 
hegemony, and culture operate, the function of 
language is again of particular relevance. As has 
already been argued, the notion of a collective 
schema has implicit in it the idea of language, 
that is, of conscious symbolic or representational 
activity. The extent to which this activity can be 
preconscious needs to be interrogated further 
however. 
Power and Discourse: A Political Economy of 
Symbols 
The suggestion by the Comaroff's of a 
relationship between ideology, hegemony, and 
culture raises the issue of the relationship 
between power and discourse. Unlike the 
Comaroffs, Foucault sought to locate the power 
of words in what he described as the technology 
of the word. In Foucault's view, language is 
always accompanied by a set of practices of 
power that are aimed at a social group by other 
groups or individuals (Poster, 1984:9). The 
official discourse of any society or social group 
a c t s a s c e n s o r to ·a II o t h e r v e r s· i o n s of h i s t o r y. 
The justification of the official version even goes 
as far as inventing categories such as myth to 
describe the reality that is "cut out" of the 
official version of the past (Strenski, 1987:1). 
The same can be said of concepts such as 
animism, totemism, fetishism, 
consciousness, ideology, and 
mana, 
religion, 
fa I se 
which 
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operate strategically to elevate or reduce the 
relative position of those that adhere to certain 
views. The fact is that we must recognise that 
even what we describe as myth is "a social 
phenomenon . the product of the life of a 
people" (Strenski, 1987: 154) The important point 
becomes to define what is said, by whom, on 
behalf of whom, and for what reasons, within any 
of these systems of symbolic efficacy. 
It is arguable that just because something is 
no longer said doesn't mean that it wasn't once 
said. In fact Debray would support this view. He 
argues forcefully for locating the notion of 
ideology within a social movement and its ideas. 
Central to such a notion is the force of command 
or instruction. But what has become accepted 
cultural practice, that which is hegemonic, is 
always contested or is at the very least 
contestable. What is removed from the official 
version of the history is what is usually 
described as myth, in the sense of that which is 
not real or factual. Even so, all history has a 
mythical quality in that history is the remainder 
of a series of possible events and processes and 
how ·these were successfully or unsuccessfully 
manipulated. This category, like all those listed 
above, relates to the ordering of relations in 
society. They appear to operate at the level of 
theory. This involves the use of language. To 
speak is to be conscious. It therefore needs to 
be considered how the conscious use of 
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language can be reconciled with a notion of the 
preconscious or the unconscious. 
Debray's collective preconscious 
schematism explains how ideology supposedly 
functions when it becomes accepted, that is, 
when it is hegemonic. The origin of this 
hegemony I i e s in the success f u I m o b'i I is at ion of 
subjects, which requires the effective deployment 
of symbolic resources but also the ability to 
consolidate an application of symbolic resources 
"on the ground". This cultural practice has its 
basis in the actual activities of society. The 
reason for these practices is explained by the 
religious nature of social existence that is 
characterised by Debray as the logic of the 
sacred. 
The Comaroffs schema falls short of being a 
complete account of symbolic efficacy for the 
reason that it does not adequately describe the 
relationship between a particular application of 
symbolic resources and the acceptance of a 
particular application by subjects, as individuals 
·or as a collective. The explanation offered by the 
Comaroff's of how ideology and hegemony are 
facilitated through the cultural aspects of 
existence does not explain why certain ideas 
have the force of effect and others not. This view 
ends up being essentially idealist, because 
although the ideas at play in a particular cultural 
field may be at any one time hegemonic and 
always ideological, the relationship to these 
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ideas and the actual social existence of people 
is not explained. Neither is a satisfying account 
given for any one set of ideas being relevant, 
accepted, rejected, or contested. Such a view 
does not help us in the end, for while it offers a 
description of the operation of symbolic 
resources, it offers no explanation. 
Despite his vigorous critique of Marxism, 
Debray does not necessarily abandon some of 
the basic premises of the Marxist theory, such as 
those that relate to the division of society into 
classes, the exploitation of one class by another, 
and the possible resolution of this situation in a 
favourable manner for those exploited. What can 
be salvaged from Marxism after the critique that 
Debray makes depends on the extent to which 
these criticisms are as far reaching as Debray 
claims they are. In any case, some of Debray's 
comments suggest that his critique of Marxism 
entails accepting it as a flawed but nevertheless 
necessary theoretical framework for explaining 
society and for guiding revolutionary activity 
(1977b:25, 46). 
A s i g n if i c a n t res p on s e to p a rt of the c r it i q u e 
Debray makes has been given by Gregor 
Mclennan in identifying the "Four Sins" that 
Post-Marxist critical theorists have found in 
Marxism. These are usually given in a critique of 
the Marxist notion of ideology. Some of these, 
"essentialism", "universalism", and 
"functionalism", are not necessarily criticisms 
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Debray makes. But one of the criticisms he does 
make is dealt with by Mclennan. That is the 
charge of "reductionism" and specifically the 
argument against the historical relevance of 
Marxist theory and critique (1996:53-74). 
Even Debray's own constancy thesis would 
challenge the notion that society has changed 
that much that theories about it are only relevant 
for certain limited periods of time. Mclennan 
goes further to argue that such a critical view of 
the historical irrelevance of Marxism and the 
critique of reductionism are both incorrect 
historically and go against the general trend of 
seeking knowledge. He argues that society has 
not changed that fundamentally and that Post-
Marxist critiques do not recognise the fact that 
Marx was criticised for reducing social relations 
to class even in his own day. In other words the 
problems that Marxist theory have m~y well be 
real ones, but not for the reasons advanced by 
such a criticism. 
Mclennan also argues that reductionism, for 
example in relation to class as the key or major 
determinant in social relations, is a feature of all 
scientific explanatory endeavours. He proposes 
what he calls a "weak" reductionism that allows 
for other determinants, but places them in a 
hierarchical relationship in order of priority. In 
any case, it is difficult to see how Debray could 
sustain a charge of reductionism against Marxism 
when his own theory is essentially reductionist. 
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In Debray's view, all aspects of society are 
ultimately the result of, or are determined by the 
centrality of the sacred. 
Using Wittgensteinian philosophical 
arguments, Nigel Pleasants has suggested that 
the entire Marxist project is an exercise in 
persuading others of the validity of Marxist 
perspectives rather than being a scientific 
project. Giving up the alleged scientific status of 
Marxism for Pleasants is a necessary 
critical theorist must take (1996:408). 
therefore does well to argue for the 






This step enables Marxism to be seen as 
one perspective among many, but it also 
maintains the claim of the superiority of Marxism, 
not on the basis of science, but on the basis that 
it is an effective guide to constructing a better 
human existence. Marxism in this sense is a 
guide to action and a catalyst for transformation 
which is "proven" through its own success in 
effective organisation (Pleasants, 1996:412). In 
the process of organisation, the truth, or reality, 
is therefore socially constructed. This would 
seem to be a position Debray could comfortably 
accept. As Pleasants puts it, a revolutionary "can 
fight, hope and even believe without believing 
scientifically" (1996:414). 
Other commentators, however, have put up a 
spirited defense of classical Marxism. Alex 
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Callinicos has argued against the Post-Marxist 
critiques by first of all presenting a substantial 
case against the very notion of post-modernity 
and for the evolutionary, historicist, reductionist, 
and functionalist reading of Marx (Callinicos, 
1989). In fact, Callinicos even argues that there 
is no such thing as the post-industrial society 
and that Marxism still supplies the only viable 
explanation of society (1989:121). If Marxism is 
relevant even though it is not fundamentally 
correct in every respect, or basically true apart 
from a few aspects, then the issue that arises is 
whether Debray's reformulation adds anything to 
Marxism. It is also important to decide what 
relationship there will be between Marxist theory 
and the theoretical issues raised in Debray's 
reading of Durkheim. 
Debray's reformulation of the problem of 
ideology as that of the explanation of the 
phenomenon of symbolic efficacy offers the 
possibility of developing a political economy of 
the symbol. Jean Baudrillard proposed just this 
in his Critique of the Political Economy of the 
Sign. This exercise sought to deal with the 
perceived failure of Marxism to explain 
·adequately the nature of the commodity. Why 
Marxism failed in this respect in Baudrillard's 
view is because it moved away from the premise 
of determining of economic relationships by the 
calculation of use value. Bauldrillard argued that 
the basis of value is exchange. As a result the 
commodity became the central feature of 
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capitalism. Within capitalist relations of 
exchange, the commodity is essentially a sign 
and even the dominant form of signification. 
(Baudrillard, 1981 :23). But Baudrillard also 
proposed that the values of exchange were 
essentially determined by a political economy 
(Levin, 1981 :20). Since language is a system of 
signs and this system is obviously determined by 
the relations of capitalism, it has located within 
it a set of relations that determine power and 
authority. For Baudrillard, "all the repressive and 
reductive strategies of power systems are 
already present in the internal logic of the sign, 
as well as those of exchange value and political 
economy" (1981:163). 
Even if we do not accept this radical thesis 
of Baudrillard, and there are important criticism 
that have been made of his characterisation of 
what is described as late capitalism, his critique 
of Marx points to factors which Debray has also 
identified. The first is that power and authority 
are not purely economic phenomena. They may 
be located or deployed in the economy and for 
economic reasons, but they are also located 
within other social relationships, for example 
between the sexes, or between parents and 
children, or between leaders and followers. 
Significantly, such social exchanges operate in 
and through discourse and therefore locate 
power and authority in that medium. These 
relationships may even have originally been 
economic, and may continue to foster certain 
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economic relations, but they are no longer purely 
economic, and economics is not their most 
significant feature. 
Secondly, the dominant forms of power 
relations are to be found in the system of the 
signs that facilitate social relationships. The 
origin of these relations of power and authority 
need to be identified. A political economy of the 
s y m b o I i c , t h a t i s , - o f t h e p r o d u c t i o n ·, o w n e r s h i p , 
distribution, consumption, and management of 
signs, is therefore essential. De bray identifies 
these in the relationship between language, 
signs, and r it u a I, and between the signified, the 
sacred, and the social. Baudrillard, like the 
Comaroffs, can be accused of not grounding the 
critique of Marxism and capitalism in anything 
but appearances. Callinicos, for example, has 
pointed out that for Baudrillard, appearance is 
everything (1989:145). 
Accepting part of Baudrillard's argument 
however, does not mean giving up the notions of 
class, class struggle, revolutionary organisation, 
and mobilisation. But it certainly does mean 
recognising that the manner in which these 
activities take place must vary both over time 
and in specific cultural situations. Ideology is 
not an. entity with its own interests. Ideology is 
the name given to the observable fact of the 
power of symbols. But in whose interests these 
symbols operate is key to understanding the 
political economy of the sign. How we define a 
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group, class, elite, or any other collective helps 
to determine in whose interests symbols are 
deployed and manipulated. An argument can be 
constructed to show that, even though symbols 
are ultimately determined by the sacred, there 
are still class interests attached to symbols. The 
development of society from an agrarian to an 
industrialised stage has been described as 
having being the transfer of power form one type 
of ruling elite to another. In this process the 
form of articulation of the sacred and the 
attendant relations of power changed, but an 
elite remained (Gellner, 1983:1, 8, 24, 35). It is 
reasonable to argue that Debray's critique of 
ideology is not a critique of all the related claims 
of Marxism, but is more about correcting the 
perceived error that Marx makes in describing 
how symbolic efficacy functions and can be 
managed in the interests of a ruling elite. 
In his critique of ideology, Debray sets out 
to f i n d a p a t h a r o u n d t h e f e t i s h i s e d n o t i o n o f 
ideology by constructing a theory of symbolic 
efficacy. His critique of ideology is a substantial 
one that at the very least compels us to 
recognise the limitations of the mechanical, 
reductionist, or reified notion of ideology that 
has its origins in the Marxist critique of religion. 
In it's place, Debray argues for an understanding 
of ideology that rests on a materialist notion of 
symbolic efficacy. Such a theory seeks to ground 
the relationship between thought and action in 
the material world. Debray provides an account 
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of the functioning of symbolic efficacy by 
explaining the relationship between thought and 
action which is to be found in the organising of 
social existence. This organising takes place 
through the delimitation of space and time, and 
raises a number of other issues which any theory 
of symbolic efficacy must deal with, including the 
very idea of the historical subject or the abstract 
person, the issue of historical agency, the role of 
language and consciousness, and the 
relationship between such concepts as class and 
culture. All of these Debray seeks to deal with by 
exposing the religious nature of social existence. 
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Chapter 3: The Religiopolitical 
Unconscious 
Debray is of the view that due to the 
fetishised notion of ideology that has dominated 
theoretical discourse, and because of the role of 
ideology as censor and exorcist, the problem of 
the political condition of humanity persists. 
Debray describes this political condition as 
being society's inability to radically transform 
itself and improve the lot of the collective or 
even of most of its individual subjects. Debray 
argues that, despite the classical Marxist view of 
ideology, as the ideas of "anti-science" and the 
alternative that Marx attempted to create in the 
form of his philosophy of the working class, 
ideology has yet to disappear from the political 
scene. It has also yet to be explained 
adequately. By its own account, therefore, the 
Marxist project has not been successful. 
Following Althusser, Debray argues for the 
position that "the ideological imaginary is 
coextensive with the existence of social 
reI at ions" ( 11 7). Two consequences f o II ow from 
this. In the first instance, there can be no system 
of symbolic efficacy without social relations, that 
is, without the collective. But it also means that 
there can be no collective without a system of 
symbolic efficacy. Because the prevailing 
discourse tends to locate ideology as being 
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superstructural, that is as existing "in the 
discourse", "in the individual", or "in the head", 
it removes symbolic efficacy from it's necessary 
environment - the social collective. According to 
Debray, we must look at the functioning of the 
symbolic in the originating context of group 
formation. Our conception of the world, the 
images that appear to drive us, originate in what 
Debray calls the religiopolitical unconscious of 
the group (117-118). Given Debray's critique of 
the notion of ideology and his reformulation of 
this problematic as that of symbolic efficacy, the 
issue is not the existence of ideology in all 
societies. The issue becomes that of the fact of 
symbolic efficacy as a necessary and perpetual 
feature of social existence. 
It is not unreasonable to accept that there 
will always be worldviews. What then becomes 
relevant is where the terms and conditions of 
these worldviews originate, how they operate tn 
subjectivity, in the collective, and in the 
interests of certain segments of the collective. 
The extent to which the various modalities of 
worldview have been described, however, is also 
relevant. Where religion ends and ideology 
begins is essentially a matter of interpretation, 
just as where myth is distinguished from 
historical fact. Debray points out that the 
relationship between religion and politics cannot 
be crudely equated with the distinction between 
the sacred and the profane. Debray's approach 
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therefore challenges conventional definitions of 
religion and politics. 
Religion and Politics: A Unified Theory of 
Power 
Durkheim defined religion as that which 
mobilises subjects. It is a power that is able to 
move people in a particular social formation. For 
Durkheim "a religion is a unified system of 
beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, 
that is to say, things set apart and 
forbidden-beliefs and practices which unite into 
one single moral community ... all those who 
adhere to them" (Durkheim, 1976:47). · Deb ray 
takes this point and develops it further by 
extending Durkheim's definition of religion to 
include that which gives rise to all "socially 
efficacious ideas". This means that, for Debray, 
the category of political ideas that are able to 
generate an effect on society are, in Durkheimian 
terms, religious by definition. Political 
behaviour, like religious behaviour, is governed 
by "faith, belief and opinion" (120). Debray uses 
the term ideologico-religious to define these 
socially efficacious ideas. He thus extends 
Durkheim's definition of religion to all "unified 
systems of belief", but still has to explain how 
political practices relate to "sacred things". 
The physical evidence for the religious 
nature of politics is to be found in the rituals, 
ceremonies, practices, and observances that are 
part of civic life. Civil religion in the United 
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States, for example, has been an obvious case of 
the merger of religion and politics. (Chidester, 
1988:88-1 09). Debray believes, however, that 
the most religious of all societies were the very 
ones that pronounced themselves to be most 
"scientific", namely, those socialist societies 
which had been in existence since the Bolshevik 
Revolution (9). This view is supported by the 
Christel Lane in relation to political life in the 
USSR (1981 ). Although these societies provide a 
living laboratory for the political anthropologists 
and manifest extreme representations of 
religiosity, all societies are affected by a similar 
condition. The newly forming states that arise in 
the developing world are also testing grounds for 
theories of the political (14). These are 
important not because they are "primitive", 
Debray insists, but because they present an 
opportunity to ensure that "ethnology and 
history" can be utilised to study "political reality" 
( 1 5). 
The extent to which worldviews necessarily 
develop distinctions among religion, politics, and 
war is called in to question by the fact that a 
case can be made for a "unified theory of power" 
(Chidester, 1988:8). Debray's assertion that 
ideology performs the same role as religion did 
in the past seems self-evident (34-35). A useful 
case study of the ideologico-religious is provided 
by the Classical Greek scholar George Thomson, 
in his Aeschylus and Athens: A study 1n the 
social origins of drama. Thomson describes the 
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development of ancient Greek society from its 
tribal origins to the city state. In this process, 
the development of religious belief is of central 
importance. From the totemic origins of the early 
tribes to even the relatively sophisticated 
aristocracy, Thomson indicates the unity of 
worldview and the absence of the secular-
religious dichotomy (Thomson, 1941 :68). Indeed, 
according to Thomson, this dichotomy only came 
much later with the development of a ruling class 
that found itself in a crisis it could no longer 
manage. Therefore, the observation of an 
increasing secularisation is not limited to 
contemporary society. 
Ethnographers have generally recognised 
the common features of religion in so-called 
primitive societies. There is no real distinction 
between religious and secular life in most pre-
capitalist societies. The gods are intimately 
involved in the daily lives of all. Worldview is 
determined by a unified conception of existence 
and the laws governing it. The natural and 
supernatural are not distinguished in the manner 
in which they are in modern societies. 
In any event, the idea that religion per se 
represents a separate and distinct social 
phenomenon emerged out of a particular history. 
Some scholars have argued for a radical 
deconstruction of the notion of religion that 
Western European discourse in particular has 
bequeathed us. Jonathan Z. Smith argues that 
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religion is a creation of academia (1982:xi). 
Distinguishing between monothetic and polythetic 
forms of classification, Smith points out that the 
former initially dominated the study of religion 
(1982:5). The development of the academic study 
of religion has been a tortured one where 
comparisons were made and particularly so in the 
context of the colonial encounter. Despite the 
claim now that religion is to be found in all 
societies, during the colonial encounter the most 
common form of engagement with people was to 
deny them any religion (Smith, 1989:37; 
Chidester, 1996:11). The challenge Debray 
makes to the category of religion, and by virtue 
of this critique to other related categories in the 
social 'sciences, is a credible one that is part of 
an ongoing debate in the discipline of the 
academic study of religion, as a recent 
contribution from Timothy Fitzgerald 
demonstrates (1996:215-236). By breaking down 
what he regards as an artificial division in the 
social sciences Debray is able to present an 
alternative in the form of a radical analysis of 
the collective. 
Debray points out that when an ideology is 
functioning, that is when the symbolic is 
effective, it is a part of what does not need to be 
said. It informs the habits and manners of its 
subjects. The "link" that exists between the 
thought and action of subjects is explained by 
Debray as being "a collective preconscious 
schematism" (125). The "schema" is an imaginary 
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conception of actual activity. It gives subjects 
knowledge about the world and how they should 
act in it. In other words, the process of 
socialisation determines patterns of belief and 
practice that are not immediately apparent to the 
conscious subject, but which determine the 
character of this belief and practice. 
Religion and ideology, as usually defined, 
are the same to the extent that they focus the 
members of the group in terms of their actions 
within a particular community. What the subject 
says, does, eats, and so on, is prescribed and 
proscribed by the ideologico-religious and an 
identity is created in this way. It is the "official 
we" that is not present in the consciousness of 
the group at all times. It may be called upon, or 
rallied for a purpose, but it is preconscious in 
that it is implicitly present in an entire range of 
social activity (125-126). In these terms, Debray 
finds that religion and ideology are modalities of 
the symbolic that focus action. 
In the process of defining the community, a 
·"them" is also necessarily created in opposition 
to the implicit "us". Social identity and polarity 
are two sides of the same coin. This fact creates 
the "polemical nature" of political life. The 
collective, by definition, occupies the terrain of a 
bipolar oppositional existence characterised by 
the basic dichotomies: "good/bad, clean/dirty, 
sacred/profane, inside/outside". This dichotomy 
creates a logic of "affectivity, efficacity and 
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community" that prescribes the nature of social 
existence (128). 
What passes for "ideology", and arguably 
for "religion" as well, is actually a dry attempt at 
rationalising and justifying our feelings, emotion, 
belief, and faith that arise out of a social 
movement. Debray argues that political life is by 
its very nature an emotive issue. We are driven 
by what is "right" in politics and against what is 
"wrong". But the actual justification for these 
beliefs is provided after the fact. When we come 
to have a worldview we do so through emotions 
and patterns of socialisation which link us to the 
world in which we find ourselves. The system of 
social forces within which we are located must 
also include the psychological motivations of the 
subject if we are to describe the totality that is 
the world. This of course means that the problem 
of relativism arises again in a different form for 
Debray. If our beliefs are so determined, how will 
anyone change their beliefs? How can someone 
be convinced of the "correctness" of any other 
worldview? The answer to this question lies not 
s i m p I y i n t h e c o n t e s ta t i o n o f w o r I d v i e w s , t h a t i s , 
in the relationship between what the Comaroffs 
describe as "ideology, hegemony, and culture", 
but also in the processes of organisation that are 
the basis of these symbolic contests. 
The Affective and the Religiopolitical 
Unconscious 
78 
Although Debray admits that he cannot offer 
a theory of emotion, he insists that the affective 
must be central to any discussion of ideology. He 
argues that emotion is at the centre of all belief, 
whether rational or irrational. Challenging even 
the dichotomy between belief and knowledge in 
relation to political ideas, or the distinction 
between myth and fact, Debray argues that the 
way ideology 1s experienced by subjects 
demolishes the divide between the "pleasure and 
reality principles" (132). Ideologies operate on 
myths and dreams. The reductionist rationalist 
project that is characterised as Western political 
thought does not consider the affective as a 
subject of inquiry. Indeed, in the study of politics 
a distinction is even drawn between the public 
and private lives of political actors, even though 
every subject is necessarily both private and 
public. Debray challenges the dichotomy between 
affective and intellectual existence that is 
perpetuated through the animal/human, 
physical/mental distinctions that operate 1n the 
rationalist perspective. In this attention to the 
emotional dimension, Debray deve.lops 
theoretical trends found in Satre's outline for a 
theory of the affective in practical reason and 
Roland Barthes attention to the affective 
character of myth. However, he insists on 
grounding thought, feeling, and myth in social 
organisation. 
The ideologico-religious and the social 
collective-"ideas" and "groups"-are different 
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aspects of the same phenomenon according to 
Debray (140). The one cannot exist without the 
other. Individuals are constituted in and by the 
social collective through the "ideal we" that the 
group projects. Individual subjects are mobilised 
through the process of enclosure into the group 
by the members of that group. We are only able 
to construct a world for ourselves in our group 
activities, not as individuals, through the 
ideologico-religious that mobilises us. As Debray 
puts it, "first comes belonging, then belief" 
(143). 
What Debray calls the "imperative to 
belong" suggests that our collective means of 
expression requires us to give up our 
individuality. The human condition in society is 
such that the political subject can only be 
constituted through the other, the group. In this 
way an idea becomes real, an objective fact, 
when any group is constituted as an organised 
force. But for this to happen the relationship 
between the subject and the group must be 
mediated, and this occurs, according to Debray 
when the group, the other, is personified in the 
form of a leader. 
Because of the organic nature of group 
formation, Debray argues, Althusser's 
mechanical metaphors for explaining ideology, 
which have the merit of having done away with 
the distinction between imaginary and real 
relations that Marx created, must be misplaced. 
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He argues that what takes place is better 
described by a biological metaphor, even if we 
must accept the fact that any metaphor will suffer 
from some degree of inaccuracy. The social 
collective is likened to an organism, in that it is 
self perpetuating and must sustain itself against 
terminal decay by re-organising itself constantly. 
There is a founding moment for any 
organised group, and the subsequent 
"transmission" of the idea through organisation 
from that point on (154). The objective of the 
g r o u p , I i k e a n y or g an i c e n t i t y, i s s i m p I y i t s own 
existence. In other words, the group is an end in 
itself, unlike any mechanical entity which has 
been constructed for a purpose. According to 
Debray, the survival and reproduction of a group 
is a natural phenomenon. We thus cannot 
determine in advance whether an idea will 
become a force or cease to be one. Because the 
characteristics of the group are that of the living 
system driven by "self-preservation, self-
regulation, and self-reproduction", the fact that a 
particular set of ideas becomes the organising 
principle of any group is an organic process of 
birth and survival in the face of death (160). But 
there must be some criteria that determine which 
ideas will be successful. Presumably the ideas 
that work are those that effectively mobilise 
people and enable them to achieve the core of 
their objectives. Certainly, this would vary 
historically and geographically, but if we accept 
the organic metaphor then certain "natural" 
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constants could be observed in social production 
and reproduction. 
The result of this organic nature of social 
collectives is that any theory of symbolic efficacy 
must explain the process of incorporation. It 
must recognise that political behaviour is not 
predictable or subject to direction, since the 
collective, the agent of political existence, is an 
autonomous, spontaneous, and organic entity. It 
must explain how groups act on, in, and through 
the political subject. The fact that the collective 
is orgc;~nic and has characteristics of its own has 
profound consequences for the study of society 
and for political practice. In addition, the group 
can only be engaged for transformation by the 
very subjects that it has constituted, except for 
violent engagement from outside of that group. 
The subject can only experience the collective 
from the inside. To be part of the group is to be 
engaged in its activities, its rituals and 
practices, its ceremonies and observances. 
Therefore, the religious nature of "organic" 
social formations is apparent. 
As noted, Debray argues that symbolic 
efficacy and the collective are coextensive. The 
one cannot exist without the other; they are 
different aspects of the same thing. All 
worldviews are the same in their origin and the 
manner in which they function. This explains the 
falsity of the distinction usually made between 
religion and ideology. Ideology .and culture are 
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also to be considered as being coextensive. The 
explanation of a collective preconscious 
schematism that Debray puts forward is an 
explanation of how the subject is given the 
means to view the world and act in it. 
The founding of the collective, the marking 
out in space and time of a group, ensures that 
social existence, by its very nature, is territorial. 
This fact, and that of the opposition between 
what is inscribed inside and outside, gives the 
bipolar character of that existence and the 
contested nature of social existence. Social 
existence is therefore "affective", according to 
Debray's account of it. To mobilise the subject, 
the collective must be able to rouse the 
emotions. The psychological subject is thus 
mobilised by the collective, but it is created by 
the insecurity of human existence and by the 
certainty of death. In this situation it is given 
certain characteristics which are commonly 
regarded as human nature. When constituted in a 
group, subjects are subordinated to collectives 
imperatives. Like any organism, the collective 
organism will succeed in perpetuating itself to 
the extent that it is able to prevent that which is 
outside from contaminating it. This conjuncture 
of biological, territorial, and psychological 
imperatives is central to Debray's explanation of 
symbolic efficacy. 
As we have seen, Debray argues that there 
can never be a society without the phenomenon 
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of symbolic efficacy, and therefore without the 
manufacture and manipulation of 
resources. Certainly, this argument 
symbolic 
recalls 
Althusser who argued that, to the extent that 
there will always be subjects, and these exist 
because society interpellates them, ideology is 
eternal (Aithusser, 1984:49). Since there can be 
no society without subjects, it fo:llows that in 
Debray's theory all societies will feature the 
ideologico-religious. This has profound 
consequences. Not the least of these is that the 
notion of a society without division and 
difference, and therefore conflict and 
competition, is not one that can be easily 
sustained. But it is conceivable that we could 
accept the thesis of symbolic efficacy that 
Debray proposes without accepting the argument 
that religion and politics are the same thing. 
Definitions of either of these phenomenon are 
bound to be contested. Religious people and 
theologians in particular tend to want to preserve 
their area of claimed expertise from the profane 
political arena. Political theorists are apt to want 
to distinguish their field as rational and 
scientific, as opposed to the mystical or 
superstitious realm of faith. 
But Debray's argument is based on a 
particular notion of religion that has a lot to 
offer. If we accept that there is an aspect of 
human existence and activity that is distinct and 
even of a superior nature, such as religion is 
often said to be, then that is a philosophical 
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position which has to be defended. Durkheim's 
definition of religion challenges such a view by 
making religion an aspect of the social. It does 
set it apart, and even elevates it by describing 
society as God. But it does not mystify the notion 
of religion. To argue for some special status for 
religion would be to accept religion on its own 
terms. In other words, religion can "express the 
nature of sacred things" (Durkheim, 1965:56), 
but that does not make religion an aspect of 
social existence which cannot be studied or even 
compared with other social activities. It also 
does not mean that it is the only medium through 
which the sacred is experienced. 
This view is one supported by a number of 
scholars. Comparative religion is said to be an 
attempt to be neutral with respect to religion in 
all its forms (Paden, 1988:36). This necessitates 
the study of all belief systems on an equal 
footing. Not only does this mean not accepting 
the a priori view that some people have religion 
and others don't, but it also means that whatever 
is regarded as sacred to a community can be 
treated as being the central point around which 
that society is organised. 
Marcel Mauss argued that we cannot 
abstract religion, politics, and economics, but 
must view these in their totality as a "complex, 
concrete reality" (Mauss, 1969:viii). He has 
further argued that there are religious aspects to 
economic activity, where ritual, myth, and 
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ceremony are as important to exchange, if not 
the very reason for certain exchanges taking 
place (Mauss, 1969:70). Durkheim even proposed 
that the very notion of economic value can only 
be properly understood in religious terms. It is 
therefore not extraordinary to seek to construct a 
similar argument for the political realm, as 
Debray does. This presents the possibility of 
providing an explanation of the political economy 
of the sacred. 
Arising from the observation of social 
beliefs and practices related to the fetish, or to 
the "cargo" in cargo movements, or to sacred 
property, that is, religious artifacts and 
commodities, it is possible to begin to construct 
a description and definition of the sacred that 
lies at the base of all social existence, as 
Durkheim suggested (Worsley, 1968; Geary, 
1986:169-191 ). These examples graphically 
illustrate the life of objects and their role in the 
beliefs and practices of people. But a political 
economy of the sacred goes beyond simply 
explaining the religious nature of social 
existence or the role of a commodity. It seeks to 
explain the functioning of society in terms of the 
sacred. A political economy of the sacred would 
attempt to explain the manner in which 
production, distribution, and exchange, the as 
well as the nature of power and authority, were 
alf a function of the sacred. 
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Debray's definition of the religiopolitical is 
therefore a broad one. He basically argues that 
any aspect of social existence is religiopolitical 
if it involves a collective. This is not necessarily 
counter-intuitive, since we simply need to rid 
ourselves of the notion of formal politics that 
dominates our existence through the 
monopolising of the terms of political activity and 
powerful communication media. Most feminists, 
socialists, environmentalists, and even 
anarchists would all go along with the notion that 
the political is everything that goes on inside 
and outside of the individual subject. The notion 
that politics and religion are identical is 
certainly not an obvious fact, but it has been 
argued that there is a definite similarity by many 
scholars, as well as no distinction by some. The 
argument dor interdependence and a unified 
theory of social belief has its origins in 
Durkheim's sociology and runs through the 
related discipline of anthropology (Chidester, 
1988:3; Wilentz, 1985:1-10). 
In contemporary Western capitalist society 
the religious and the political seem to fall into 
two different spheres, the private and the public. 
Notwithstanding the problematic nature of this 
distinction, it is a view of secularism that 
prevails. There are however many religious 
societies, where the distinction between politics 
and religion is not only done away with but also 
those where such a distinction is regarded as 
evil. Jurgensmeyer has described the religious 
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nature of some nationalisms, the anti-imperialist 
nature of some religions, and the relatively 
recent origins of secular politics in the 
eighteenth century, which is linked to 
industrialisation and the globalisation of capital 
(1993:1, 4, 15, 17, 26-27). 
There are other scholars who have argued 
that religion, politics, and war are simply a 
modern division of labour. Marx and Engels 
argued that priests were the first ideologues 
(1970:51). As already been noted, in ancient 
Greek society no real distinctions were made 
between religious belief, and political practice, 
including the use of organised physical violence, 
in the sense that all were legitimate aspects of 
human existence bound up with clans and tribal 
groupings (Thomson, 1942:59). Even if we grant 
Debray the collapsing of the distinction between 
religion and politics, it is not the case that the 
phenomenon he describes of ideas that move 
people and in which they believe, necessarily 
arise from any unconscious. The issue of how the 
sacred is defined has also to be adequately 
ex p I a i ned if we are to a c c e pt the not i on of the 
religiopolitical. If, as Debray argues, religion, 
politics, and war are just variations on a theme 
of collective organisation, we need to offer a 
coherent account of how these appear to have 
become separated from one another. 
The description Debray gives of the 
relationship between the group and the individual 
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offers a unique explanation for the subject and 
the phenomenon of agency. Idealists are usually 
at a loss to explain how it is that an idea, a 
"non-material" entity, can cause a person to act, 
and even be able to get other people to act. The 
explanations for this process usually invoke 
some utilitarian argument, some version of 
rational-choice theory, or rely on the notion of 
methodological individualism (Callinicos, 1987:4, 
9-11). 
Biology, Psychology, and Territory 
We have already observed that to get 
around this problem some philosophers have 
literally done away with the subject. This 
position of anti-humanism has both Marxist and 
non-Marxist adherents. Debray argues forcefully 
against such a position. Locating the subject in 
the collective, he makes a strong case for the 
retention of the subject and by explaining the 
subject's terri t o.r i a I or i en tat i on , the psych o I o g i c a I 
basis of the subject, and the biological 
imperatives. 
In the first instance, it is logical to accept 
that there are basic biological drives that 
humans have, including the need to eat, drink, 
rest, and so on. That we must perform certain 
actions to maintain ourselves physically is 
obvious and has been noted before (Marx and 
Engels, 1970:42). What Debray argues is that on 
top of these physical imperatives, humans are 
driven by certain psychological factors, primarily 
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by fear of death. The Freudian notion that there 
a r e b a s i c h u m an n e e d s t h a t d r i v e u s h a s m a n y 
adherents. The entire Freudian movement and 
subsequent Lacanian school of psychoanalysis is 
testimony to the resonance of this view. The fear 
of death would seem to be a logical consequence 
of self-consciousness. Such a psychological 
predisposition towards survival, however futile in 
the ultimate sense, would have the consequence 
that humans constantly seek the security of 
physical comfort. But this essential imperative 
explains much more. The collective gives rise to 
an existence which is both a haven and a threat 
for the subject. Within the collective there is 
security, but there can also be danger, simply by 
force of numbers, for example. The Sartrean 
notion of the Terror of the collective is similar to 
Debray's description of the character of 
collective existence (Sartre, 1976:15, 18). There 
is also an ambiguous character to the 
relationship between the individual and the 
collective, since the subject must surrender 
individuality in certain respects, as well as 
tribute and taxes, which are inevitably forms of 
coercion. 
Language and the Collective 
An account of the relationship between 
these aspects of human existence would be 
incomplete if we were to ignore the role of 
language, which arises once more in relation to 
the social. It is language which in any case 
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facilitates expression for the subject. It is 
arguable that without language humans would 
display only a herd mentality. It is possible that 
animals that have no language are self-
conscious. The quality of that conscious 
experience, 
significantly 
however, must at least 
different than our own. For 
be 
one 
thing it would be a private world that animals 
experience. Language, whether in the spoken or 
written form, and certainly in the vastly expanded 
forms of communication in contemporary society, 
is treated literally as a world all of its own. As 
language becomes more complex, sophisticated 
and takes on different modalities, it gets a life of 
its own. The example of cyberspace illustrates 
this. This system operates by creating a virtual 
world which represents or mimics the real world. 
But this world has no existence outside of the 
wires, plastic, programs, and other features of 
the technology. What facilitates all of this and 
why this system exists, is for the purpose of 
communication. None of that is conceivable 
without language. 
The subject may be driven by physical 
needs to carry out certain actions, may be 
psychologically motivated by fears and anxieties, 
and may even be constrained to act in certain 
ways by the collective. But it is language which 
gives the subject the means of distinguishing 
itself from the rest of the world, including from 
the collective. It is also language that can 
provide conscious recognition of the biological 
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and psychological needs of the subject. 
Language is the essence of consciousness, since 
to even be aware of ones e If is a ref I e c t i v e 










debate between the adherents of the view that 
individuals make history on the one hand, and 
those that subscribe to the idea that structure or 
history makes individuals, on the other. One of 
his conclusions is that the structure and agency 
cannot be separated (1987: 6-7). This seems to 
support the argument that Debray is making 
about the collective and the individual. Even if 
this is true, however, the relationship between 
the individual and the collective can only be 
e f f e c t i v e I Y. u n d e r s t o o d i f w e c o n s i d e r t h e p I a c e o f 
language. For any theory of symbolic efficacy, 
this is an important consideration. The symbolic 
is by definition a semiotic modality. But symbolic 
efficac·y must explain not only how ideas have 
effects, but where ideas come from and must also 
adequately deal with how these ideas are 
communicated and what the responses are to 
them. 
According to Pierre Guirard, communication 
has been described as having six functions, 
"referential . emotive . connotative 
aesthetic phatic and 
metalingusitic". In Guirard's view, a sign is 
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something that provokes a response and is 
defined by the quality of being the bearer of a 
message. A sign therefore has meaning 
(1971 :22). It is through convention, however, 
that a signifier and signified develop an 
apparently stable relationship and meaningful 
language is produced (1971:24). Guirard also 
observes that collective communication, within a 
group is r it u a I is tic. He ex pI a ins t h.a t "the r it u a I 
message is emitted both by and in the name of 
the community" and that in the case of ritual "the 
sender is the group" (1971:93). Debray's 
collective preconscious schema cannot be 
conceived of without language, but it is language 
spoken by the group that generates this schema. 
Debray's collective preconscious 
schematism explains how the ideologico-religious 
functions when it becomes accepted, that is, 
when it is hegemonic. The origin of this 
hegemony lies in the successful mobilisation of 
subjects, which requires the effective deployment 
of symbolic resources. This cultural practice has 
its basis in the actual activities of society. Once 
again, these practices are explained in terms of 
the religious nature of social existence. That 
Debray calls the logic of the sacred. 
Incompleteness: sacred space and sacred time 
Debray argues that the ideologico-religious 
is the end product of a process, the organisation 
of a group. The ideologico-religious is an 
organising principle and not simply a way of 
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"seeing" the world. The key to understanding the 
structure and function of the religiopolitical is 
therefore to be found in the "logic of 
organisation". What explains belief and also 
motivates our actions is that which generates 
belief - the "structural invariant" in the formation 
and functioning of the social collective. An 
enduring theme in Debray's analysis is that a 
clue to the nature of this "structural invariant" 
lies in the common origin of religious studies and 
political science. In fact, as already observed, 
the two were originally not distinguished from 
one another because there was no distinction 
between religious and political practice (169). 
According to De bray, the fundamental 
"structural invariant" of social organisation can 
be stated as a general principle: "there can be 
no organised system without closure and no 
system can be closed by elements internal to 
that system alone" (170). Debray identifies this 
general principle as the law of incompleteness. 
The very nature of closure that defines the group 
is one that relies on an externality. There is 
therefore a dynamic contradiction in the 
existence of the group in that it relies not only 
on that which is inside of it but also that which is 
outside. Throughout discourse, whether 
religious, political, or scientific, there is a 
relationship between pairs of opposites that 
Debray argues can be explained by the law of 
incompleteness. "Heaven and earth", "absolute 
and relative", and many other pairs are 
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consequences of closure in that the opposite 
within any of these pairs is given along with the 
closure that demarcates the enclosed field of 
opposition. 
The law of incompleteness allows for the 
deduction of political laws of order and even of 
explanations for hitherto unexplained issues in 
social, political, and religious studies, such as 
why all attempts at revolution and transformation 
usually seem to fall short of the expectations of 
those that are supposed to benefit from them. 
The law of incompleteness does this by 
addressing the interdependent and persistent 
action of three aspects of organisation on 
political structures. These are identified by 
Debray as "lack, closure and the body" (171). 
Debray explains the social group to be like an 
inverted cone, the centre being a hole around 
which it's members are kept in adherence. The 
central point through which the movement is 
created and on which a community· is based is 
the leader, the individual who traces the line that 
demarcates the community. Ideology, religion, 
and worldview are the process of organisation, or 
that which circumscribes a movement that is 
fixed to a territory (172). The whole process is 
one which encompasses the economic, political, 
sexual, geographical, chronological and other 
aspects of our social existence, including the 
symbolic aspect. 
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For Debray, the act of closure removes the 
three dimensional space that 1s created by 
people from the ownership of those within it. As 
with the temple, the act of marking out sacred 
space gives the distinction between what is 
sacred and profane by means of dividing what is 
inside from what is outside. Circumscription and 
consecration simultaneously define the religious 
nature of the social and the social nature of the 
religious. Describing what he calls Durkheim's 
"vicious circle" in this way, the fact that society 
makes God, and "God"-the setting apart of the 
sacred-makes society, Debray offers an 
alternative explanation of Durkheim's paradox in 
the model of incompleteness that constitutes the 
"automatic logic of the sacred" (172). Because of 
the "automatic logic of the sacred", social 
organisation and religious ecstasy are created at 
one and the same time. This effect of "assembly" 
generates a regularity that governs the formation 
of social collectives. It also gives rise to the 
notion of civic religion, the ritualistic nature of 
political life, and explains the relationship 
between relations of economic exchange and 
worship. 
Durkheim mistook the social movements and 
their periodic rise as the principle of regularity. 
Their regularity actually arises from the 
"structural invariant" of social organisation 
(173). Embodiment means enclosure, enclosure 
means circumscription, circumscription creates 
the individuality of the group and the religious 
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character of the group's existence. This process 
results in an inevitable alienation, since subjects 
must surrender their individuality to belong to 
the collective and therefore are unable to subject 
the collective to their own will, except if they 
occupy the position of the leader. Because 
delimitation and transcendence are identical, the 
collective is described as originating outside of 
itself. This is effectively true, since the 
experience of the existence of the group is one 
that only individuals can have, even if it is 
shared. 
The effe'ct of this law of incompleteness 
enables the understanding that the actual 
experience of social groups is one which occurs 
on two planes, space and time. Groups cannot be 
imagined without their territorial delimitation and 
their existence over identifiable periods of time. 
This convergence of geography and history 
occurs within the context of the necessary 
sacralisation that arises from the act of closure 
on the one hand and origin on the other. We are 
therefore confronted with the consequence of 
organising being essentially "religious work" 
(175). Politics is described by Debray as being 
mediation because it revolves around the 
process of unification, and the point or body 
around which that unity is generated is sacred. 
This sacred. point is embodied in the "founding 
father", or leader, who acts as the mediator 
between the group and its members. 
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Since organisation is about the unification 
of the many, it must be the function of an 
externality to these many. "Irrationality, 
mysticism and the supernatural" are essential to 
groups since the process of organisation is one 
of abstraction, mediation, and alienation. To the 
extent that these are religious processes, the 
existence of the group is therefore a religious 
one. Debray believes that this religious 
"structural invariant" is prior to and supersedes 
such other factors as class for instance. What is 
commonly described as "human nature" must be 
looked at as a religious phenomenon and can 
therefore only be understood in these terms 
(176). 
Power and Authority: The Substitution Effect 
Furthermore, since politics is the 
consequence of external factors, in the sense 
that authority is beyond people, this power is 
seen as mystical and sacrosanct. Not only that, 
but the very arbitrary nature of power which 
arises from the gap or absence which is the 
function of incompleteness, necessitates the 
legitimisation of power. Power is open to a 
constant "substitution and repetition", which is 
created by a logical set of rules according to 
which politics functions. The "substitution effect" 
is a result of the structure of social sets that 
determines the functions of the processes of 
social organisation and the relations of the 
members of the collective. Incompleteness 
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initiates a "representation and repetition" for any 
social collective that results in a function of 
power which is of necessity essential and which 
has negative implications (178). 
A "Party" or a "Leader" must stand in for, or 
represent, such collective entities as the 
"group", the "nation", or the "working class". 
Such substitution is necessary because the very 
"founding absence" of the group requires it. 
Because power is "representative" it is 
"substitutive". The driving force of politics is the 
notion that this "founding absence" was actually 
present or at one time existed. Political reality is 
therefore lived as a constant return to a mythical 
origin. Debray believes this origin to be 
fictitious, and the function of historical myth is 
to empower this fiction. Since the point of origin 
can never be realised, the group 1s g1ven 
constant futile activities; it must reconstruct the 
unreconstructable. The group therefore has a 
"vocation for failure" that drives social activity. 
Debray argues that "all ideologies set deadlines 
that are never met" (183). The discourse of the 
ideologico-religious resonates in society 
because it imitates the hollowness of society that 
is a function of the law of incompleteness. All 
social activity 1s essentially symbolic and 
ritualistic, since even material acts communicate 
messages, intended or otherwise, that try to fill 




This raises the question as to whether 
social existence can ever be demystified, since it 
is open to the manipulation by those exercising 
control over or directing symbolic activity. The 
answer to this is not simple. We can demystify 
social activity by critical analysis and by 
ensuring as much democracy as possible. This 
would have the effect of secularising social 
existence through revealing the origin, nature, 
and functioning of the sacred. This would only be 
successful to the extent that subjects are 
physically and psychologically predisposed 
towards accepting the organisational imperatives 
that must accompany such a process. But the 
effects of this are also ambiguous. Debray points 
to the "privatisation of the sacred", which 
removes the sacred from the ambit of the 
collective and allows the individual the latitude 
of responding to the sacred without the force of 
the collective. But this must surely be a purely 
symbolic exercise. There is a difference between 
being compelled by the collective to accept a 
particular ideologico-religious framework and 
being called symbolically to the same. Unless 
individuals are conscious of the imperatives that 
lead them to hold certain beliefs and practices, 
the extent to which they are organised is 
superficial. 
Debray sets up a number of theses about 
this essential character of social existence, 
incompleteness, that need to be examined. In 
trying to explain the apparently fixed nature of 
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social groups, Debray derives a "social physics" 
form his "law of incompleteness". Groups are 
closed sets and therefore subjected to an 
externality giving them at once a "closed and 
open" existence that follows the general 
principle of "incompleteness" which he describes. 
Closure initiates the sacred in society by 
marking out the sacred in space as well as in 
time, thereby creating a necessary relationship 
between the geography and history of a group. 
Absence or lack, therefore, regulates the 
functioning of power in society. It enables the 
necessary representation and substitution which 
facilitate the arbitrary nature of power and 
ensure its legitimation in society. The body of 
the group is the source of the alienation of the 
members of that group and facilitates the 
mediation between the group as an "ideal we" 
and the actual members through leaders or a 
select group that represent the group. For any 
group, there is a "founding absence", the 
. necessary enclosure that demarcates the group, 
and the resultant "body" that is then experi,enced 
as that particular group. The religious nature of 
the group, the structural nature of these three 
aspects of social existence, "lack, closure and 
the body", determine what Debray regards as 
human nature, that is, "irrationality, mysticism 
and the supernatural". These features of human 
nature, however, are given a materialist 
explanation through the law of incompleteness. 
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It does seem self evident that any group has 
boundaries that define it and therefore the notion 
of enclosure that Debray uses seems to be 
useful. In practice, the actual boundaries may be 
territorial, but they might also be linguistic or 
cultural. The members of any group can only 
define themselves in opposition, since identity 
assumes difference. But what Debray is 
describing goes beyond any superficial notion of 
difference, as in the case of different languages, 
for example. It is evident from a number of 
commentators that definition is made possible by 
the practice of inscription, delimitation, and 
classification. People give the world meaning by 
orientating themselves in space and time. 
Cognition is thus facilitated by the relational. 
For individuals to even distinguish themselves as 
separate entities requires the grasping of the 
fact that one is distinct from one's own 
environment, including other people. In the same 
way that the self is perceived through the 
demarcation of the body, the recognition of this 
demarcation and the ritual practices that humans 
engage in that give expression to this process in 
the formation of a group. 
Catherine Bell has remarked that "a 
consensus of sorts has emerged granting the 
body a critical place in the social construction of 
reality" (Bell 1992:95). For now it is not 
important to enter into the debate as to whether 
it is the body that has primacy over society in 
terms of the social construction of reality, though 
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it would seem logical that it is the case. What is 
essential is to recognise the fact that 
demarcation is fundamental in terms of ordering 
the universe for any subject. David Chidester has 
proposed that the very notion of worldview is one 
which necessarily implies "a set of discursive, 
practical, and social strategies for negotiating 
person and place in the world" (Chidester, 
1992a:4). Fundamental to any worldview is the 
process of classifying some people as same and 
others as different. In terms of colonial and 
imperialist projects, as Chidester has noted, this 
classification also implies 
and negative connotations 
other (Chidester, 1992a:4). 
recognise that central to 
violent, pejorative, 
in relation to the 
Debray's theses 
this notion of 
classification is a relational or 
ordering, which leaves each of 
comparative 
the defined 
categories dependent on one another for 
meaning. 
Any act of enclosure, any description of an 
"us", requires a centre around which the group 
can be defined. Chidester has also described the 
manner in which sacred space requires a centre. 
He asserts that orientation in space requires "a 
central axis around which the world revolves and 
in relation to which the human world derives its 
meaning and 1s experienced as full of 
significance" (Chidester, 1988:86). There is no 
reason to doubt that, as it is in relation to actual 
physical orientation, the notion of a centre, 
together with the periphery, is essential to any 
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orientation that is more than one dimensional 
and to any meaningful worldview Chidester, 
1988:79). 
Of equal importance is the notion of sacred 
time. All social groups utilise methods of 
measuring time, be they mythical or otherwise, 
that designate identifiable periods of time and 
which thereby orientate the group, as Chidester 
also explains (1988: 1 05). Debray emphasises the 
fact that it is the relationship between these two 
features, space and time, that is the key to 
explaining the sacred. It is important to 
recognise, as has been pointed out by several 
s c h o I a r s o f r e I i g i o n , t h a t e v e n t h o u g h t h e' 
demarcation of space as sacred is essential to 
religion, in the case of marking out the area of 
the temple, for example, this process is literally 
arbitrary. Anything can be sacred and does 
becorne so if our attention is focused on it for 
that purpose. Jonathan Z. Smith has pointed out 
that "there is nothing that is inherently sacred or 
profane" (Smith, 1982:55). Smith argues 
convincingly that the sacredness of anything is 
relational. It must follow that the same is true for 
sacred time. 
Debray argues that the national question is 
in fact the sacred aspect of social existence. The 
strategy of delimitation in terms of time and 
space are anti-death processes that the human 
species deploys. They are attempts to counter 
the "irreversible passage from life into death ... 
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and spatial disintegration, the dissagregation of 
a community and its reversion to an arbitrary 
state" ( 1977b:27). 
Durkheim has to be accorded the 
recognition due him in describing religious life 
as the demarcation of the world into sacred and 
profane domains (Durkheim, 1976:37). Debray 
deploys Durkheim's revelation of the primacy of 
religious belief and the social origin of this 
belief in an attempt to unlock the "structurally 
invariant" aspects of social existence. Durkheim 
argues forcibly that society has the effect of 
generating the terms of the sacred simply by 
virtue of its relationship to the individual and the 
members of a community Durkheim, 1976:206). 
This is exactly what Debray concludes ·is 
essential to understanding the ideologico-
religious. 
The consequence of the incompleteness that 
arises from the circumscription of the group 1s 
dramatic. Using the Marxist concept of 
alienation, Debray describes the ambiguous 
relationship of the individual to the group and 
the need for mediation between the subject and 
the collective. It is this yawning gap that 
determines the nature of power in society. Like 
Debray, Chidester and Linenthal have argued 
that alienation, exile, and exclusion can be 
important features of how "meaning and power 
coalesce" in the actual manufacture of sacred 
space (1995:31). 
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Arguably, the most eloquent and innovative 
work on the nature of power has been that of the 
historian and philosopher Michel Foucault. In 
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 
Foucault describes the relationship between 
knowledge, discourse, and juridical relations that 
combine to form the techniques by which power 
is exercised and experienced in relation to 
punishment in society. Power and object 
relations are studied through the interrogation of 
the techniques of the t;>ody in this regard 
(Foucault, 1977:24). Foucault sees his study as 
being one in the "micro-physics of power" 
(Foucault, 1977:28). In this regard power is seen 
as a strategy that is exercised in "a network of 
relations, constantly in tension, in activity, 
rather than a privilege that one might possess" 
Foucault, 1977:26). Of singular importance is the 
notion that power is invested in both those that 
deploy it and those that are seen to be devoid of 
it and is "transmitted by ... and through them" 
(Foucault, 1977:27). While this is a richer 
description of power than is to be found in 
Debray's description of the phenomenon, it is 
nonetheless one that recognises power as both 
representative and substitutive, otherwise it 
could not be deployed in the manner described. 
Chidester and Linenthal have noted that it 
is not only an elite of a group which can deploy 
successful strategies to manipulate the symbolic 
resources that are generated in a society through 
the sacralisation of space and time (Chidester 
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and Linenthal, 1995:16). This essentially affirms 
the point made by Debray in relation to the 
manipulation of these resources. What Chidester 
and Linenthal demonstrate, however, is that 
sacred space is highly contested. While elites 
may demarcate them, other groups can 
appropriate these spaces, but also can invert 
their order, turning what is profane into what is 
sacred, for example (1995:17). Foucault also 
makes this point by demonstrating that the 
management of space is central to the exercise 
of power. (1977:201) He points out that "power is 
exercised rather than possessed ... it is not a 
'privilege', acquired or preserved, of the 
dominant class" (1977:26). 
The production, manipulation, management, 
distribution, and consumption of symbolic 
resources is essentially a strategic issue. At no 
time can it be argued that these resources are 
purely deployed in and for themselves. What is 
revealed in this process is the nature of agency 
and the place of the historical subject. The 
subject is both constitutive of and constituted by 
the collective. But because the individual cannot 
relate to the separate entities that make up the 
collective all the time, these have to be 
represented in the form of an individual or an 
accessible, identifiable group, and by other 
agreed signs such as flags, banners, badges, or 
monuments. This effectively means that not all 
subjects are equal. The position of mediator is 
strategic and gives considerable power over the 
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collective, since all have access to the collective 
via that medium. The relationship of the 
mediating figure is therefore symbolic since it 
represents the collective. Because the position 
of mediator is set apart it necessarily has a 
sacred aspect. Agency is dependent on the 
relationship between the collective and the 
individual and is often facilitated or inhibited by 
the mediator. The position of mediator, therefore, 
derives its capacity from the logic of the sacred. 
In defining the centrality of incompleteness 
in generating the terms of the sacred, Debray 
has placed the subject in a particular relation to 
the collective. But this does not mean that the 
individual is determined in some crude fashion 
by the collective or is unable to impose his or 
her will on the collective. Obviously, the contest 
for the position of mediator can be fought at both 
symbolic and at material levels. It is the material 
that secures this position in the final instance, 
however. Precisely by the grasping of the need 
for a founding absence, the creation of a 
mythology, and most importantly by the 
recognition of the substitutive nature of power, 
individuals and elites are able to effectively 
deploy symbolic resources for strategic 
purposes. It can be argued that advanced forms 
of democracy especially require such practices 
and are thereby undermined by these same 
processes as they have the effect of removing 
actual power and authority from the collective to 
an individual or an elite. 
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The notion of myth plays a prominent role in 
Debray's view of how symbolic efficacy functions 
in society. Debray argues that myths describe a 
fictional point of origin for groups. But this 
distinction between myth and fact is not without 
its problems. It has been convincingly argued 
that all official versions of the past perform the 
same function of myths. In that sense, there are 
no truths in history, or conversely, as Strenski 
puts it, "there is no such thing as myth" ( 1987:1 ). 
What Strenski means is that myth must- be seen 
in its historical and social context because it is 
"the product of the life of a people" (1987: 154) 
T h e ext e n t to w h i c h m y t h i s a · q u a I i ta t i v e I y 
different phenomenon from an ideology, religion, 
or a worldview is more a matter of interpretation 
than anything else. Myths essentially perform the 
same function as these phenomena. As such they 
are the same phenomena described in different 
terms. Myths, in Strenski's view "are reborn in 
our own time as ideologies or 'political myths"' 
(1987:132). In the broadest definition, Roland 
Barthes has argued that myth is essentially a 
form of language, that is a type of speech that 
functions on behalf of a particular social class, 
and depoliticises language in the interests of 
that class, fabricating a natural order out of 
contingency. Significantly, Barthes sees myth as 
being predisposed towards the right politically, 
that is in favour of the establishment. This is due 
to the fact that the worldview imposed by the 
ruling class, the oppressor, is pervasive and 
strategically positioned to perpetuate the 
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prevailing order. The oppressed by contrast, has 
only one language, that of his emancipation. 
Barthes theory of myth, like Debray's notion of 
unmasking official discourse, undermines the 
effect of authority and reveals that there are no 
truths or falsities in political life, only official 
and unofficial versions of history and even of the 
possible futures that are open to a society. While 
this has the effect of once again giving life to a 
radical relativism, this understanding of myth is 
one which can serve to demystify official 
discourse. Taken together with a democratic, 
egalitarian approach to politics and history in 
general, this position undermines the role of 
experts, professionals, and other ideological 
technocrats. It allows for the possibility that the 
people themselves can write their own history 
and reconstruct their own past to chose a future. 
But this does not happen so simply. For Debray 
there is a structural issue in the form of the 
religiopolitical unconscious that needs to be 
confronted. According to Debray, this collective 
unconscious informs the very character of 
collective life. 
The Collective Unconscious and Natural 
Religion 
Debray sets out to explain the structural 
causes of the religious nature of social existence 
by deploying the concept of natural religion. 
These structural factors function at three levels; 
the "logical, biological and the physical", 
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although Debra.y insists that their distinction is 
purely conceptual to aid understanding (184). 
The law of incompleteness that Debray describes 
can only be applied to structured, 
organisationally coherent groups, those which 
Debray calls "voluntary, collective formations" 
(186). Unlike social science in general, which he 
argues is concerned with difference, Debray's 
theses are concerned with that which is common 
to the various forms of these voluntary collective 
formations. 
The idea of natural religion is given by the 
abstract concept of the group. Despite the 
dangers of the notion of natural religion, Debray 
insists that it is a helpful concept because it 
gives a recognisable form to the existence of the 
political unconscious. Natural religion, Debray 
suggests, is analogous to phonology, which he 
argues considers the laws governing sounds 
without contradicting the discipline of 
comparative linguistics. What Debray proposes is 
a "syntax of the sacred". As universal grammar is 
to actual language, so natural religion is to the 
ideologico-religious. This syntax allows the 
development of endless systems of belief to be 
created around " a finite set of elements defined 
by their reciprocal relations and oppositions" 
(190). 
Natural religion is "a universal, innate 
schema of behaviour deriving from the logical 
structure of the group" (191 ). Understanding this 
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through the law of incompleteness allows us to 
grasp how the sacred is established as a social 
phenomenon and how the ideologico-religious is 
the institutionalised form of this phenomenon. 
We are also able to observe the historical 
pattern of social existence which is dictated by 
the "natural state of dependence" of human 
beings, for which religion performs the function 
of a valuable insurance. Fear and anxiety are the 
definitive characteristics of the social being. 
These are biological and social "givens" which 
Debray describes as "natural characteristics" of 
human beings. 
Historically the concept of natural religion 
has usually been associated with deism. It is 
taken to mean the way in which nature lends 
itself to the religious interpretation of existence, 
the natural religiosity of humanity, and proofs for 
the existence of God by natural reason rather 
than divine revelation. As Byrne has shown, 
natural religion is most often associated with 
natural theology, in opposition to revealed, civil, 
mythic, or supernatural religion (Byrne 1991:1 ). 
Debray does not use the term natural religion in 
the sense described by Byrne, although the 
dynamic between nature and human existence is 
one which he emphasises as being important. 
Debray employs the term, natural religion, to 
revisit the Marxist relationship between nature 
and history. In Marx and the discourse of the 
rationalist project in general, there is a tension 
nature and history. They are given a particular 
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meaning and relationship depending on the 
extent to which the one is emphasised over the 
other. Debray argues that Marx recognised the 
dialectical relationship between these two 
factors, nature as given on the one hand, and 
history as labour or productive activity on the 
other. But Marx, again unwittingly it is suggested 
by Debray, facilitated the elevation of history to 
the position of being regarded as the dominant 
factor in terms of social existence through the 
explanation of labour as the "simultaneous 
transformation of the world and the labourer" 
(199). The natural object is given a negative 
existence, again as the opposite in a mutually 
interdependent pair. Debray believes that Marx 
did not shake himself free of the idealists that he 
criticised, but instead only achieved a more 
narcissistic idealism, an idealism in which the 
human being is a self-creator. For this flaw in 
theory to be overcome, "nature" must be 
accorded its rightful place in the discourse. The 
law of incompleteness reveals the "formal and 
natural given" which explains how practice is 
always undermined by the physical facts of our 
existence. This natural order limits, conditions, 
and helps to determine the field and scope of 
practice. 
Debray argues that nature and the 
ideologico-religious go hand in hand. The need 
for religion and the institutionalisation of the 
sacred that follows are constant and universal. 
In this way the natural is "a constant determinant 
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of culture" (205). It cannot therefore be removed 
from society. Religions and other worldviews are 
the historical forms of a natural, material 
"invariant". Examples can be found of 
"theological grammars" that reveal the religious 
in economics, with money being the classic 
Marxist illustration. In politics however, the 
material "invariant of religion" has not yet been 
demystified, according to Debray. 
Debray argues that religions and political 
ideologies perform the same function since they 
attempt to preserve the security and individuality 
of social collectives. They do this through the 
specialised supervision of the application of 
ritual and the socially rewarding apprehension of 
mythology in the collective. Religion requires 
theology, which is "an intellectual system to 
rationalise faith" (215). Because religious belief 
is "experienced and communicated through 
affectivity" and insecurity is provided in the fact 
of the mortality of individuals, belief is 
understood as an "organisational requirement" 
which, along with the need for safety, determines 
our social existence. 
The influence of Durkheim with regard to 
Debray's view of society as being naturally 
religious, as has already been noted, is obvious. 
In The Elementary Forms ·at the Religious Life, 
Durkheim set out to describe the origins of 
religious beliefs and practices. He also set out 
to show that the "fundamental notions of thought 
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or the categories" were religious and social in 
their origin (Durkheim, 1976:xiii). Durkheim was 
of the considered view that "all religious 
representations are collective representations 
which express collective realities" (Durkheim, 
1976:9). These collective representations find 
their expression in the individual because she or 
he has both an individual and a collective 
intellectual existence. It is a short step from this 
duality to the notion of an unconscious and for 
such an unconscious to be a collective one. In 
his own way Durkheim suggests as much 
(Durkheim 1976:16). 
Debray explains how the law of 
incompleteness gives rise to the structural 
nature of the religious in society. A "syntax of 
the sacred" is identified, which Debray describes 
as natural religion. The syntax theory which 
Debray proposes is a way of describing the 
religiopolitical unconscious. Along with the 
fragility and mortality of humanity this natural 
religion is an invariant which can be explained in 
material terms and must be accorded its rightful 
place in social, political, and religious theory. 
Nature and religion are always identified 
together as they are mutually dependent. 
Ideology performs the same function as religion. 
They both preserve the existence, difference, 
and security of the group. 
The notion of natural religion is one that 
has been part of religious studies for a 
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considerable period of time. In their efforts to 
grasp the common essential features of religious 
belief and practice scholars have been drawn to 
the obvious neatness and simplicity of such a 
concept. Of course the dangers of such a 
concept are that it can lead to oversimplification 
of the problem of understanding religion and can 
miss grasping the centrality of ritual and the 
sacred by looking for hidden essences where 
there are none. It can also result in religion 
being considered outside of the causal nexus of 
its social origins. 
But Debray's notion of a natural religion has 
nothing to do with making a list of the essential 
characteristics of religion, or discover;ing the 
rational essence of faith. Since his definition 
encompasses all human activity that stands in 
relation to the sacred and is ritualised, he avoids 
the error of dividing up human activities into 
spheres of the religious and the non-religious. 
Instead, he borrows the linguistic notion of 
syntax to argue for an underlying foundation that 
allows for all ideologico-religious belief and 
practice. 
However, another problematic notion is 
introduced in this regard. Since this syntax is 
regarded as somehow operating "beneath the 
surface ", Debray argues that this feature of 
human existence is one that is unconscious. This 
notion of the religiopolitical unconscious is not 
simply given. The concept that Oebray describes 
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is one upon which his entire thesis turns and 
arguably stands or falls. 
The Unconscious 
The notion of a human unconscious is not 
new, but it is one fraught with difficulties. A very 
helpful description of the concept, it's origins in 
Freudian psychoanalysis, and the various 
criticisms of the notion, has been offered by 
David Archard. He explains the problem of 
attributing to the concept of the unconscious 
purely Freudian terms of reference and particular 
interpretations of Freud which have their basis in 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, and the philosophical 
objections to the notion of thought processes of 
which the subject is not aware (Archard, 1984:9-
11 ). Archard defines the terms of an unconscious 
as being of great significance when it is argued 
that our current mental· states are to a certain 
extent determined and constricted by 
consciousness which is not apprehended by the 
subject (Archard, 1984: 124). 
A substantial critique of the notion of the 
unconscious has been provided by Alistair 
Macintyre in The Unconscious: A Conceptual 
Analysis. Macintyre argues that the notion of the 
unconscious is so readily accepted because it 
appears to be able to explain so much about 
human behaviour (1958:1). In that regard, it is a 
concept not unlike the notion of ideology. It 1s 
instructive to note that Macintyre offers a 
critique of Freud's notion of the unconscious that 
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is similar to Debray's critique of ideology. He 
describes the Freudian concept of the 
unconscious as lending itself to "spatial 
metaphors". In this sense the theory of t5he 
unconscious is topographical ( 1958: 11-12). 
Macintyre argues that classical Newtonian 
mechanics are the model for Freud's theory, 
making assumptions about causality and 
equilibrium in systems that are no longer so 
simply accepted (1958:17-18). Macintyre is also 
critical of the Freudian distinction between the 
unconscious, the preconscious, and the 
conscious. He points out that the unconscious is 
a negative concept that relies on a previous 
definition of the conscious (1958:29-30). To the 
extent that these modalities of human motivation 
are theoretically distinguishable, the 
relationships between them and the manner in 
which past experience is preserved and later 
motivates actions is also problematic. There is 
an ambiguity in Freud's theory of the 
unconscious between the phenomenon as the 
" u n k n ow i n g " a n d t h e " u n k n own " w h i c h Ma c I n t y r e 
identifies (1958:42). He is also of the view that 
Freud's theory maintains the rationalist 
Cartesian dualism that leads to the notion of the 
unconscious as a place which is "distinct and 
apart, a place or a realm which can be inhabited 
by such entities as ideas" (1958:45). As an 
invisible· and unfalsifiable postulate, the 
unconscious is contradictory because its 
character is rationally determined to the absence 
of rationality. 
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This is obviously a substantial critique of 
any theory of the unconscious. Whilst Archard is 
also not convinced of the merits of Freudian and 
Lacanian explanations of the existence of the 
unconscious, he is prepared to accept that the 
nature of the human mind is such that the 
meaning of words and signifiers, in short, of 
language, has to be found not in relation to one 
another but in relation to what is meant or 
signified by the language (Archard, 1984: 132). 
This opens up the possibility for the social 
determination of the meanings of any language, 
and thereby the collective's influence over 
language in general. That some of this may be at 
a non-conscious level to the extent that we 
experience it as language is fairly easy to 
substantiate as is shown by Debray's concept of 
the collective preconscious schema. There are 
countless examples of beliefs or practices that 
have no obvious conscious causality. But that in 
itself would not constitute evidence of an 
unconscious. For example, religious belief could 
and does ascribe the origins of these to be 
supernatural or divine. But the very essence of 
De bray's thesis is to find materialist 
explanations for social belief and practice. 
Chomsky describes universal grammar as 
that creative side of language that "expresses 
the deep-seated regularities which, being 
universal, are omitted from the grammar itself" 
(Katz, 1985:84). The sense in which Debray 
deploys the notion of a natural religion is 
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precisely this: Society is religious in a myriad of 
forms because the universal syntax of religion 
which gives rise to religious belief is that which 
underlies all social activities. Of course this 
thesis not only reinterprets social activity but in 
the process reinterprets religion as well. It also 
provides a materialist notion of the unconscious, 
since it is not a realm apart from the conscious, 
but is the socially prescribed aspect of our 
existence. It 1s therefore part of our 
psychological makeup and determines our 
behaviour through configuring our beliefs and 
practices. 
This sense of the ideologico-religious has 
its origins in Durkheim's definition of religion as 
a social phenomenon. What Debray has done is 
to turn this definition around and interpret all 
efficacious collective social activity as religious. 
As has been pointed out previously, such a 
strategy completely undermines the distinction 
between religion and ideology. There is support 
among other Marxist scholars for this position of 
undermining the distinction between religion and 
politics. For example, as we have seen, George 
Thomson convincingly demonstrates the 
development of Greek culture within a society 
which initially made no distinction between 
religion, politics, and war. The reverence for the 
warrior, chief, and gods was practiced in a 
unified system of ritual that recognised the 
sacred in relation to all these forces (Thomson, 
1980:68). Durkheim himself saw the distinction 
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between religion one the one hand and science 
and philosophy on the other as being a later 




in itself does not prove Debray's 
it certainly reveals the wider 
of the problematic notion of the 
distinction between these aspects of social 
existence. 
Marxism and Religion 
Debray continues his critique of Marxism by 
pointing out that Marxist practice, in the form of 
"really existing socialism", has had the effect of 
ensuring that religion is no longer thought of as 
something that will eventually disappear at a 
given historical moment when a particular level 
of development has been attained. The religious 
nature of Marxism, which he argues is witnessed 
in the practice of Marxists, requires the 
particular attention of critical theory·(218). 
By ensuring a dialogue among Marxist 
theory, anti-Marxist theory, and the sociology of 
religion, Debray believes the necessary 
conditions can be created for a proper 
understanding of the religious nature of social 
existence. This includes accepting that Marxism 
its e If has fa i I e d a·s a scientific d i s co u r s e 
because it appeals to the authority of Marx, 
Lenin, Trotsky, and others. Marx himself was 
highly critical of the attempts by various political 
theorists and actors to bring "religious attitudes, 
verbosity and moralism" into the discourse of 
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social science. This, as Debray points out, 
surely makes the notion of the creation of a 
Marxist religion doubly ironic (221). 
Debray argues that Marx's treatment of 
religion as a manifestation of humanity's own 
limitations and incomplete existence was part of 
the problem. It makes religion the expression of 
a "defect" in society which stems from what is 
regarded as the unnatural cleavage of the human 
being from society, from the community of others, 
and even from the self (223). Only when society 
has been ,healed of this scar of alienation will 
religion cease to exist, according to Marx. For 
this view, Debray accuses Marx of utopianism. He 
argues that Marx did not provide an analysis of 
politics but used religion "as a sacred parable 
for the sacred element in the political" (224). 
From this Debray concludes that the fetish of 
modern society may be ideology, but for Marx it 
was religion. 
Debray believes that there is a fundamental 
contradiction in Marx's theory that is revealed by 
the law of incompleteness. Society can never be 
made whole, since it is separated from itself 
through the fact of organisation. There is 
therefore a s t r u ct u r a I constraint on society which 
will ensure that it cannot be made "whole" and it 
is therefore always subject to the logic of the 
sacred (227). This religious structure of society 
gives a particularly contradictory nature to our 
social existence. It ensures "archaism in 
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modernity (and) prehistory in the final struggle" 
(234). Part of the human condition, according to 
Oebray, is to accept this situation, since nature 
has, through the structural limitation of the law 
of incompleteness, a hold over humanity. 
De bray 
although the 
is very careful to 
"religious structure 
point out that 
of collective 
action" arises out of the fact that nature cannot 
be purged from history, just as the conscious 
cannot rid itself of the unconscious, this should 
not lead us to a pessimism or cynicism when 
dealing with social, political, and religious 
issues. Our "tribal nature" is given by the fact 
that "the recurrence of religion merges self and 
other, origins and ends" (234). In social 
psychology the "I" is always an other, but that is 
inescapable and therefore something we must 
come to grips with as human beings. 
The constraints of our collective existence 
must be recognised, just as we must recognise 
that political failure and renewal are as 
necessary as any other natural cycles. Debray 
points out that the situation of a group, its 
stability and the period of its existence, is an 
important consideration. Where there is a fairly 
stable existence of groups, such as the national 
groups of Western Europe, the nature of 
existence of subjects within these groups will 
differ from those in a group which is under threat 
or 1n decay. Once these identities are 
threatened, and this would not mean in the sense 
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of intellectually challenged but in the real 
physical sense of a challenge to the continued 
existence of the identity, then the group would go 
into the protective mode that is necessary to 
defend itself (240). 
Debray offers an alternative view of social 
existence to that generally held in the social 
sciences. The process of inscription and 
origination of communities creates a structural 
invariant that determines the religious character 
of social existence. Because the religio-political 
unconscious determines these characteristics, 
Debray is inclined to refer to these features of 
society as being human nature. Although we need 
not adopt this position, we have to recognise the 
powerful case Debray makes for a "social 
physics". It is this social physics which 
determines the functioning of symbolic efficacy. 
Historically the study of symbolic efficacy 
has been characterised along the lines of the 
dichotomy that arises from the omnipresent 
dualism of the rationalist project. True to form, 
this has led to an unnecessary distinction being 
drawn between types of ideas that mobilise 
subjects. This, together with the effects of the 
division of labour have resulted in a failure to 
grasp what is common to all socially efficacious 
ideas, the sacred nature of these ideas and the 
rituals and practices that accompany them. 
Debray argues that the ideologico-religious 
is material and is that which organises people. 
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By extending Durkheim's definition of religion to 
all socially efficacious ideas, Debray creates a 
powerful analytical model. Th.is model effectively 
collapses the distinction between religion and 
ideology. By making society and the ideologico-
religious coextensive and by uncovering the 
collective as territorial, Debray reveals the 
religious nature of all social existence. It is in 
nationalism that we find the most efficacious 
expression of the religiopolitical unconscious in 
contemporary society. By allowing scope for the 
most potent production and manipulation of 
symbolic resources, nationalism is a modern 
religion. 
The Sacred and Symbolic Efficacy 
The manner in which Debray's thesis is 
constructed raises important issues for 
consideration. The arbitrary nature of the sacred 
allows for the endless possibility of the 
identification and designation of what is sacred 
to any community. This would explain the variety 
of expressions of symbolic efficacy, commonly 
referred to as myth, religion, and ideology. The 
proliferation of the sacred is attested to by the 
many rituals that are currently practiced in 
relation to the home, the family, work, the 
political sphere, not to mention the worship of 
the sacred 1n organised religions. Social 
organisation, therefore, can be said to have 
within it the capacity to define the sacred. 
126 
These rituals not only reaffirm the sacred, 
but are also the raw material out of which a 
particular society is constructed. Crudely 
considered, social organisation is a matter of 
some or other leader or leaders embarking on a 
project to gain political power. This entails 
establishing rituals that reinforce their project's 
survival once they have managed to break down 
the hegemonic grip of another project. This 
management of the sacred~-~tl:l_co_ugh Jhe _stcat.e~gj_~ _____ ......____.- --. - --· - ~-·· 
m a n i p u I ati o n of s p a c e a r1 cj _ t i m e i s w h at a II s o c i a I 
--==-'=~-~ _,__,. -· -=.- ._ 
~~~-~~\/ i ty is abo~ t. I L i ~--~ I __ ~_Q g~lJjt~ __ l_2_gi£?_1 _ _lr_9~DJ~tb-t? 
to deduce that a particular class, or some 
p rev i o u s I y d e f i n e d co m m u n i t y, s u c h a s a n e t ~ n is 
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group, for example, might involve itself in such a 
project. It can reasonably concluded from this 
that Debray's thesis is not incompatible with 
some Marxist theoretical canons. 
Like everything else, the sacred is 
represented symbolically. The power of sacred 
symbols comes from what they represent. 
Symbolism is language and language and 
consciousness are contingent upon one another. ~~ 
QDJ~~~a __ c;ollective has agreed on th_e_sac_red, _i_t~A( 
r~p_r~s_entation of this gets set down in the 
discourse. Obviously, agreement is based on the ,-
relations of power and authority, originally 
~ 
established by force and ultimately reliant on the 
capacity for violence. }he_ power a0d_ auth()_r!ty 
located within discourse is essentially anchored 
in the designation, recognition, and veneration of 
the sacred. 
127 
In this sense science and rationalism may 
represent the fight against ignorance at any one 
point. But as these become established, set up 
relations of power and authority in the relevant 
discourse, the critical edge of theory gives way 
to doctrine. Revolutions in science have for some 
time been recognised as a feature of even this 
supposedly non-dogmatic activity (Kuhn, 1962). 
The relationship between myth, religion, 
and ideology is best understood as being simply 
modalities of the symbolic representation of the 
sacred in history. These are essentially different 
historical views of symbolic efficacy. It might be 
argued that all of these are therefore temporary 
views, contingent upon history and therefore, in 
a manner of speaking, false consciousness. But 
such a characterisation does not capture the 
opposite, positive point of view, which is that all 
these historically contingent views are, in their 
own way, correct. 
Since each of these views is manufactured 
through a movement by its leaders and later by 
its intellectual functionaries, the extent to which 
each of these views is correct is the extent to 
which it can mobilise people in support of the 
particular modality of the symbolic 
representation of the sacred. The effective 
manipulation of symbols is therefore located in 
society and the value of symbols determined by 
the relations of power and authority that 
determine their use. To uncover the power of 
symbols requires a 
sacred is required. 
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political economy of the 
Such a political economy 
must ask and answer, in whose interests are the 
various modalities of the symbolic deployed and 
how are these relations maintained? To answer 
that we may consider the modern modality of the 
sacred, nationalism, and see how particular 
interests are fought for, won, and lost in the 
quest for power. 
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Chapter 4: Nationalism 
Marxism and the national question 
Debray indicates that the national question 
has allowed him to interrogate Marxism critically 
(1997b:25). He observes that in those countries 
of "really existing socialism", where nationalism 
should theoretically be a thing of the past, 
reference to patriotism and the fatherland are 
not uncommon. If anything these countries are as 
nationalist, if not more so, than countries 
described as bourgeois democracies. Debray 
explains that in interrogating his own beliefs and 
the recognition of the apparent failure of his own 
political theory, his "chosen viewpoint was once 
again the permanence of the nation" (25). It is 
this survival of nationalist sentiment, of what 
Debray describes at another point as the "ethnic 
factor", that first called Marxism into question for 
him. It also opened up a whole area of study for 
Debray which he refers to as mediology 
(1995:531). Debray was not the first to notice the 
apparent permanence of nationalism. Reference 
is made to it by a number of commentators. 
There are proponents of the view that 
"nationalism and Marxism are philosophically 
incompatible" (Connor, 1984:1 ). Early Marxist 
debates referred to the problem of contradiction 
between nationalism and the class consciousness 
of the working class and the differences were 
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settled by discussants opting for one of a number 
of options. The first option was to deny that the 
national question was a problem for socialists. In 
essence, this argument was that the national 
question had been solved and societ'y would 
eventually catch up with the revolutionary 
consciousness of the vanguard who had made 
this possible. The second was to argue for a 
world-wide, permanent revolution to build a 
socialist consciousness to supersede 
nationalism. This meant not accepting 
nationalism as anything but a reactionary 
tendency and dealing with it as such. The third 
approach was to try and learn to live with 
nationalism. In practice, this meant accepting the 
longevity of the nation-state as a historical form 
and leaving the question of its development to 
time. In the view of this approach class 
contradictions could best be dealt with in the 
context of the nation-state. 
As late as 1987 an official Soviet 
publication could claim that the "multinational 
entity-the Soviet people" had been created 
without any loss of identity for the national and 
ethnic groups that formed part of it. This was 
seen as "the first example of the practical 
solution of nationalities problem" (Zadarnovsky, 
1987: 18). This example of rigid and doctrinaire 
Marxism, which was a feature of the "official" 
Marxism of the USSR, could not deal with the 
national question because it refused to accept 
that it existed as a problem in socialist societies. 
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Karl Brecker has argued that socialism can 
only be built by bypassing the national question 
entirely and mobilising workers for permanent 
revolution. This view sees that revolution as 
anything but national in character (1995: 66). In 
fact, according to Brecker, any dilution of the 
socialist demands of the working class in a 
national movement amount to reformism 
(1995:41 ). Clearly, such revolutionaries can have 
no truck with nationalism. 
At the same time, we are able to observe 
any number of examples of well established 
socialist formations that accept, for the time 
being, however long that might be, the need to 
contest political power within the ambit of the 
nation-state. In essence, this "social-democratic" 
view, which does not seek to extend the 
revolution beyond the existing borders of the 
nation state, and which includes anything from 
the struggle for welfarism of a British Labour 
Party to the radical socialist demands of the 
Brazilian Worker's Party, is the dominant v1ew 
amongst Marxists and socialists today. 
These three responses were essentially 
categorised as the Stalinist, Trotskyist, and the 
social-democratic, and later, nee-Marxist schools 
of thought. Ronalda Munck eloquently discusses 
these responses to what is recognised as the 
"stubborn fact of nationalism". Beginning with 
Marx's own contradictory statements on the 
national question, Munck traverses the history of 
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the problem in relation to Marxist theory and 
political practice right up until the period prior to 
the demise of socialist states in Eastern Europe. 
From a Marxist perspective, Munck sees the 
roots of the formation of nation-states in the 
expansion in capitalism (Munck, 1986:1 ). 
Munck characterises Marx and Engels as 
being "very conscious" of nationalism, although 
he argues that they never specifically dealt with 
the phenomenon theoretically (Munck, 1986:9). 
The founders of historical materialism therefore 
left a legacy pregnant with contradiction in 
relation to the phenomenon of nationalism. In 
essence, the view of Marx and Engels that there 
were nations which could be regarded as 
"historic", which meant progressive and 
developing and those that could be regarded as 
"non-historic", which essentially meant backward 
and reactionary was unfortunate. Marx's finding 
that nations were the outcome of "environmental, 
economic, historical, and other. influences", did 
not detract from the ambiguity that exists in 
Marxism as a result of this theoretical vacuum he 
left (Munck, 1986:21 ). 
Connor has detected what he describes as 
three strands of nationalism in the writings of 
Marx and Engels. Characterising the Marxist view 
of nationalism as an evoloutionary or modernist 
one, Connor asserts that "classical" Marxism 
placed class conscioussness and struggle above 
nationalism in terms of revolutionary significance 
-
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Marxism recognised opportunistically 
supported the right nations to self-
determination. The Marxist view that recognises 
the primacy of nationalism in the capitalist mode 
of production he refers to as "nation a I" Marxism 
(1984:20). These categories, while somewhat 
simplistic provide an alternative, less sectarian 
matrix for viewing the trends outlined in the 
history of Marxist practice and the national 
question. 
Nationalism and the Second International 
Munck identifies Kautsky as the Second 
International's "expert" on nationalism (Munck, 
1986:29). Kautsky recognised the reality of the 
nation-state, placing language at the centre of 
nationalism and the ability of a nation to realise 
the necessary unity to facilitate effective 
political power (Munck, 1986:30). The spilt that 
existed in the Polish socialist movement between 
two opposed groups on the national question was 
a precursor to the schism that was to be the most 
debilitating factor in the socialist project. Called 
on to "arbitrate" this dispute, Kautsky fudged the 
issue (Munck, 1986:30). Essentially the Second 
International adopted a position which 
recognised the right of nations to exist and to 
determine their own future. But it saw the nation 
as a "cultural" issue. The actual debate on the 
national question turned on the issue of what 
was the prime objective of working-class 
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organisations, the struggle to build socialism and 
advance the interests of the entire working class 
or the struggle for national autonomy in the face 
of national oppression. Reducing this to a 
cultural matter was, to say the least, 
understating the issue. This reduction of the 
issue of national self-determination to being 
"relative and not absolute" continued to put the 
working class movement in a position of both 
strategic and tactical weakness (Munck, 
1986:32). 
Munck points out that not only was the 
"national question" inside the working-class 
movement, but the working-class movement at 
the time was largely based in the imperialist 
countries of the world (1986:33). Opportunism in 
the socialist movement allowed for distinguishing 
between claims to national sovereignty by 
categorising these as more or less relevant 
depending on the "civilised" or "savage" nature 
of the people making the claim (1986:33-34). 
What gave rise to the collapse of the 
Second International in Munck's view was the 
"Balkans crisis". The movement was torn apart 
around the issue of "national defense" (Munck, 
1986:36). Only Lenin correctly analysed the 
roots of the conflict and the response that was 
needed from the working class. He argued for 
turning the war into a people's civil war against 
the bourgeoisie, but the socialists vacillated 
between pacifism and people's war and the 
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Leninist option was not implemented (Munck, 
1986:37-38). It was not until Lenin was to put 
this strategy into practice in his own country that 
the proof of its effectiveness would be 
demonstrated. 
Munck describes the development of Marxist 
theory on the national question through the 
recognition of the importance of the 
distinctiveness of "culture" by Otto Bauer, as 
well as through Bauer's rejection of the 
distinction between "historic" and "non-historic" 
nations. Bauer also described extreme national 
chauvinism and jingoism as "transformed class 
hatred" (1986:40). He argued that while the 
working class was international and needed to be 
united internationally defeat the bourgeoisie, 
"bourgeois nationalism" needed to be 
vanquished. For Bauer, this meant finding "the 
national substance of class struggle" (1986:41 ). 
The debate about the relationship between 
"psychology and territory" continued after the 
First World War. Rosa Luxembourg debated the 
issue of nationalism with Lenin continuously 
throughout her political life. Luxembourg held 
"that the working class is the only agency fitted 
to carry out the task of national liberation" 
(Munck, 1986:52). This issue was not to settled 
only by calls for national autonomy, but through 
alliances among the proletariat internationally. 
Luxembourg at first strongly criticised the idea of 
nations having any "right" to anything, but 
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argued that socialists must fight all forms of 
oppression, whether national, gender, or 
otherwise. The crisis of the Second International 
made her recognise the centrality of the nation-
state. Her argument was that only socialism 
could deliver the objective of national liberation 
(Munck, 1986:52-53). 
It was Lenin's contribution on the national 
question which has had the most practical effect 
historically. Munck explains how his often 
"contradictory and pragmatic" writings on the 
issue were codif,ied as an "orthodoxy" most 
notably by Stalin. This in effect meant that the 
"right to self-determination" was articulated but 
not necessarily practiced by the USSR (MunCk, 
1986:69). In the end the handling of the national 
question by the Second International, the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and 
Comintern did little to advance the theoretical 
clarification of the issue of the relationship 
between socialism and nationalism. In the 
Russian Socialist and Democratic Labour Party, 
the issue of the representation of Jewish workers 
in the party initial.ly gave rise to the discussion 
of this matter (Munck, 1986:69). But it was 
Lenin's analysis of imperialism that revealed the 
complexity of the issue and gave rise to his 
development of a fuller response. Consistent 
w i t h h i s v i ew o n i d e o I o g y, L e n i n d i s t i n g u i s h e d 
between bourgeois and proletarian nationalism. 
This led to him charting a course between what 
Munck describes as rightist "socialist 
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nationalists" and the "leftist denial of nation 
oppression" (Munck, 1986:71 ). 
The issue of the nation is intricately bound 
up with that of the development of the state in 
Lenin's writings. Marxism had to recognise two 
distinct tendencies in relation to nation-states 
and imperialism according to Lenin. The first was 
the rise of nation-states on the periphery of 
imperialism and the second the increasing 
globalisation of capital, markets, and culture in 
general (Lenin, 1976). 
The history of socialist movements 
grappling with the national question shows the 
considerable theoretical confusion over the 
matter. While Lenin may have analysed the 
trends in relation to nationalism, his response to 
the matter was largely tactical. It amounts to a 
recognition of the psychological state of 
historical subjects, the fact that they may or may 
not have revolutionary consciousness, and a 
recognition of the strategic importance of 
territory in relation to the overall struggle of the 
working class internationally. This means that 
the right of any group of people that regard 
themselves as a nation, whilst being recognised, 
may have to be sacrificed in the interests of the 
working class internationally. Clearly this is a 
less than simple matter at the level of practical 
politics. The response of any group will therefore 
depend on their willingness to play the role of 
the proverbial sacrificial lamb in such a 
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situation. If coerced they may well respond by 
rejecting the interests of the overall working 
class in favour of their national group. In 
practice that often seems to have been the case. 
The National Question in the Third World 
Munck explains how this issue was at the 
centre of the Third International's experience in 
relation to the national question. In the era of 
anti-colonial struggles after the Second World 
War, the interests of the then Soviet Union and 
its leader Stalin often seemed to dictate the 
response of the Comintern on the matter. Lenin 
had done away with the distinctions between 
First and Third World nationalisms created by 
the Marxist legacy of "historic" and "non-historic 
nations", but this did not settle the theoretical 
issue of what nationalism is and how it has to be 
engaged by socialists. 
Since the time of the Comintern, the key 
issue has been whether or not the bourgeoisie in 
a colonially occupied territory could be 
revolutionary or not. The most oppressed and 
exploited sections of the nationally oppressed 
people, workers and peasants, needed to know 
how to relate to this class politically in pursuit of 
their common goal of national liberation. The 
contradiction for the poor is clear. Will national 
liberation not simply result in their enslavement 
by the local bourgeoisie once the coloniser has 
been defeated? If so, there is little to choose 
from between these two groups of exploiters. The 
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working class could maximise its opportunities by 
struggling for socialism and not national 
liberation. If the workers had an organisation 
that could lead the revolution, they were urged to 
do so by the Comintern; if not, they should 
support the bourgeois movement, but attempt to 
build the socialist potential in the revolution. 
The experience in the various countries 
under imperialist rule was so vast and varied 
that any tactical response was bound to be 
useful in some countries and useless, or even 
detrimental in others. In many respects, the 
debates started by Marx and that plagued the 
Second International simply continued. Even 
though Marxist theory was developing, the 
central issue in relation to nationalism still had 
not been addressed and some Marxists even 
began to argue it could not be. 
Debates at this period directly concerned 
South Africa, where the Communist Party of 
South Africa (CPSA) had emerged as a 
significant political force in the then colonised 
country. Experiences in various parts of the 
world began to cause the divergence of theory 
and practice that has come to characterise 
Marxism in general. Munck explains how debates 
that extended outside the Comintern all still 
turned on the issue of whether national liberation 
or socialism came first. However the issue also 
began to arise as to what kind of national 
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liberation could be won in the struggle against 
imperialism (1986:96). 
Global debates and events were by this time 
so locked into the logic of the Cold War that any 
contribution on the issue of the relationship has 
to be viewed in that context. The end of the 
Comintern saw the rise of independent centers of 
Marxist thought that led to a number of 
contradictory developments. While anti-colonial 
struggles continued to see Marxist theoreticians 
grapple with the relationship between socialism 
and capitalism, the responses were as varied as 
geography and history could ensure. "Third 
Worldism" literally turned the historic/non-
historic nations thesis "on its head" by positing 
the thesis that the countries that had made the 
break, or could make the break, with imperialism, 
were the most revolutionary. At the same time, 
independent Marxists in Latin America, Africa, 
and elsewhere began to grapple with the 
conundrum in their own way, often with positive 
results. Debray, incidentally, was personally 
involved in a number of these struggles. 
Amilcar Cabral was one of the most 
influential revolutionaries in this respect. 
Cabal-'s anti-Eurocentric stance challenged the 
reduction of history to being simply that of class 
struggle. For Cabral, the struggle for national 
liberation was a social, political, and economic 
one that allowed people to "regain their 
historical personality". He argued that the 
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revolutionary petite-bourgeoisie, who would be 
the dominant class where the working class was 
weak, needed to be prepared to "commit suicide 
as a class" to allow the socialist revolution to 
triumph. Obviously, that does not often happen in 
reality (Munck, 1986:1 09). 
In essence, however, the debate still 
remained locked in the logic of the contradiction 
left by Marx. Abandoning any hope of resolution, 
some Marxists have concluded that nationalism is 
not a theoretical but a practical or political 
question. In his historical consideration of the 
practical handling of nationalism by socialists, 
which is valuable in its own right, Munck never 
adequately deals with the theoretical issue of 
nationalism because he does not consider the 
inter-disciplinary nature of his own subject and 
the need to consider its history as being 
determined not only by socialists agencies but 
also by non-socialists factors. Not only Marxist 
theory and practice, but also the forces of 
colonialism and imperialism have determined the 
term "nation" in Marxist debate. Just as 
Chidester reveals the contested nature of the 
term "religion", and the role of the study of 
religion in colonialism, any consideration of the 
national question must do the same (1996:3). 
The category of nation is inherently contested, 
as are definitions of the state, economy, and 
even class, because of capitalist, colonialist, 
and imperialist relations of power and struggles 
for emancipation and liberation. 
/ 
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Debray argues that Marxism has failed to 
"reflect the conditions of existence of the 
national phenomenon". Debray goes further to 
remark that "the energy of nationalism leaves the 
apparatus of 'scientific socialism' looking very 
sheepish" (25). Debray explains that while the 
nation is a phenomenon which is "historically 
determined", what the nation expresses, the 
"cultural organisation Of the human collective", IS 
not. It is a permanent, structural feature of 
social existence. For Debray, as we have seen, 
the very essence of this existence is the sacred. 
He states emphatically that the sacred is the 
"real national question" (1977b: 26). He also 
argues that no socialist revolution has ever 
taken place that was not "fused with a national 
liberation struggle', or where it did not defend "a 
national identity" (1977b:33). 
Some examples of various contemporary 
views expressed in relation to Marxist practice 
and the national question reveal the generally 
accepted truth described by Debray. Gopal 
Balakrishnan has commented that Marxism has 
b.een "confounded" by the failure of the 
proletariat to defeat it's class enemy, 
internationally or in advanced industrialised 
countries (1995:57). The historian Eric 
Hobsbawm sees this as an inevitable result of 
t h e u n i v e r s a I i s m o f t h e I e f t p r o j e. c t a n d n o t j u s t 
as a flaw in Marxism (1992). This again 
illustrates the theoretical issue which has to be 
dealt with, namely, how do we explain the 
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contradiction between the universalising and 
localising processes that are observed to be a 
feature of the development of society? 
Class Revisited 
In Marxist theory since the Second World 
War there has been a noticeable shift in debates 
on the nature of nationalism and the national 
question. The three noticeable types of 
responses are augmented by the acceptance of 
the inability of classical Marxism to explain the 
durability of nationalism. Some noticeable 
exceptions do occur. James M. Blaut has put 
forward some convincing arguments for accepting 
an amended framework of what is basically 
classical Marxism. Blaut suggests that "historical 
materialism is an incomplete theory where it 
deals with pre-capitalist history and Third World 
geography: it is still to some degree Eurocentric 
and diffusionist" (Biaut, 1987:4). Even though 
Blaut is careful to disclaim comprehensive status 
for his interpretation of Marxism and the national 
question, he makes a number of important points. 
Not least of these is that nationalism does have 
some relationship to class struggle. Although 
Debray does not explicitly rule out the notion of 
class struggle, he does play it down. Blaut 
reminds us of the fact that national struggles, 
particularly in the colonial context, have 
elements of class struggle that are central to 
these efforts. The relationship between coloniser 
and colonised is both one of othering as well as 
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one of exploitation. Indeed, the one relationship 
facilitates the other. In South Africa, this 
argument has a specific relevance. 
What remains obvious, however, is that 
Marxists have not got to grips with the fact that 
nationalism, ethnicity, and racism have persisted 
and have become more powerful despite the 
industrialisation of society and the emergence of 
global culture, markets, and capital. Debray is 
one of a number of social theorists who 
concerned to explain this phenomenon. His 
proposal to deal with· this problem by, firstly, 
recognising the religious nature of social 
existence, and secondly by recognising the 
material nature of symbolic efficacy is however, 
in many respects, distinctive. In order to 
understand Debray's contribution, however, it 
will be necessary to review broader trends in 
non-Marxist discourse on the phenomena of 
nationalism, ethnicity, and racism. Despite his 
criticisms of Marxism, Debray's views do not fit 
easily into any of these approaches, 
nevertheless, they raise issues that Debray's 




and Modernist theories of 
academic discussion the 
phenomenon of nationalism is distinguished from 
that of ethnicity on the grounds that nationalism 
relates primarily to claims to the right of self-
determination and is usually connected to some 
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kind of attempt to locate political power in the 
form of a nation-state. Ethnicity, on the other 
hand, is seen as related to the determination of 
differences within a context of a particular nation 
state (Calhoun, 1993:211-239). However, this 
definitional distinction between nationalism and 
ethnicity is not supported by any significant 
argument. Arguably, any ethnic identity could be 
regarded as an aspirant nationalism if it 
articulates the demand for state power. It is also 
quite obvious that conquered nations do not 
necessarily have state power. This would not 
necessarily reduce them to the status of an 
ethnic group. Such distinctions seem to be 
affected by the kind of problematic that 
Chidester explains in relation to the colonial 
encounter. The main motivation for describing an 
identity as being "not national" would be the 
strategic dismissal of its legitimacy. 
suggested that a Benedict Anderson has 
critique of existing theory 
question needs to start from 
on the national 
' 
the position of 
recognising that even those who seek to do away 
with the phenomenon are prone to act according 
to it. He cites wars between socialist states as 
examples (Anderson, 1983:1 ). Anderson goes on 
to argue that both the Marxist and liberal 
traditions have failed to deal with the "anomaly" 
of "nation-ness, as well as nationalism", which 
are in his view a type of "cultural artifact" 
(Anderson, 1983:4). It is also significant that 
Anderson does not see nationalism as an 
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ideology as defined in the sense of the classical 
m o d e r n i d e o I o g i e s s u c h a s I i b e r a I i s m o r fa s c is m . 
He prefers to classify it along with categories of 
social phenomena such as religion and kinship 
(Anderson, 1983:5). The reduction of nationalism 
to culture is obviously problematic. Not only is 
nationalism more than culture, but it is arguable 
that nationalism informs culture. It may well be 
the case that nationalism is articulated and 
negotiated in and through culture, but there is 
more to the phenomenon than just ways of 
talking, eating, and drinking. 
Anderson is supported in his critique of 
liberal theorists on the national question by 
Partha Chatterjee. Chatterjee notes what he 
describes as the "liberal-rationalist dilemma" in 
relation to considerations of nationalism 
(Chatterjee, 1991 :2). Where theories of 
nationalism constructed by Europeans and 
American theorists do not concur with reality, 
especially in the colonial situation and in the 
light of the terrible atrocities and destruction 
carried out in the name of nationalism, these 
theorists are apt to start distinguishing between 
types of nationalisms. They begin to retreat into 
racist or orientalist positions that provide their 
arguments no advantage, but which have the 
virtue of exposing the moribund nature of their 
thoughts on the matter. 
The main debate in liberal theory and in 
non-Marxist theory generally with respect to the 
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national question has turned on the issue of 
whether nations are archaic or modern features 
of society. Two influential proponents of these 
opposing schools of thought are student and 
teacher, Anthony Smith and Ernest Gellner. 
Smith defines nationalism as "an ideological 
movement for the attainment and maintenance of 
autonomy, unity and identity of a human 
population, some of whose members conceive it 
to constitute an actual or potential 'nation"'. He 
defines a nation as "a named human population 
sharing an historic territory, common myths and 
memories, a mass, public culture, a single 
economy and common rights and duties for all 
members". Smith goes on to point out that this 
"kind of social and cultural community" ensures 
the unique loyalty of its members. He 
distinguishes the state as a separate "legal and 
political concept" from nation, though the two are 
closely related in his view (1996:359). 
Smith argues that states preceded 
nationalism and that the "lack of spatial and 
temporal fit" between these two phenomena is 
one of the prime reasons for contemporary 
conflict of a national character. Smith continues 
by claiming that nations are not "perennial and 
immemorial", and while they may be partly 
"imagined" entities as Anderson has argued, or 
even "invented" as Hobsbawm suggests, they 
are not purely the product of "modernisation" or 
a "feature of modernity" (1996c:360-361). Smith's 
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point of view is that nations are the "products of 
pre-existing traditions and heritages which have 
coalesced over the generations" ( 1996:361 ). In 
other words, they are imagined or invented out of 
the raw material of the past, which turns out, 
according to Smith, to be essentially ethnic. 
In addressing the relationship between 
nationalism and modernity, Smith has tackled 
what he describes as the "conservative" school 
of nationalism, exemplified by the classical 
romanticist Kedourie (Smith, 1971:6, 8). Smith 
has also criticised the Durkheimian notion that 
nationalism fulfills the role of a "civic religion". 
He prefers to see 
which is in turn 
systems" (1971:54). 
nationalism as an ideology, 
a sub-category of "belief 
Since Smith has argued that nations are not 
modern in their origins and not religious in their 
nature, they are archaic and secular 
phenomenon. Smith's v1ew is an interesting one .. 
He argues that there are examples of "ancient 
nationalisms", such as Zealotism and pan-
Hellenism, in which it is possible to distinguish 
between "polycentric" and "ethnic" nationalism 
(1971:158, 161). It is arguable that this very 
distinction undermines Smith's theory of 
primordiality, since N reveals that the raw 
material of any national identity need not be 
ethnic. Smith also agues that to understand 
nationalism we must separate out the 
"sentiments, consciousness, attitudes, 
149 
aspirations, and loyalties" that are to do with 
nationalism from the "doctrines, ideologies, 
programs and activities of organisations and 
movements that are attached to these 
(1971:168). As Debray shows, it is precisely that 
separation which allows us to undermine the 
distinction usually drawn between types of 
collective identity. 
Smith argues that in contrast to the 
"modernist" position that Ernest Gellner 
proposes, his position is one that directly links 
nations to "ethnic" and "cultural" predecessors 
and even to "pre-modern" versions of these. He 
criticises modernisation theories as also being 
too general and of hampered by the economistic 
materialism which they advocate (1996:361). He 
argues that, while not all nations have these 
"antecedents", the "prototypes" of European 
nations did, and all nations since have mimicked 
these models. He refers to this "perspective" as 
being "ethno-symbolic", at the same time as 
questioning the very notion of a single theory of 
nationalism. In this way he distinguishes the 
"civic, territorial nationalism of the French 
Revolution and the West, which sees the nation 
as a territorial association of citizens living 
under the same laws and sharing a mass, public 
culture" from "ethnic nationalism" which sees 
"the nation as a community of genealogical 
descent, vernacular culture, native history and 
pop u I a r mob i I is at ion" ( 1 9 9 6 a: 3 61-3 6 2). 
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Gellner's response to this argument is 
basically that if the past mattered so much then 
all nations would have a rich past in the way 
Smith describes it as being necessary 
(1996a:365). As Gellner observes, however, the 
"role of culture in human life was totally 
transformed by that cluster of economic and 
scientific changes which have transformed the 
world since the seventeenth century." He goes on 
to argue that it is the "incorporation and . 
mastery of high culture ... a literate codified 
culture which permits context-free 
communication" that is essential to nations and 
nationalism. He continues in this vein to 
describe how "the mobility and anonymity of 
modern society and the semantic non-
physical nature of work" make this "culture and 
acceptability in it the most valuable possession a 
(person) has" (1996a:368). In Gellner's view, 
people have to become nationalists because 
economic, political, and even social survival and 
advancement are tied to this phenomenon. This 
was not always the case. Prior to the 
development of capitalism, and arguably the 
subsequent developments of colonialism and 
imperialism, people lived in primarily agrarian 
communities in which culture played the role of 
ascribing social position and identity differently. 
(1996:368) Status and identity were expressed 1n 
primarily religious terms and in relation to a 
monarch or leader. Language and other 
differences were so vast that even villages were 
distinct from one another in other cultural terms, 
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making for a variety of culture no longer possible 
in the world. For Gellner, there is little or no 
real continuity between the Ancient Greeks and 
the Greeks of today. In this respect nations do 
not "have navels", meaning, they do not 
necessarily have primordial origins in the form of 
ethnicity. ( 1996a:369). As has been noted from 
,S m i t h ' s own c I a s s if i c a t i o n of n a t i o n a I i s m s i n to 
"polycentric" and "ethnic", as well as his 
definition of "civic" nationalism, Gellner's point 
is not adequately answered by Smith. 
Where agreement can be found among 
diverse theoris.ts such as Gellner, Hobsbawm, 
Anderson, and Smith is that they all find that 
nationalism operates at the symbolic level. Their 
explanations for this symbolic aspect of 
nationalism vary, but they share the dilemma of 
relating the symbolic character of nationalism to 
ethnicity, culture, economics, or the quest for 
state power. While useful contributions, these 
theories of nationalism offered by social 
theorists not from the classical Marxist school of 
thought have also failed to deal adequately with 
the problem of nationalism because they do 
explain the relation between the symbolic 
ethnic, cultural, religious, or ideological 
symbolism -and power. Debray's strength is that 
he offers a theoretical framework that explains 
all "belief systems", as Smith refers to them, 
without elevating any one to a position of 
primacy. 
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A few points will illustrate further 
weaknesses of non-Marxist theories of 
nationalism. In the first instance, if as Smith 
strongly argues but Gellner and others seem not 
seriously opposed to, nations have ethnic 
origins, his argument that this is the primary 
model of nationalism cannot be sustained. 
Obviously, there are nations that do have a myth 
or memory of some ethnic past. The problem for 
such a theory, however, is not only that are 
there are nations that do not have this ethnic 
perspective, but it also seems not to matter once 
a nation exists what its origins are. People 
believe they are American, for example, even 
though they come from a variety of ethnic 
backgrounds. In addition, such a theory does not 
explain where ethnicity comes from and only 
argues that it 1s different from nationalism 
because the latter relates to the state. Such a 
view is wholly Eurocentric, since it sees 
nationalism "spreading out" from Europe along 
with the diffusion of the modern state form. It is 
obvious that states existed in other parts of the 
world, such as in what are now China and 
Greece, These were certainly not unlike nation-
states in the modern sense, yet they pre-date the 
nation-states of Europe. Since an argument could 
be made for these nations having influenced 
states in Europe, the European exemplar theory 
cannot be sustained. 
The modernist theory on the other hand 
does not explain how it is that the cultures that 
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become an essential aspect of any nationalism 
originate in a previous "low" culture, to use 
Gellner's phrase. Not only this, but as Smith has 
pointed out, some "low" cultures perish but 
others do not (Smith, 1996b:380). It is not 
sufficient to argue that it just is the case that 
some cultures survive and others do not. 
Nationalism and the State 
Other theorists have come closer to 
providing a fuller account of nationalism. Patrick 
H a II has argued that the nation is i.t s e If "a soc i a I 
relation of power and knowledge" that "becomes 
represented as a discursive regime, where the 
nation appears to be the historical subject" 
(1997:3). Hall explains the relationship between 
institutions such as the state and pedagogy, 
whose authoritative, and universal functions, as 
well as the individualist, historicist functioning 
of culture enable what is a modern expression of 
a "discursive hegemony" (1997:3). As such Hall's 
theoretical framework has many of the elements 
of a fuller account of nationalism, including the 
manner in which space and time, as well as 
claims to knowledge and actual physical power 
operate at the level of a culture to bring about 
the collective recognition of similarity that is 
nationalism. 
The role of the state in organising people 
and in the pedagogy of subjects is explained as 
being an aspect of the nation-state that 
characterises the "social relation of power and 
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knowledge" (1997:3) But Hall does not explain 
the sociological aspects of identity fully. For 
example, he gives no account of the functioning 
of religion or other forms of ideology. While he 
describes the manner in which the state 
functions as the official "academy", generating 
the "sovereign objective truth", he explains this 
purely at the level of the discourse and does not 
describe the materialist origins of this hegemony. 
None of the non-Marxist theorists explain, 
at a general level, the origins and functioning of 
the social collective or the specific nature and 
functioning of social identity and nationalism in 
particular. It is often not even clear that 
theorists in the various non-Marxist approaches 
are talking about nationalism as a single 
phenomenon, given the varieties of nationalisms 
alleged to exist and the astrategic nature of the 
dominant theories. Debray challenges Marxist 
and non-Marxists alike to rethink the national 
question. He offers an alternative perspective 
through his argument for the recognition of the 
phenomenon of symbolic efficacy. 
Symbolic 
Identities 
Efficacy: The Manufacture of 
As has already been indicated, in Oebray's 
theoretical framework, collective or social 
identities are produced by the religiopolitical 
unconscious. The delimitation of space and time, 
the two strategies that humanity deploys against 
the inevitability of death, give rise to group or 
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collective consciousness. Origin and inscription 
give rise to "ritual repetition, the ritualisation of 
memory, celebration, commemoration-in short, 
all those forms of magical behaviour signifying 
defeat of the irreversibility of time" and the 
marking out of "the outline of sacred space", 
which is the mythical birth of a society. In short, 
according to Debray, myth and ritual make the 
nation. (1977b:27) They do this by providing an 
articulation of the biological, psychological, and 
territorial requirements of the collective and the 
individuals that constitute it. The strategy for the 
simultaneous management of these aspects of 
humanity is that of enabling the location of the 
individual subject and the collectivity in space 
and time. 
The sacred and politics are one and the 
same thing. Not only are "national and social 
liberation struggles" deeply affected by religion 
(5). The official rituals of the nation-state, which 
find their extreme case in the cult of 
personality, reveal the unitary nature of religion 
and politics. It is "the circle that produces the 
sacred", and encirclement that intensifies the 
level of sanctity (312). 
But the nation is only one possible 
"modality of a primary invariable belonging to 
human nature". Although the nation is the 
inevitable territory which a group must occupy if 
it is to exist, cultural identity is premised on 
d iff ere n c e ( 1 9 7 7 b : 2 9 ) . T h i s d o e s not me an that 
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the nation 1s an idealist category. On the 
contrary, for Debray "the idea of the nation is the 
most materialist of ideas" (1977b:29). 
In Debray's view the demarcation of 
territories is essentially a consequence of 
conflict, or war. The first communities were 
founded on the principle of defense (270). The 
state has its origins in this process and identity 
is created as such communities are founded 
(280). In other words, the precursor to modern 
nationalism is the Hellinism of ancient Greece, 
the Catholicism of the Middle Ages, and modified 
Protestantism of the Enlightenment (280). It 1s 
also the pre-colonial identity of inhabitants of 
Southern Africa, South America, and as written 
record shows, of the Chinese empire. Unlike the 
theorists who see a discontinuity between these 
various modalities of the collective, Oebray 
argues strongly for the position that, family, 
clan, tribe, ethnie, city-state, religion, and 
nation are all variations on a theme. They are all 
ways of operating at a collective level; in other 
words they all represent the social aspect of our 
human existence. Like nationalism, none of these 
forms of social organisation are merely 
epiphenomena. As Oebray argues, the nation is 
no superstructure, however. Like language and 
culture, it is a real infrastructure because it 
facilitates the social functioning of collectives 
(1977b:38). 
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The Orthodoxy of Politics 
Identity is about stereotypes. The ideal 
types that define the identities that are created 
through the processes of history and geography 
are obviously fictions in the sense that there is 
no person that actually corresponds exactly to an 
ideal type in reality. Debray develops this point 
further by. adding that the production of 
stereotypes 1s itself a stereotyped process, 
involving the creation of an orthodoxy. He argues 
that this process is a continuous one that is 
"hidden" behind the ideologico-religious. What 1s 
constantly taking place behind the ideologico-
religious, Debray argues, is "incorporation 
through the production of a lack" (243). 
As was explained above, organisation takes 
place around an absence. This process of 
organisation and the founding absence creates 
the power of the other and the opportunity to 
mediate in this situation. The figure of this 
absence is the pedagogical father and the 
absence tor the group is death. What is needed 
for the foundation of a doctrine then, is the 
death of this pedagogical figure. 
All authority stems from the fact that those 
in authority speak not in their own name but in 
the name of such a figure. Even the most extreme 
forms of the cult of the personality require the 
cult figure to speak in the name of some other 
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figure or entity. Stalin, for all his power, had to 
speak in the name of Marx or Lenin. Pol Pot and 
Kim il Sung suffered the same circumstances. 
Within organisations, it is the emissaries who 
wield the power of command, and always on 
behalf of some higher authority. This includes 
the function of teaching itself. Debray argues 
that the communication of truth is dependent on 
what is "a potentially religious hierarchical 
matrix". To that end, "belief and transmission are 
coextensive" (246). Any organised system of 
ideas that is considered to be true and 
authoritative by a community is a doctrine. The 
relationship between what is taught and how it is 
taught is of great importance, according to 
Debray, since the history of all belief systems 
has been about masters or teachers and their 
disciples or followers. The process of 
organisation requires "conversion, indoctrination 
and correction". In short, it requires continuous 
education (248). 
Debray points out the obvious contradiction 
for historical materialism in this regard. The 
attempt to define this theory as a science is 
constantly undermined by the fact that it has to 
be regarded as authoritative and "all true" if it is 
to be effective as an ideology. It therefore has 
had to become a doctrine and like all doctrines a 
matter of faith, dogma, and orthodoxy. This 
problem is structural and cannot be overcome by 
the theory itself, since the theory is subject to 
the same weakness (250-251 ). 
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The sacred enters into politics by virtue of 
the fact that this relationship between the 
teacher/authority and the students/followers is 
premised on a distinction between the profane 
and the sacred. Those who do not accept the 
authority of the doctrine and the leader are, by 
definition profane, and those that do are part of 
the sacred society. This may involve what can be 
termed recognised degrees of sacredness, where 
disciples are promoted until they may be part of 
an inner circle. Religion and ideology, as far as 
Debray is concerned, are the institutionalisation 
of this sacred element in society. The 
relationship between the teacher/authority and 
students/followers implies relations of the 
transmission of the doctrine as well as the 
content of the doctrine. 
Debray argues that there are two key 
aspects of doctrinal work which are caused by 
the political unconscious in relation to ideas. 
These are circumscription and exclusion. 
Organisation takes place through the inclusion 
and exclusion of subjects as well as the 
relationship of those subjects to the sacred ideas 
and texts of a group. Any idea, if it is to survive, 
requires a school or a pedagogical ·institution. 
Such a body requires an orthodoxy to function, 
but this orthodoxy stands in contradiction to any 
notion of the idea as a driving force for change. 
This inclination towards orthodoxy is particularly 
problematic for Marxism, since it points to the 
inherently conservative nature of doctrines. 
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These "regulate identities and stabalise change" 
(256). If this is true then the very idea of 
revolutionary change becomes problematic. 
Funerals serve a particular function in the 
founding of groups, according to Debray. 
Sacrifice and sacrilisation go hand in hand. 
Whether by execution or other means, the 
founding absence that creates a group must be 
present. This creates the void around which the 
group can organise itself (258). Debray argues 
that death has such a power to drive 
organisation because "it is the basis of the group 
unconscious and the source of group history" 
(259). Death is evident in all the myths of 
foundation for societies, and where necessary 
this involves a ritual sacrifice. As Debray puts it, 
"death transforms time into space and a 
biography into a topology of actions and words 
punctuated by our memories" (260). Death is 
both a guarantor for the collective and a reason 
for the group to congregate. 
The ecclesiastical structure of the group is 
one that Debray believes is necessary for the 
group to survive. Individual humans are mortal 
but groups can seem immortal to the extent that 
they transcend the deaths of individuals. Since 
we have to organise ourselves to attempt to 
avoid death, there is a futility to this practice 
which underlies all social activity. This collective 
anguish is the basis of collective life that is 
-fashioned in the midst of the chaos and disorder 
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that surround us constantly. Political work is 
therefore frustrating, tiresome, and even 
unproductive, but it is unavoidable (268). All 
attempts to avoid entropy, which are what the 
activities of the collective are, are by definition 
conservative as far as Debray is concerned. 
Debray argues that the survival of groups 
and the definition of individuals within groups 
are governed by the fact that the "inscription 
principle" demarcates either "ideal or material 
territory". This principle ensures that the 
dimension of the group, namely space, 
predominates. Inscription allows the definition of 
sanctuary, which is obviously hallowed as it has 
life preserving property. That which preserves 
life is sacred. Debray describes his sacred 
enclosure as simultaneously "military, political 
and religious" (270). 
Debray goes on to describe effective 
doctrines that continue to exist as "topographical 
systems". All space is managed and all 
management is in terms of the spatial. The 
organisation of time is managed within the space 
created through the ceremonial aspects of 
collective existence. Through these cultural 
activities the group seeks to "domesticate the 
unpredictable and to exorcise the future by 
commemorating the past" (271). As already 
noted, doctrines function to provide security for 
the group. Dogmas are therefore the product of 
fear. But the belief and power necessary for the 
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doctrinal effect arise from humanity's "biological 
impotence and logical incapacity" (274). These 
problems of our sociability are, in a 
contradictory manner, caused by the very 
absence of a biological means of historical 
transmission of group identity. It is because 
there is uncertainty about the project of any 
collective that what Debray describes as "bodies 
of cultural functionaries" arise, which are 
experts in ensuring the continued existence of 
any given collective. 
Inscription is embodied in the phenomenon 
of territory, since it cannot be embodied in itself. 
This territoriality is the necessary reply of the 
political to the presence of "hostility", the threat 
which gives rise to the political in the first place. 
Whether in the form of actual physical territory 
or the territory of doctrines, this principle is the 
same. The enclosure of doctrines and cities is 
described by Debray as being preventative. He 
calls spatial enclosure "the first anthropological 
act of self-defense" (276). The need for security 
is necessitated by the continued presence of war 
in society. Debray characterises war as being 
"universal and recurrent" and "inherent in the 
existence of social groups" (277). The duality of 
social existence is defined by the existence of 
the individual and the enemy and this is 
encapsulated in the principle of inscription. 
According to Debray, "Enclosure is the basic 
category of the political world, since the 
opposition between inside and outside 
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establishes both its identity and its necessity" 
(277). 
Doctrines are prone to exclusivity because 
they are themselves founded by the act of 
exclusion. Any heresy, if it is to survive, must 
succumb to the orthodoxy effect. This arises out 
of the need to create a strong community. Debray 
argues that ideas "come into politics" by a 
strategic need. Any doctrine is a weapon 
developed from culture. We can look back over 
history and recount the creation of any identity 
by its other, whether in the form of "ethnic 
groups, nations, religions or classes" (280). For 
Debray, all movements are born in struggle and 
involve the use of force, violence, and war in 
what he identifies as the process of "cultural 
normalisation". 
The exemplar in this regard is Constantine, 
who combined politics, religion, and warfare in 
the creation of the unified "sovereign, warrior 
and theologian". Any movement must imitate this 
"Constantine effect" and adopt a total approach 
to organisation if it is to be successful. 
Constantine is not only the exemplar but also the 
foundation of modern Western society for 
Debray. By taking Christianity and making it the 
hegemonic religion of the "West", Constantine 
also made Christianity essential to political faith. 
Christianity allowed for the unilinear direction to 
history and theory as well as providing the final 
end point for this process. 
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The Strategic Imperative 
Since political practice is defined by Debray 
as being about war and strategy, all other 
aspects of political discourse are discarded as 
being utopian because they are "atopian", in that 
they do not relate to territory. Even Marx's 
communist society is unrealisable in the form in 
which he proclaims it, simply because it is 
astrategic and therefore atopian. Marx never 
considered the theory of warfare in his 
deliberations and thus made it impossible for 
people to engage with him. This did not stop his 
theory becoming a powerful movement, but, as 
Debray puts it, this was not because of Marx's 
theory, but in spite of it. 
All political programmes announce 
intentions, but whether .these are realisable is a 
matter of strategy and tactics, according to 
Debray. The need for strategy creates in turn the 
need for security. What this need for security 
does is undermine the very viability of 
revolutionary change. The absence of progress 
in terms of communist ideas is explained by 
Debray as being a result of the astrategic nature 
of these ideas. According to Debray, it was 
claimed by Marx that communist society would 
not be in need of any banners. But without these 
banners no one could be mobilised. In this sense 
all social formations must be territorial, and 
therefore those existing territorial units must be 
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efficacious, otherwise they would not exist for 
very long. 
It is in this sense that Debray levels a 
significant charge against Marxism and the 
theory of historical materialism. Debray makes 
the suggestion that a synthesis of Marxist ideas 
and the ideas of Clausewitz, the philosopher of 
war, would have perhaps cured this problem, but 
that this synthesis did not take place. This is not 
strictly true, since Lenin can be described as 
being the Marxist theoretician that saw the 
strategic weakness of Marxism. His solution was 
the formation of the professional revolutionary 
organisation, the Party. However, as Munck, 
amongst others, has shown, while this may have 
solved the pedagogical problem of Marxism and 
created a strategic vehicle for managing the 
ideological territory, the Party did not deal with 
the problem of managing the relationship 
between geographical territory and the cultural 
identities which people have acquired. This left 
Marxism perplexed by the nature of nationalism 
and how to grapple with it at a practical level. 
The fact that all collective action is strategic in 
the final analysis ensures the failure of all 
utopian ideas. In this respect all revolutions 
have announced programmes, but have failed to 
implement them. Debray's criticism is that class 
is literally "trumped" by nationalism in that 
individuals will tend to go along with the 
nationalist option when presented with the 
dilemma of choosing between the two. Marx 
I 
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failed to recognise this because of the astrategic 
nature of his theory. 
A Social Physics 
Debray returns to the issue of Marxism's 
lack of a theory of representation in order to 
interrogate the issue of symbols. He argues that 
to understand symbols, emblems and banners we 
need to have "a theory of the imaginary and of 
the subject, or of the imaginary constitution of 
identity" (309). All that Marxism says about these 
is that they are undesirable hangovers from our 
prehistoric past, but that is not good enough as 
far as Debray is concerned. All socialist 
formations and movements have placed a great 
deal of emphasis on symbolic production and 
manipulation. What is even more significant in 
Debray's estimation is the fact that the theory of 
Marxism has "overlooked" the matter of the 
nation. Despite socialist revolutions, which have 
usually taken place within nation states or within 
a national framework, the nation-state has 
continued to exist and has been essential to 
socialism. If the nation, as Marx would have us 
believe, is a historically determined category, 
then the fact that these still exist under 
socialism and even seem to be essential to 
socialist revolutions needs to be explained. 
Debray's own view is that because the need 
for frontiers is determined by the threat of war, 
and in that respect socialist groups are no 
different from any other type of group. For 
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socialist countries national antagonisms have not 
withered away. What this illustrates is that the 
idea of communism being built in one country or 
in any limited section of the world is one that is 
unattainable, since this would mean encirclement 
by other countries, which would necessitate a 
specialised bureaucracy for the safety and 
security of the country. This in turn would 
generate shortages in the society through the 
"war economy" of such an encampment. Such a 
situation is the antithesis of communism, 
according to Debray. 
The removal of this hostile aspect of society 
is desirable as far as Debray is concerned, but it 
is idealistic. Since religion is "the continuation 
of war by other means", the same would apply to 
religion. If we were to do away with war we could 
do away with religion, but that is the same as 
arguing for the end of society (312). This 
proposed "state of nature" is utopian and would 
mean the end of history. When societies are 
under threat the sacred is subjected to an 
intensification as the social physics that Debray 
has described comes into effect. This "escalation 
of the sacred" is unavoidable because it is 
endemic and structural. In, this respect Debray 
also identifies a correlation between religious 
fundamentalism and the foundation of any 
political community. Debray argues that the 
sequence of organisation that follows the 
configuration of war, religion, and institution, 
provides a clear exposition of social physics, 
168 
revealing the normally latent mechanisms of the 
establishment of order" (316). 
The effects of the social physics Debray 
constructs are dramatic. Not only can the sacred 
not be done away with, but the division between 
what are described as the rational and irrational 
aspects of our collective socia I existence are 
entrenched within the group. The ritualised 
conflict between the "sacred and profane, 
irrational and rational, archaism and modernity, 
universal and local" constitutes a regular 
contradiction that regulates social 
existence(323). This creates a "constancy 
principle" that De bray believes "governs the 
functioning of the social apparatus". This he also 
describes as the "spontaneous self-regulation of 
collective identities" (324). 
The traditional consideration of this 
antithetical relationship between pairs is one 
that seeks to consider reconciliation of this 
divide or destruction of one aspect of the divide, 
usually considered to be negative, as illustrated, 
for example, in the attempt to conquer 
irrationality through scientific instruction and 
education. The notions of progress and 
evolution are, however, contradicted by what 
Debray describes as "ethnic factors" that 
intervene to restore balance to the social 
apparatus when it has been disturbed (324). But 
as far as Debray is concerned the very notion of 
progress is naive, even if it is seen in the 
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negative sense of the word, where it is 
considered to be the increasing secularisation of 
society away from the desirable in the form the 
sacred. Debray responds to this by arguing that 
where the constancy principle operates it is 
accompanied by the "law of the return" (326). 
The law of return suggests that the 
traditional manner of viewing these antithetical 
properties is flawed. Whereas the matrix of 
viewing history has been one of considering that 
society moves from one point to another, 
Debray's view is that where there is movement it 
is only in circularity and thus society perpetually 
returns to its origins. This is symptomatic of the 
fact that what is regarded as "historical 
consciousness is lined through and through by 
the a-historical unconscious" (327). Because of 
the constant presence of the sacred in society 
there can be no secularisation of history. All that 
happens is that where increasing technological 
complexity demystifies aspects of our existence, 
the sacred becomes diffused and uncontrollable, 
or commodified and privatised. 
Debray seeks to redefine the notion of the 
archaic to explain that it is not a chronologically 
determined aspect of our history, but rather the 
foundation on which social existence rises. We 
therefore have to recognise that we all belong to 
collectives, in the form of families, language and 
cultural groups, religions and nations. But these 
are not a matter of anteriority; they are a matter 
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of authority. The more modern identities are the 
more superficial they are, since they are created 
less out of the closeness of the individuals 
within them than out of the technology that 
allows for them. When a crisis occurs we retreat 
into those groups that will afford us the required 
security. Such a crisis can even challenge our 
membership of one or more of the collectives, 
but Debray describes our loyalties as 
"genealogical" (329). Since the division of 
society into these groups is not only horizontal, 
as in the Marxist sense of classes, but also 
vertical, we have to be able to explain this. 
Modernity is characterised by increasing 
aterritoriality, but this Debray argues is 
for by the ideologico-religious. 
of ideas become homes for the 




ethnicity (332). Provocatively, Debray 
characterises ideology as "what remains when 
the acropolis has been razed, the walls have 
been destroyed and the plane trees have been 
cut down" (334). The continued appearance of 
religion and even magic in modern societies is a 
reflection of the continued presence of the 
sacred. Our societies may become more complex 
and relations more abstract but the centrality of 
this fact cannot be ignored. All that happens with 
this "decentring of the sacred" is that its 
incarnation becomes concentrated and 
individualised (337). 
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What is true for time is also true for space 
in the modern world. The "archeo and neo" 
relationship is mirrored by the "micro and macro" 
and as national identities become greater and 
more diffuse, so do regional and local identities 
intensify (337). In this sense the world is "anti-
Marxist", since the notions of totalisation and 
homogenisation that are found in Marxism are 
undermined by the historical process of the 
privatisation of the sacred (339). In fact, the 
relationship between, socialism and nationalism 
in general is predetermined by what Debray 
describes as "an obsessional territorial neurosis" 
(341 ). In the end, humanity has to reproduce 
itself by fragmenting and reconfiguring as 
territory. 
A number of the claims Debray makes in 
relation to the orthodoxy of politics can be tested 
by observation of ongoing political practices. In 
defining politics as driven by orthodoxy, Debray 
argues that all organisation takes place around 
the founding absence of a society. The idea that 
the subject is created through the collective is 
the most cogent argument that can be put 
forward to explain the relationship between 
individual and collective. This description is 
dynamic because it allows for the fact that 
organisation is an ongoing activity that 
necessitates the physical and mental engagement 
of people. It also allows for the explanation of 
the ongoing tension between the universal and 
the local. 
172 
Our belief in society and even conceptions 
of truth, are a function of the authority of the 
founding absence, which creates a particular 
contradiction for any notion of a scientific social 
theory. The perpetual presence of the sacred in 
politics leads to all theory becoming doctrinal 
and dogmatic. The presence of the sacred is an 
effect of the political unconscious and the life-
death process on which society is founded. This 
explanation of a subterranean collective sense of 
identity, though not unproblematic, vividly 
describes the manner in which the symbolic 
practices that are a feature of all collectives are 
generated so that all may recognise them and 
partake in the manufacture, contestation, and 
consumption of these resources. The concept of 
the ideologico-religious allows for the theoretical 
explanation of all types of social or collective 
identities. Orthodoxy describes the material 
basis of the relationship between power and 
knowledge, through the creation of specialised 
institutions for managing these functions, as well 
as for the manufacture of the symbolic resources 
that legitimate the institutions own functioning. 
Societies are defined by the act of 
inscription which creates identity, but at the 
same time this means a delimitation of territory. 
Since groups are territorial, they are also 
strategic and must be considered as such if we 
are to understand them properly. Nations and 
ethnic groups have been ignored by astrategic 
theories, the prime example being Marxism. The 
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presence of the sacred leads to the issue of the 
traditionally defined relationship between 
antithetical pairs, which needs to be 
reconsidered in the light of Debray's constancy 
principle. The regulation of social apparatuses is 
governed by the fact that any collective must 
always seek to return to its foundation, and is 
thus subjected to a constant return to origin 
which indicates the primacy of the archaic within 
social groups. This archaism is inherent within 
any society and is even a feature of modernity, 
where it lends itself towards the ever increasing 
fragmentation of society and the localisation of 
identity. 
The Frontier 
An important factor in the functioning of 
nationalism and of collective identities that 
Debray does not adequately deal with is the 
issue of the relationship between the economic 
and the symbolic aspects of society. While it is 
true that Debray explains the functioning of 
collective identities at a general level, and even 
describes the relationship between the 
universalisation of society while it is being 
effectively privatised into more local units, he is 
far to dismissive of the economy. As we have 
seen, Oebray claims that the sacred rather than 
class is primary. To the extent that the 
organisation of society takes place in the manner 
that Debray describes this may be true. But all of 
this organisation does not take place 1n the 
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abstract or without purpose. It cannot be denied 
that where Marx was absolutely accurate was to 
describe human activity as being about the 
competition over the appropriation and 
consumption of natural resources. Debray 
acknowledges this by arguing for the restoration 
of "nature" in our understanding of "history". But 
he never adequately makes the connection 
between national and class identities, for 
example. 
The solution to this problem, however, might 
still be located in- Debray's theory. This is to be 
found in a number of themes that are 
identifiable, firstly in relation to the notion of the 
frontier, which locates concepts such as culture, 
colonialism, imperialism, and even nationalism 
and socialism 1n a particular manner that 
essentially redefines them. Secondly, in dealing 
with the simultaneous universalising and 
localising tendencies that exist in our world, 
Debray interprets history in a particular way that 
describes the relationship between power and 
knowledge in institutionalised forms that enables 
a dynamic definition of these institutions, as well 
as a dynamic analysis of the relationship 
between nationalism and class. Thirdly, the 
designation of the sacred 1n commodity 
dominated economic systems can be identified at 
two separate levels that explains the relationship 
between the archaic and modern in a manner that 
can resolve the tension between them. 
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Chidester has explained how the frontier 
has functioned both in real and imagined terms 
as a place where comparisons have developed "a 
new taxonomy of world religions" (1996:27). This 
frontier served as an "open zone of intercultural 
contact" that was subsequently "closed with the 
establishment of some form of European colonial 
hegemony" (1996:26). What he points out is that 
at the same time as this was occurring "tribal, 
ethnic, or national identities of indigenous 
people were produced in and through the process 
of establishing those colonial boundaries" 
(1996:22). It seems logical to add that at the 
same time the identities of the colonialists were 
being reproduced. Chidester points out that the 
f u n c t i o n o f r e I i g i o u s c o m pa r i s o n w a s p a r t o f a 
broader project of strategically and 
systematically othering and homogenising 
linguistic, class, gender, social, and racial 
differences, for the purposes of maximising the 
effectiveness of colonial administration. This was 
a "strategy for simplifying, and therefore 
achieving some cognitive control over, the 
bewildering complexity of a frontier zone" 
(1996:22). 
It is clear that Debray's own description of 
the historical development of identities can be 
read in the same way. Not only does he describe 
all society as being regulated by the functioning 
of frontiers which are essential to all groups. But 
the very historical development from the initial 
simple unit of the family through to the modern 
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nation can be read as one of the extension of the 
boundaries of the frontier. This process 
continues through the colonial era, and as 
Chidester has noted, serves to make the 
management of human populations economically 
profitable and administratively viable once they 
have been militarily conquered. All of this has to 
be located within an understanding of the role of 
capital, private property, and the division .of 
labour if it is to be useful as an analytical tool in 
contemporary society. 
In the same way as the colonial frontier 
functions as a special zone, we can consider the 
"frontier" between capitalism and socialism, or 
the nation and class, as the place where the 
future is being contested. It contains, as Debray 
points out, both the archaic and the modern, but 
also, as in the colonial frontier, the possibility of 
what can be in the future. The 1ssue then 
becomes how do we forge that future 
strategically, while at the same time recognising 
the contradictory nature of the present? Perhaps 
there is cause for the kind of pessimism that 
Debray seems to retreat into when he considers 
the implications of his own theory, but it is 
possible that the very nature of modernity is 
such that the genocide or erasure of the 
collective memory that is part of the colonial 
experience will not necessarily be a feature of 
this extra-colonial encounter on the frontier. The 
v e_r y u n i versa I i sing trend of c a p it a I m a y we II 
undermine the localisation trend of identity. As 
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Gellner observes, the fact that the "rich 
cultural nuances" of the "agrarian world" have 
given way to approximately 300 nation-states, 
seems proof of some kind of homogenisation 
process (1996:369). 
Even if it does not do this at a rapid rate, 
Debray points out the effect of the universalism 
of capitalism is such that it creates the space for 
the "privatisation" of the sacred. By this he 
means that where the sacred once was rigidly 
defined, whether in relation to the relevant God 
or the nationalist Leader, the effect of the 
increasing universalism of society is such that it 
allows for individual redefinitions of the sacred. 
This may mean that, where there has been a 
limiting of the role of the nation as the space 
through which people have organised 
themselves, for example in the former socialist 
countries, there may be an escalation of this 
kind of activity. But this trend could just as 
easily result in new processes of elite formation 
and consolidation, or to use Marxist terms, the 
creation of a new ruling class. 
None of this suggests that the sacred is not 
at the centre of all political activity. It simply 
means that who defines the sacred, which is an 
arbitrary process but not an arbitrary matter, is 
best able to do this at a national level in this 
historical period. This nationalisation of the 
sacred corresponds to the way in which capital 
functions currently. Despite all the arguments 
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about globalisation, the state still plays a central 
role in the capitalist cycle of accumulation. That 
the nation-state is the most efficacious form of 
this apparatus currently is obvious (Amin, 
1996:34). But the issue under consideration is 
why this is the case. 
An explanation might be found in 
reconsidering the economy in relation to identity. 
In crude terms, the state has mirrored property in 
the form of capital in terms of its reach in 
society. Where property has been social or 
communal, as in so-called primitive societies, 
meaning those that do not conform to Western 
technological-military standards, the state is 
communal. Once the economy becomes privately 
owned and controlled, by leaders or chiefs, this 
communal character begins to change. The 
degree of centralisation of power in the form of 
the state coincides with the narrowing of the 
ownership of wealth and the extension of the 
territory within which such patterns of ownership 
occur. This function of the state can only be 
effective where the state has a homogenising 
role, in other words, where it effectively creates 
the kind of hegemony for it's functioning without 
necessarily having recourse to the continued 
direct use of force or violence, although 
establishing this hegemony certainly seems to 
entail the use of force. As Debray shows, this 
process develops from the family to the modern 
nation-state. But this development is a matter of 
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the form rather than the principle of 
organisation. 
We have to consider: What are the 
corresponding forms of identity that coincide with 
the various moments in the development of the 
state, private property, and the division of 
labour? It then becomes obvious that these are 
the family, the clan/tribe/phratry, the empire and 
the church, the modern nation-state and the 
political party. In these examples it is also clear 
that the localising versus universalising 
contradiction only becomes an issue between 
various collective identities when universal 
culture, in the form of the printed word becomes 
a significant feature of reality for the vast 
numbers of people. The most important feature of 
all these societies is that they all involve elites, 
in relation to the family the male as dominant 
individual, the king in the empire, and the 
national movement and its leaders in the latter. 
In this respect symbolic efficacy functions to 
facilitate description of the unit which forms the 
"us". As development takes place this us take 
son a different form. The division of labour and 
the success of various modes of production in 
generating a surplus all provide the opportunity 
for redefining the identity of the group. Patterns 
of these groups are obviously left for social 
theorists to study and describe. In the context of 
the expanding frontier of the collective these 
definitions take place, but are always and 
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everywhere contested. However, they do not take 
place outside of the class struggle. 
This description of society as the perpetual 
frontier assists us in understanding claims to 
knowledge as located in the colonial situations. 
There are always relationships of power 
involved, and these need to be considered when 
we are analysing who is describing the political 
situation at hand. In this regard, culture is better 
understood as layers of symbolic opportunities 
within which people attempt to operate and stake 
their claims to power and knowledge. What 
determines the hegemony of these claims is not 
their authenticity but their material basis, that 
is, the organised force that vouches for them. 
To appreciate this process, it may be 
necessary to redefine what we mean by 
colonialism. As frontier relations, colonialism 
need not necessarily be located in far off lands 
or be defined without a class content. 
Colonialism can be discerned in any relational 
situation where there are two counterposing 
groups, one aggressive and dominant and the 
other defensive. This could take place at the 
level of the development from society as the 
family to the clan/tribe, or from the feudal village 
to the nation. The issue is to what extent a 
discourse successfully articulates the physical 
process of othering, displacement, and conquest 
that go along with any colonial situation. 
Obviously, this does not detract from the unique 
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experience of those people living in communities 
which were invaded and occupied physically 
under the classic colonial conquests. This 
redefinition serves to demonstrate that the 
relations of power and knowledge in this 
situation are very similar, if not identical to 
those experienced by oppressed groups, even 
within a nation. Gender oppression serves as a 
graphic illustration of this relation. 
Imperialism is defined by Lenin as being a 
particular stage of capitalism with specific 
features (1976:83). It could equally be defined 
as the outcome of the colonial process, which 
includes the period of concentration of 
production, monopolies, the export of capital, 
and the division of spoils in relation to all 
aspects of social existence, that is economic as 
well as symbolic. In this way we can understand 
that along with the particular economic factors of 
imperialism there are symbolic features that not 
only mirror but actually facilitate this system. In 
this respect, the rigid ownership, control, and 
utilisation of the sacred should be understood as 
a significant feature of colonial and imperial 
projects. 
Ownership of the sacred must be located 
within an effective unit if it is to function and 
facilitate the necessary cohesion for the market 
to operate under specific conditions. Here 
nationalism becomes significant. Not only does it 
realise the aim of the bourgeoisie by facilitating 
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the necessary homogenisation that is required 
for commodity production and exchange, but 
nationalism also provides the fighting unit which 
may be called on to protect the sacred in a 
society and even the aggressive accumulation of 
the necessary raw material for the satisfaction of 
the logic of the system of individual ownership of 
private property. By defining the other, 
nationalism facilitates the necessary military and 
political cohesion for the maintenance of private 
property, that is capital, in a global market. In 
other words, nation-states cannot be understood 
outside of the logic of a world system of these 
states (Amin, 1996:27). They are the necessary 
unit of capitalist commodity production and 
exchange, 
In this regard socialism can be redefined 
not as being in opposition to nationalism, but as 
being necessary to resolve the contradiction of 
nationalism. Socialism represents the actual and 
proverbial last frontier, for the time being 
anyway. It resolves the national question 
because it requires the negotiation between 
national units to facilitate peaceful production 
and exchange. This may be misunderstood as 
being utopian if it is taken to mean the voluntary 
commitment to those process by all nation-
states. 8 ut if taken to mean the extension of 
hegemony after the physical capture of the 
necessary strategic terrain to effect such an 
agreement, then this is not necessarily utopian. 
Such an approach does not require ignoring or 
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denying, or negating the national. Nevertheless, 
it requires entering a frontier where, along with 
.a II other identities, the nat i on a I w i II be 
renegotiated. 
Property and Identity 
Accordingly, the contradiction between the 
universalising trend of the market and the 
localising trend of nationalism is revealed not to 
be a contradiction but a site of struggle. No 
identities arise out of thin air, as it were. In that 
respect, the primordialists are correct. But the 
symbolic material with which such identities are 
constructed may well be imagined and even 
fictitious. Where the primordialists must give way 
to the modernists is in accepting that this 
process can only take the character it does with 
the necessary development of productive 
relations and technology that are to be found in 
the commodity market. 
In reality, the extent of an identity is 
defined by the function of property. Hence, 
identity is the same whether regarded as tribal, 
feudal, or national. It is the territory that differs 
and the extent of the identity differs accordingly. 
In modern culture, identity has been 
individualised by the market and the pursuit of 
commodities to satisfy individual needs. The 
confusion between individual identity and class 
conscioussness can only be resolved 
organisationally. Similarly, the nation rs not 
subdividing into smaller regional and local ethnic 
184 
identities. If anything the opposite is true at the 
level of the homogenisation of culture that is a 
feature of contemporary capital. What is 
occurring is that within the broader 
deterritorialisation of identity, local units of 
organisation have become more strategic. To that 
extent identity is fragmenting, but not as an 
overall feature. 
It is in relation to the definition of the 
sacred that the economic and religious nature of 
society has to be understood. Firstly, as Marx 
has pointed out, the commodity takes on a life 
and power of its own in the cycle of production, 
exchange, and consumption. There is no denying 
that the commodity has been demarcated as a 
sacred aspect of society. Whether in the form of 
private property or the desired objects of 
consumer culture, commodities play a central 
role in the rituals, practices, and observances 
that identify these objects as sacred. Typically, 
identities of people, stereotypes, are partly 
determined by the relationship of individuals to 
property and to commodities in general. The 
example of the definition of what it is to be 
American, which is a national identity, is literally 
meaningless without the notion of private 
property, of abundant possession, and 
consumption of commodities. The emergence of 
this tendency in Cuba after the reform program 
has been observed by at least one commentator. 
According to Francois Houtart, not only have the 
contradictions of the market and the pursuit of 
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wealth generated a new individualism, but that 
the disjuncture between the increasing demands 
for commodities and the failure of the system to 
deliver them equitably has resulted in an 
increased role for religion. In his explanation of 
the functioning ·of religion in this context, 
Houtart asserts that where "individuals cannot 
resolve problems on the material level they try to 
find a solution in the symbolic field" (1997:47-
48). Following Debray, however, we need to 
recognise that the material and symbolic operate 
on the same field as each other. 
Secondly, symbolic resources have become 
commodities in their own right in developed or 
technologically advanced capitalist societies. 
The image now plays a particularly important 
function, because of the increasing significance 
of the symbolic in the individualising tendency of 
the market economy, but also because of the 
technological advances that have made the mass 
consumption of this form possible. In his recent 
work on mediology, Debray has investigated what 
he identifies as the three ages of the image, 
namely, "writing, printing and audio-visual" 
(1995:531). These ages of the image represent a 
history of "the mediations through which an idea 
or visual representation becomes a material 
force" (1995:530). 
In this respect, the decline in national 
hegemony is significant only because it flows 
from the individualisation process of the market. 
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But this does not weaken the nation-state as an 
entity, or the nationalist discourse through which 
power and knowledge are appropriated, 
articulated, and deployed. The individual space 
created by the nation is not threatened by the 
process of exploration of this space. It is only 
necessary to close this space when the collective 
is under attack, since this space, the identity 
that goes with the organising of the nation, 
stands as defined until it is superseded by 
another collective identity. Individuals may 
explore other identities, may even hold multiple 
identities, but these must be under the gaze of 
the prevailing identity of the capitalist era. That 
identity is the national identity. 
Nationalism is therefore a feature of 
capitalist society that articulates the constant 
process of incorporation and interpellation of 
subjects. As this system stabilises, the 
hegemony of nationalism creates the necessary 
space for individuals to reclaim the part of 
themselves sacrificed for the creation of the 
collective. South Africa has been no different in 
this regard. The history of accumulation and the 
configuration of current ownership patterns in 
relation to property contains the riddle of our 
own national question and perhaps an answer to 
it. 
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Chapter 5: The National Question in South 
Africa 
The South African Constitution declares that 
the country is founded on the principles of non-
racialism and non-sexism, grants all citizens 
common citizenship, and these principles are 
described as the foundation for a united and 
democratic country (1996:1,3). Any outsider who 
knew little about the history of the country would 
be tempted to conclude that the national 
question is not an issue in South Africa. But the 
same constitution recognises certain rights of 
"cultural, religious or linguistic communities" 
(1996:15). Under the section of the constitution 
dealing with State Institutions Supporting 
Constitutional Democracy, there is a provision 
for a Commission for the Promotion and 
Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious 
and Linguistic Communities. While these 
inclusions do not necessarily undermine the 
united, democratic, and non-racial focus of the 
constitution, these described rights and the 
suggested institution do remain rather curious. It 
again requires knowledge of the history of the 
country to understand what are these measures 
which were taken to manage the national 
question in the new democracy. 
A brief consideration of this history is 
therefore necessary to locate the national 
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question in South Africa. Debray's thesis has 
serious implications for addressing the issue of 
nationalism in a multi-cultural society, more 
specifically with the legacy of colonialism, 
imperialism, apartheid, and capitalism. It is also 
I 
instructive to note that for a significant number 
of South Africans, socialism remains a pertinent 
political issue. Given Debray's arguments on the 
nature of revolution, this matter requires some 
attention. Historically, the national question in 
South Africa must be located in the transition 
from apartheid to democracy and in relation to 
the future hopes that many people hold for the 
trajectory of the national democratic revolution. 
Debray's theory provides a significant framework 
for considering the South African experience of 
the national question. To consider this 
experience sympathetically it is important to at 
least consider the relevance of the most 
important historical occurences that are relevant 
to the issue of nationalism in South Africa. 
The History of the National Question in South 
Africa 
It should be remembered that there is a 
history of inhabitants of the country that 
precedes the era of written record. Pre-colonial 
South Africa was a thriving society. The 
formation of communities, and patterns of 
conquest, resistance, defeat, and incorporation 
have left their imprints for any observer to 
peruse. The various communities that existed in 
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the era before the colonial conquest of what is 
today South Africa would have been much like 
those described as existing in ancient Greece by 
Thomson (1941 ). The patterns of language, 
chieftainship, and the residue of development at 
the time suggest vital communities that were to 
only later be defined as tribes by the colonists. 
In so far as these identities were pre-capitalist, 
nationalities would perhaps be the wrong 
description, but to the communities at the time, 
however they described themselves, it is as 
accurate a description in terms of the subjective 
experience then and now. 
During the era of the colonial conquests a 
number of features of nationalism that Debray's 
theory describes emerged. On the one hand, 
there was the imperialist discourse of the 
invaders. The main originating strands of this 
particular nationalism were of course Dutch and 
English. These settlers spoke of the right to own 
an d d e v e I o p t h e I a n d , a n d to e d u c a t e a n d c i v i I i s e 
the indigenous people. All of this was done in 
the name of an allegedly superior identity, that 
of the civilised European (Chidester, 1996e:5-29; 
O'Meara, 1996:40-43). But this was not all. As 
the settlers began to establish themselves, bring 
up children, build permanent establishments, 
their own ·experiences at the hands of the 
imperialist began to generate an independent 
articulation of settler interests. This emergent 
settler nationalism placed the settler population 
between the indigenous people on the one hand 
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and the imperial masters on the other. They saw 
their own interests being best served by 
expressing their identity as separate from these 
two other identities. 
The response of the indigenous people is as 
revealing. In opposition to the powerful 
colonialists an emerging unity between fairly 
diversified and independent communities is 
detectable. Where once there were a number of 
communities, the response to colonialism begins. 
to unify the conquered as their common 
experience and common enemy becomes the most 
enduring feature of their changing world. There 
were of course shifting patterns of identity that 
were not purely or simply prompted by the 
colonial invaders. The nation building project of 
a Shaka, for instance, was due to population 
expansion and a particular level of development 
that was reached independently of the colonial 
intrusion. During the twentieth century, however, 
the main motor of change that encouraged 
patterns of urbanisation that began to break 
down local agrarian and feudal based identities 
was the economy. Arguably, this process 
stimulated the birth and subsequent development 
of an African nationalism (Meli, 1988b: 1-29; 
Mzala, 1988a:30-41; Jordan, 1988: 111-114). 
The end of the colonial wars and the 
subsequent experience of the indigenous people 
is one dominated by forced segregation and later 
apartheid. In the attempt to liberate their land 
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from the colonialists the indigenous people 
formed their own organisations. Essentially it is 
this period that saw the violent struggle and 
conflict between, on the one hand racist 
Afrikaner nationalism, and on the other an 
African nationalism. This struggle sees the 
attempt, by force of arms, of the White minority 
to stop the process of nation formation by the 
majority of South Africans. 
The remainder of the people, the English 
speaking whites, and the predominantly 
Afrikaans speaking coloured people, as well as 
the Indian and other significant black minorities, 
found themselves somewhere in between these 
two opposing groups. The groups who found 
themselves in South Africa for various reasons 
pertaining to colonialism, articulated their 
interests in a particular manner, parasitic and 
contingent on the two main contending 
nationalist projects. The specific identities of 
these minorities were later to re-emerge as a 
survivalist response to the changes brought 
about by democracy. But during the apartheid era 
these identities play completely different roles, 
due also to the artificial and official nature of 
these sub-national identities. For example, most 
black people who were not of predominantly 
indigenous extraction, that is, who came from the 
coloured or Indian minorities, made a conscious 
choice to ally themselves with one or other of the 
dominant nationalist projects or to remain 
neutral. Early developments made such a choice 
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seem a simple one, but towards the time of the 
negotiated settlement the matter became more 
complicated. 
The attempts by the former regime to create 
sub-national identities out of the remnants of 
historical identities are a classic example of 
what results from mistaking the symbolic 
representation of nationalism for the actual 
nation, movement, and the process of nation 
formation. The apartheid regime sought to create 
independent countries in geographical areas 
where, in its own view, tribal groupings had 
originated. The resultant Bantustans were a 
complete failure, primarily because the people 
who were allocated to them did not accept the 
country, its borders, or the identity that went 
with it. The only examples where there has been 
some success in this project has been in the 
creation of a, temporarily, formidable Zulu 
national movement in KwaZulu-Natal and in 
relation to coloured people in the Western Cape. 
These cases have some significant differences, 
but what is similar is the extent to which 
organisation was the primary motive force in the 
development of these identities. It is arguable 
that coloured identity for example, is actually 
multiple variants of an identity that is essentially 
in opposition to the two extremes of Black and 
White identities created by apartheid. It is 
therefore not a nationalism as such that binds 
these people together but a fear of the other 
(Rasool, 1995). 
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The anti-apartheid struggle in the post 
Second World War era saw the articulation of a 
progressive nationalism by the national 
liberation forces in South Africa. The call for a 
united, non-racial, non-sexist, and democratic 
political dispensation is premised on the idea 
that all South Africans are equal, regardless of 
race, religion, sex or creed. There are, of 
course, responses that reject this identity to 
some or other degree. But the extent to which 
South Africans agree that they are a nation now 
is marked. The apartheid project attempted to 
separate the people of South Africa physically, 
by defining them linguistically, in terms of skin 
colour, religion, and in terms of perceived 
historical ethnic and tribal identities. In this 
project a geography and political economy of 
apartheid was developed. It is this level of 
organisation that any national project in South 
Africa must unravel if it is to successfully build 
an alternative nationalism. The emphasis of the 
nation building project in South Africa must be 
on revolution in terms of the geography and the 
political economy of the country. 
What this potted history reveals is a number 
of things. Firstly, the new nation can trace its 
origins, but what is significant is that the point 
of origin can vary, depending on who is tracing 
the origin and for what purpose. For the 
generation of African leaders that are the now 
the elders in the struggle against apartheid it is 
arguable that the nation was born on January 8, 
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1912. For the generation of the non-racial 
defiance campaign era the origins of the nation 
are at Kliptown in 1955 at the People's Congress 
that adopted the Freedom Charter. Those that 
were too young to remember this event and 
joined the national liberation movement in the 
1980's would probably see any of these dates 
and all of them as relevant. For the rest of the 
population who either supported the new 
dispensation post 1990 or 1994, the starting 
point of the nation is April 27, 1994. Clearly, 
there are South Africans who have been just that 
for longer periods than others. All of these 
markers can be located organisationally and 
historically. 
Similarly the inscription of the nation has 
varied. It started out being just Africans in 
response to colonial conquest. In the 1950s it 
became Africans plus Coloureds, Indians, and 
progressive White people. In 1994 it became all 
those who live in South Africa and swear 
allegiance to the constitution. 
But it is not as if the old identities have 
been completely discarded. They survive to the 
extent that the people who were mobilised by 
these identities require them. It is the case that 
these survivals are the cause of a great deal of 
anxiety for the new ruling political organisation 
that seeks to lead the process of building the 
united, non-racial, non-sexist democracy, for 
various liberals that see nothing but instability 
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arising from sectional racial and ethnic interests, 
and from the various spokespersons, either self-
appointed or elected, of the various minorities. 
The strategy of the national liberation movement 
has been to relocate the organisations that 
attempt to articulate the interests connected to 
these survivals. Hence the location of the 
Afrikaner self-determination process in the 
constitution of the new South Africa, the struggle 
for the location of Zulu identity between the ANC 
and the IFP in KwaZulu-Natal, and for the mantle 
of the representative of the Coloured majority in 
the Western Cape. To the extent that the ANC 
has adopted this strategy it has been successful, 
for example in demobilising Afrikaner 
nationalism. To the extent that it hasn't it is still 
not in political power, for example in the Western 
Cape. 
The sacred can be detected in the discourse 
of various movements that exist in South Africa. 
The democratic movement appeals to the sacred 
nature of the doctrine of non-racialism, to the 
blood of it's martyrs, to the hallowed ground 
where the new democracy now functions from 
(Meli, 1988b:7-14). The Afrikaner nationalists 
appeal to the sacred Fatherland on which 
Afrikaner blood has been spilled, to the church 
and the God that granted them their Israel 
(Chidester, 1992a:6-8). Various people classified 
as coloured find the sacred in the spot where the 
slave tree stood in Cape Town (Weeder, 1996). 
The Griqua people see it in their forefathers land 
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of which they have been dispossessed. English-
speaking white South Africans may find it in the 
private school that upholds the values they 
regard as the cornerstone of "civilisation" as 
they see it. 
All of these beliefs and the practices that 
go along with them reveal the process of the 
manufacture of and the manipulation of symbolic 
resources. Most indigenous South Africans would 
have at the time of the launch of the ANC defined 
themselves as either Xhosa, Zulu, Sotho, or 
otherwise. The adoption of a flag, manifesto, and 
a leadership in 1912 constituted the raw material 
out of which a nation could be forged. The 
symbolic acts of constituting an organisation to 
represent the African people was both 
constituted by and constitutive of the new 
national identity. 
As time went by and the various individuals 
mobilised themselves and others in a practical 
manner against the segregationist policies of the 
settler community they literally forged a nation. 
The line can be traced from the first leader, the 
first meetings and the first declarations of 
nationhood, in the most obvious case by 
aggressive, young leaders in the ANC in the 
1940' and 1950's, but detectable even at the 
founding of the liberation movement (Chidester, 
1992b:223, 225). The idea of a return to a moral 
order that had collapsed was clearly audible in 
the dis'course of these founders of the new 
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nation who insisted that the diverse communities 
of South Africa were a nation. 
Similarly, the functioning of myth and ritual 
can be detected in the history of Afrikaner 
nationalism. The myth of the Great Trek, the 
Covenant between God and the Afrikaner people, 
the development of the language, Afrikaans, are 
all manufactured by a movement and, in this case 
a r e I i g i o u s e I i t e a t t h e h e a d of fh i s m o v e m e n t. 
The formation of various organisations saw the 
rise of the Afrikaner nation. The origins of 
Afrikaner nationalism lie in the response of the 
Free Burghers to colonial dictate, the accepted 
practice of colonialism at the time. The creation 
of a political party, the National Party, was only 
one significant moment in the manufacture of the 
Afrikaner national identity (O'Meara, 1996). 
Debray's schema also enables us to detect 
a number of other things about the nation 
building process in South Africa. Not only is it 
contested, but the forces that are ranged against 
each other have specific strategic options they 
may or may not deploy. For instance, many of the 
perceived ethnic, or sub-national, identities are 
closely related to the provincial boundaries that 
have been created in the negotiations process 
that led to the adoption of the interim and final 
constitutions. These may in the future be utilised 
for national movements. The decisions in this 
regard will ·depend on the various leadership 
figures, the arti·culation of local interests, 
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distribution of resources, and the extent to which 
any of these groups of people can effectively 
organise themselves. The extent to which this is 
possible is to some degree captured in the 
predominant theoretical description of the 
transition and the nation-building project 
articulated by the ANC and the Tri-Partite 
Alliance. 
The national question and the transition to 
democracy and socialism 
The issues of non-racialism, national 
sovereignty, national rights for groups, and 
national unity were all addressed in the Freedom 
Charter adopted in 1955 and could be traced 
back to the 1949 Youth League programme (ANC, 
1985:72-78). But the main theoretical formulation 
that has guided the national liberation movement 
was first clearly articulated in the Road to South 
African Freedom, the 1962 programme of the 
South African Communist Party. The formulation 
of an analysis that guided the building of the 
national liberation movement was and continues 
to be a contested issue (Vadi, 1995: 171-175). 
The thesis of Colonialism of a Special Type and 
the theory of the National Democratic Revolution 
were systematically articulated in the 1962 SACP 
programme (SACP, 1962:22-35,42-46). These 
were later adopted at the Morogoro Conference 
of the ANC in 1969. 
This thesis recognised the formation of 
communal identities based on the patterns of 
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indigenous communities, the colonial encounter, 
the apartheid system, and the dominant features 
of the capitalist economic system. The 
programme characterised the situation as a 
special type of colonialism, where the oppressor 
and oppressed resided in one territory, but where 
relations of power were essentially as in any 
colony. The programme defined the main 
objective of the revolution to be the liberation of 
African people. The programme explicitly states 
that the Party's proposal is not for a "socialist 
state" but for a "national democratic one" (SACP, 
1962:46). This position has its origins in the 
famous Black Republic Thesis of the Comintern, 
but the extent to which this was simply endorsed 
by the CPSA or debated by the structures of the 
Party is a matter of divergent opinion. Later 
refinements of this theory begin to grapple with 
the complex nature of the nation-building project 
and the qualitative nature of the national 
democratic revolution (SACP, 1989:35-36; SACP, 
1992:17). 
Much of this theory has guided the ANC as 
well. The theoretical development that guided the 
liberation movement took place across the 
organisations, but there was and arguably still is 
a definite Marxist basis to the ANC theorisation 
of the national question. As the ANC's 1994 
Strategy and Tactics document explains, the main 
feature of the revolution is still the "all round 
political, economic and social emancipation and 
upliftment of the black majority", Africans in 
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particular, and the i•achievement of national 
unity" (ANC Strategy and Tactics, 1994:6.5, 5.5). 
The mere fact that liberation is premised on the 
social, economic, and political advancement of 
the mass of people reveals a strong adherence to 
many of the ,views articulated by Marxists in this 
regard. There is no romantic or idealistic notion 
of the nation that sees it emerging out of some 
primordialist ethnic past, for instance. 
But what will determine the success or 
failure of the nation-building project in South 
Africa is not simply the theoretical formulation of 
the path of the revolution, although this is 
important in terms of informing the strategy and 
tactics of the movement. As Debray shows, what 
is important is the extent to which a movement is 
built that strategically forges the nation. The 
notion of the nation in the making is a persistent 
theme in the discourse of the ANC and the 
Alliance (Jordan, 1988:114-119; ANC, 1997:58). 
But there is also a clear discourse 
articulating nationalist sentiments and even the 
practice of nationalism as religion. In the context 
of the struggle for national liberation and the 
violence of apartheid, this nationalism has been 
characterised as a violent religion, for example, 
or a force for redemption and liberation 
(Chidester, 1992b:88, 92, 235). 
Chidester has also noted the importance of 
symbols in the national democratic revolution 
(1992b:171). As Vadi observed in relation to the 
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Freedom Charter, none of these symbols is 
uncontested. Wolpe has also noted the contested 
.. 
nature of nationalism and class, both as 
concepts and in relation to ·the trajectory of the 
transition (1988:48-49) . 
. Alternative characterisations of the 
transition in the country ·have attempted to 
interpret this process as e I if e· driven · rather than 
mass based, as the ANC claims it is (Kotze and 
DuToit, 1996: 1-17). The strategy of these 
claimants would seem to b·e to· try to reduce the 
legitimacy of the transition and the ANC by 
c I a i m i n ·g t h a f t 1h e o r g· a n i s a t i o n i s a n e I i t e 
grouping not rooted in a mass base. The answer 
that Debray seems to offer in this regard is that 
all movements are led by elites.· The issue is 
w h a t i s t he c h ar a c t e r o f t h a t e I i t e a n d t h e p r o j e c t 
that they are leading and whether they 'are 
accountable to a mass base. 
On the other extreme the transition has 
even been hailed as a ll)iracle. This discourse 
emanates even from the ANC itself 
{ 
(Guelke,1996:141). Guelke's response to this has 
been to try to identify the myths of the political '. 
. p r o c e s s a ·n d t o r e i n t e r p r e t t h i s p r o c e s s i n t e r m s 
of the objectives of those propagating the myths. 
A g a i n o n e i s t e m p t e d t o c i t e D e b r ay ' s p o i n t t h a t 
a movement without myths cannot be a 
movement. The issue is what is the objective of 
the movement and who is manufacturing and 






The debates on the national question have 
in some cases, taken on a hysterical tone. In the 
province of the Western Cape, for instance, the 
issue of the national question has been 
conducted in the context of an ANC defeated at 
the polls by the NP and the rise of some extreme 
forms of narrow ethnic identities that have been 
characterised as being in opposition to one 
another. At times it has seemed that 
commentators do not even want to use ethnic 
terms for fear of mobilising the darker side of 
ethnicity (Alexander, 1995). The debate on 
nationalism, ethnicity, and identity is conducted 
in the open in the Western Cape because of the 
demographic situation which essentially ensures 
the political organisation that secures the vote of 
the majority of Coloured people an electoral 
victory. But the dominant response to the 
national question in South Africa, despite the 
theory to prove the contrary, has been one of 
superstition, fear, and dread. Generally, until 
recently, those in the liberation movement have 
preferred not to even talk about ethnicity, 
possible national disintegration, or strife, for 
fear of awakening a phenomenon by mentioning 
it. This response is not without foundation, given 
the history of the country and similar situations 
in the rest of Africa and former colonies, where 
anti-colonialist struggles have at times led to 
inter-racial strife, war, and genocide. 
There have been some notable exceptions 




national question which have begun to emerge 
(Nzimande,1996; Carrim, 1996; Dexter, 1996). 
The ANC has also released a discussion 
document for the 50 1h Conference ·of the 
movement to discuss which correctly finds that 
the "national question can never be fully 
resolved", but then goes on to say that this is 
not "merely" because the issue is a "material" 
one "related to various forms of power". In the 
view of the author(s) of this document, the 
national question is also "emotional and 
psychological" and in any case, "people will 
con t i n u e to have m u It i p I e i dent it i e s" (AN C , 
1997:57). It is easy to agree with parts of this 
view, in that it comes to the right conclusions, 
although not necessarily because of the correct 
theory and characterisation. Debray's thesis 
shows that it is precisely because the national 
question is material and deals with power that it 
is not easy or even possible to resolve. 
The confusion over terms such as nation 
and ethnicity is also not surprising. Given the 
h~story of these terms as deployed by the racist 
National Party regime, commentators are 
suspicious of any use of such terms that are not 
clearly located in the more critical academic 
framework (Sharpe, 1988:79-99). Any debate that 
is to resonate in the context of the national 
democratic revolution must re-appropriate these 
terms and locate them in the context of the 
national democratic revolution. There is also the 
problem of the generally Eurocentric nature of 
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the discourse in terms of debates (Pieterse, 
1996:54). These terms must be re-appropriated 
from this Eurocentric gaze as well. The debate 
about these terms has not faded and no doubt is 
one that will have to be given attention as the 
issues of nationalism and ethnicity become 
increasingly significant (Jubber, 1997: 156-170). 
Perhaps the most eloquent intervention with 
regard to the national question was made by the 
Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, on the occasion 
of the adoption of Constitution in May 1996. The 
Deputy President essentially claimed all the 
identities in South Africa and thus redefined his 
identity as an African while at the same time 
redefining the identities of all South Africans 
(1996). The issue however, is to what extent this 
identity, that is the nation, can be built in reality. 
The view that the national project is taking 
place in a particular international context and 
global conjuncture also needs to be interrogated. 
Previously, the analysis of the balance of 
domestic and international class forces was 
premised on the notion that the world was moving 
towards socialism and that national liberation 
struggles were part of that movement. This was 
clearly the view of those attending the ANC's 
1969 Conference in Morogoro and the 1985 
Conference in Kabwe. The new international 
context has been characterised in a number of 
ways. Reference is made to the new world order, 
the unipolar nature of this order, and the 
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p h e n o m e n o n of g I o b a Hs at i o n . T h e s e c a n n o t be 
properly considered here, but the point in terms 
of the national liberation struggle must surely be 
that there is no world tide away from capitalism 
towards socialism and there is no guarantee of 
any such movement in South Africa. This raises 
the issue of the national liberation movement 
having to address the issue of nationalism in this 
new capitalist world order that are 
simultaneously local and global. Some 
commentators have begun to point to possible 
strategies in this regard, but these discussions 
are preliminary and require considerable more 
detail (Amin, 1997). The notion of an African 
Renaissance has arisen in precisely this context. 
Once again, without the organisation to realise 
this renaissance, merely calling for it is simply 
reciting a wish rather than implementing a 
programme. 
Debray's theory creates the opportunity to 
have the debate about the terms we are using to 
describe the phenomenon of collective identity 
as well as the manner in which these identities 
are experienced in society. By reformulating the 
problem of the national question within a theory 
of symbolic efficacy, as Debray does, the debate 
about nationalism can be located in a historical, 
structural, political, social, and economic 
context. This could help remove the emotion and 
vested interests from the theoretical debate for 
one thing, but more importantly it will allow a 
sober debate, not so much about whether the 
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national question is an issue, because that 
seems to be obvious, but more about managing 
the national question given the nature of the 
symbolic. 
In short, Debray's thesis puts on the agenda 
the fact that the national question will not be 
resolved or dissolved. It is going to be with us 
for the foreseeable future. For those who 
propose that the transition should continue and 
move "in an uninterrupted progression to 
socialism", the fact of the national question 
presents a serious challenge (Mzala, 1988a:54). 
Given the multi-cultural character of South Africa 
the situat,ion seems infinitely more complicated 
than theory has catered for. But this need not 
lead us to a pessimistic position that sees 
democratic transformation, or even socialism, as 
a remote or impossible goal. 
Harnessing the Symbolic and Managing the 
National Question 
What Debray's thesis does 
explain the parameters within 
is basically 
which any 
democratic or socialist project must locate itself. 
Firstly, any political project must be able to 
grapple with the national question as a real 
issue. It is not sufficient to dismiss nationalism, 
national sentiment, or the nation-state as 
reactionary false consciousness. Secondly, the 
national question, like all political matters, is 
essentially a religious matter. Therefore 




on the basis of science or rationalism. Thirdly, 
any political project must be able to utilise the 
national sentiment to further the revolution. At 
the level of practicality these parameters 
suggest that for the transition to proceed to any 
socialist objective, and arguably for 
consolidation of democracy, nationalism must be 
given a progressive and even socialist content. 
This obviously means that those who lead the 
nation-building project must be democratic, 
progressive, and must articulate a progressive 
socialist national agenda. For this to be more 
than just symbolic it means ensuring that the 
manner in which the nation is defined "on the 
ground" is progressive. The sacred is not 
necessarily or inherently reactionary, but it is 
biased in favour of power, order, dogmatism, and 
orthodoxy. None of these degenerate features 
can be in the interests of the poor, the 
dispossessed, the marginalised, and the 
exploited. 
Current debates about the national question 
and the transition in South Africa reveal that 
there are at least two trajectories for the future 
of the national democratic revolution. The one 
sees nationalism as being coextensive with 
capitalism and even necessary to ensure the 
success of both capitalist growth and 
development. The other sees nationalism as a 
tool for the mobilisation of the South African 
poor and working class around some kind of a 
socialist project. While Debray's thesis points 
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out that the odds are against the second project 
succeeding, it is also clear that the first cannot 
succeed without abandoning the radical tradition 
of democracy and mass participation that has 
been a feature of the national liberation 
struggle. 
The key issue then is the character of the 
nationalism that is being built and articulated by 
the ANC. Other nationalisms may well exist and 
be articulated by national movements, but given 
the electoral results and subsequent opinion 
polls that confirm the strength and unity of the 
Tri-Partite Alliance, no other serious national 
movement can arise in the very near future. What 
is a real possibility if the ANC does not continue 
to mobilise its constituency behind the 
revolutionary project, is that this broad South 
African nationalism might degenerate into a 
number of sub-national movements based on 
existing ethno-cultural identities, or on the 
dictatorship of an unrepresentative, authoritarian 
e I ite. 
Given that the sacred is created in the 
process of organisation there may be a 
temptation to think that the answer is to simply 
start a movement. There may be times when this 
is necessary, but in the context of existing 
organisations, particularly now that they have 
captured institutions of power, the key strategic 
issue is to ensure that the sacred and the 
discourse that it facilitates is not monopolised by 
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a narrow, bureaucratic, elite. This would result in 
the degeneration of the national project. 
Historically, it has been the case that movements 
have become orthodoxies. Debray asserts that 
this is unavoidable. Even if it is, the extent to 
which that atrophycation occurs, the pace of this 
degeneration, and whether there is a possibility 
of a revival or renewal of the project is 
dependent on the extent to which this is allowed 
to occur by people. 
Awareness of the extent to which this 
degeneration is occurring depends on the 
demystification of the sacred. The primary 
facilitators of such a demystification are 
democracy and a radical pedagogy. In South 
Africa, we have the space to ensure these exist, 
mainly due to the forces that drive the 
revolutionary process. While they are united in 
the ANC, independent organisations exist that 
ensure a dynamic tension between the elite and 
the mass base. It is this tension, which never 
allows an absolute monopoly over the productive 
and managerial capacity of the sacred, that 
secures the continued success of the revolution. 
The continued success of the revolution thus 
requires a radical managerial project for the 
sacred. The only possible guarantee for this is to 
ensure that the national democratic revolution 
remains genuinely "people driven" and "mass 
based". 
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Historically, the South African revolution 
has suffered from a disjuncture between theory 
and practice. While the national question has 
been theorised in Marxist terms, the practice in 
dealing with it has been anything but Marxist in 
the classical sense. It is ironic that to end up 
with a theory that was flexible, marketable, 
strategic, and effective, Marxists had to 
construct that theory in terms of the prevailing 
discourse. But a closer analysis of the 
Colonialism of a Special Type thesis and the 
practice of the movement in relation to managing 
the national question, reveals that it recognises 
the importance of nationalism, the strategic 
nature of the symbolic, and the enduring 
character of the national question. All of this is 
done without any revision of Marxism, that is, 
without a coherent Marxist, or any other, theory 
of the national question. 
Even in terms of the national question 
currently, the ANC leadership display a unique 
sensitivity in dealing with the issue that ensures 
an important emphasis on the symbolic. This has 
led some to characterise the emerging 
nationalism in South Africa to be a kind of "rugby 
nationalism" with a flag, two national anthems, 
three popular sporting teams, and a President 
everyone loves. All of that is necessary, 
perhaps, but if the reality of the creation and 
management of the symbolic resources of the 
nation is ignored, this symbolism will very soon 
be found to be, literally, "up in the air". There is 
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therefore an unhealthy emphasis on the symbolic 
aspect of the sacred, leaving the production, 
ownership, and control of the sacred to be dealt 
with in a rather astrategic manner. 
The national liberation movement has 
generated the terms of the sacred that now 
dominate. The bearer of the national symbolic 
resources accepted by the majority has 
historically been the ANC. As an organisation the 
ANC now faces the challenge of ensuring it that 
keeps that historical role, and maintains its 
character as an organisation. This challenge is 
linked particularly to the issue of whether the 
ANC becomes a political party or remains a 
national liberation movement. It is tempting to 
say that Debray shows beyond any doubt that the 
latter option is the most strategic. The current 
disarray among opposition political parties in 
South Africa is essentially because they cannot 
even articulate a counterpoint to the symbolic 
power of the ANC. The ANC is the new South 
Africa and everything that is not ANC is part of 
the terrible past. Evidence of this is to be found 
in the two provinces that the ANC did not win in 
the 1994 election. These literally are in the 
past, both in terms of the political ideas the 
ruling parties propagate and the manner in which 
they function. 
The tension within the ANC between 
becoming an orthodoxy, or an organisation of a 
degenerate elite, as opposed to continuing to be 
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a revolutionary organisation will be found in the 
policies that the ANC adopts. The contradiction 
between the Marxist discourse that dominates the 
ANC-Ied Alliance and economic policies that are 
seen to favour financial capital, for example, is a 
symptom of this tension. 
The only trajectory of the revolution that 
will resolve this tension is the one that defines 
the nation in terms of a socialist future. If it is it 
matched on the ground with the appropriate 
organisation, such a vision defines as socialist 
everything that shifts resources, power, and 
influence away from the minority, even if that 
minority is a new elite, towards the majority, the 
poor, the dispossessed, the marginalised, and 
the exploited. The most powerful of these 
resources will be those that are generated by the 
religiopolitical unconscious through the 
organisation of the society in the nation-building 
process. In this continual process and unending 
project, the nation has to be defined in a 
movement that builds socialism in this manner. 
Currently, this is facilitated through an 
alliance between the working class and other 
classes from the former oppressed communities 
in an organisational relationship that ensures the 
working class the right to occupy a strategic 
relationship that allows them to manage, 
influence, and even control the sacred, that is, 
the symbolic resources of the national 
d e m o c r a t i c rev o I u t i o n . Th e i s s u e 0 e b r a y r a i s e s 
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is whether they will be able to sustain this 
advantage. The odds may be against it, because, 
as Barthes observed, myth, the power of 
discourse, is "always on the Right". The only 
possible response to such an assertion is that it 
is not in this case. If the revolution fails, if it 
degen~rates, if it collapses out of a fear of 
radicalism, or because of the tension between 
the pull of orthodoxy and the needs of the 
majority, it will be because the working class and 
the socialists in the movement did not speak to 
the founding absence and did not claim the 
symbolic resources that are a product of the work 
of organisation before them. Failure will be all 
the more ironic if it results from an unwillingness 
to engage with the obvious shortcomings of 
Marxist theory that Debray has revealed. 
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